


Southern Exposure

the military & the south



JULIAN BOND • WALTER COLLINS • DEREK SHEARER

ROBERT SHERRILL • LEAH WISE • HOWARD ROMAINE

As the South blends into the national picture, its problems are less unique, more national in character. Yet there is a continuing uniqueness to the region—both in its history of struggle and its possibilities for developing alternatives to the rest of America's crisis-prone growth.

In 1970, with the advent of an era characterized by rapid economic expansion, urban growth, "New South politics," and more subtle forms of racism, we founded the Institute for Southern Studies. Our staff is young, black and white, men and women who were active participants in the struggles of the sixties. With an appreciation for region/nation interrelations, we seek to offer imaginative strategies for social change. Our goal is to provide ideas, analyses, facts, and programs for groups and individuals building the South of the Seventies and beyond, to translate information into action for progressive change.

This first issue of our new journal focuses on the military and the South. In the following essays, militarism emerges not simply as one aspect of our society, but rather as the *modus operandi* of an expansionism which now threatens to turn our collective existence into a global Wasteland. The immediate and apocalyptic dichotomy between expansionism and waste perhaps best describes the theme that runs throughout these essays, the integrating reality of militarism in a "post-scarcity" society.

Julian Bond, Leah Wise and Walter Collins articulate the racism involved in furthering democracy's cause by "wasting" Vietnamese villagers, as Lt. Calley called it, or by draining the black community of its leaders and then dumping the "unusable" black veteran back on America's scrap heaps. And former Lockheed Aircraft employee, Henry Durham, unveils the scandal of giant corporations squandering billions of public dollars while human needs go unmet.

How are such obvious absurdities justified? Congressmen William Proxmire and Les Aspin confess they can't find the answer to such questions. And Howard Romaine's tale of a CIA college professor suggests that much of academia has simply embraced the privilege of planning what's

right for the rest of the world rather than maintain any semblance of applying critical analyses to the alternatives.

There are alternatives, of course, and Derek Shearer's plan of converting military facilities into publicly-owned economic coops is certainly one that makes sense. But perhaps the first step is simply to face the fact that America can, and should, no longer waste its resources and its lives to insure its capability of defining how other countries—any other country, anywhere—behave. The review of recent books by former Pentagon cost experts, policy advisors, and professional soldiers reveals their collective recognition that an endless pattern of international expansion and domestic growth through military waste is doomed to failure. There is no progress in militarism—only glittering decay.

With its disproportionate share of military bases, defense jobs, and Congressional power, the South has long built its political economy on the military dollar, and reflects in its internal development that waste/growth contradiction. We hope the special section on southern militarism will hasten a broader discussion of alternative methods for this region—and the nation—to survive and develop.

Future issues of *Southern Exposure* will focus on other Institute projects, such as the *Roots of Southern Struggle*, a project designed to recapture the popular history of social and political struggle during the turbulent 1930's and 40's, and the *Corporate Power* study of the operations of multi-national businesses in the region. Other articles on southern prisons, urban power structures, agri-business, the co-operative movement, and labor and university organizing are being planned.

We encourage your ideas and your participation in the journal. Articles and book reviews are welcome. The Institute is tax-exempt, and depends on private contributions for its existence. Gifts of \$10 or more receive a complimentary subscription to *Southern Exposure*. Regular subscription rate is \$8.00. All correspondence should be addressed to *The Institute for Southern Studies*, P.O. Box 230, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514.

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VIOLENCE and GENOCIDE:

the american way of growth and expansion

By Julian Bond and Leah Wise

When Rap Brown said in 1967, "Violence is as American as cherry pie," he shocked most Americans with a truth they had knowingly suppressed. His statement was meant in the same context—and was accepted as equally blasphemous—as Malcolm X's remark, "Chickens come home to roost," following the assassination of JFK. The tradition of violence in America is rooted in its birth as a nation. The political act (the Declaration of Independence), if you will remember, followed the "first shot" by a year or so—a pattern in incident and style which became the precedent for expansion West. Steeped in a history punctuated by war every two decades or so, the nation as a whole, despite regional and cultural variants, uniformly developed a dedication to violence as a means to solve its problems. The use of violence to intimidate, conquer, and liquidate emerged directly as a tool of expansion when whites banded together with their superior weapons to kill the native Americans and steal their land, and as a tool of enslavement, to obtain the most profitable labor supply and guarantee its security through the use of terrorizing slave patrols. These were the early beginnings of volunteer militarism in America, and it is important to recognize that they were organized against non-white people.

Of course rationalizations discrediting the humanity of the victims developed to justify these acts of violence. Indians were defined as savage agents of the devil. Black people were viewed as subhuman chattel worthy only of enslavement. Similarly, Mexicans and, later, the Filipinos needed to be exposed to civilization. And so the arguments prevail. Thus, racism and militarism combined to help define and implement the economic exigencies of this developing capitalist nation.

It was in the South, however, in the culture of the gentleman soldier, the virginal southern belle and the black slave, where the violence of racism and militarism became particularly entrenched in daily life. Boasting of warmth and chivalry on the

one hand while perpetrating brutality and violence on the other, the South developed a siege mentality in defense of its "peculiar institution" and its later forms. Vigilante action (voluntary militarism with lynching style) was key to maintaining the intimidation of the black populace and, hence, the status quo. But the penetration of violence went even deeper. It became the means to prove one's manhood, be it random or organized, sports or beatings. Of course, the victim was constant—the black man. Politicians built their careers condemning blacks—a successful tactic obscuring the twin issues of economic ills and class suppression. Furthermore, war stimulated the industrialization of the region. What better evidence of the efficacy of violence?

It is no wonder, then, that the South has become the training ground for the American fortress. The South today has more military bases and more soldiers per capita than any other region in the nation. It boasts the highest percentage of gun-owning households. In addition, of the twenty cities with the highest murder rates in the country eighteen are southern.

To be sure, in recent years violence in American life has become paramount in the American consciousness. While whites lambast urban crime (robbery, muggings, murders and rapes) and view it as a recent surge of violence in the society, blacks and other minorities witness the vigorous resurgence of an age-old trend of random and premeditated violence against us: police attacks (highlighted by the Algiers Motel incident and the murders of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark), conspiracy charges (against such folk as the Panthers, the RAM 17—a group of black school teachers, Rap Brown and Angela Davis), campus assaults (at Orangeburg, Southern University, Texas Southern and Jackson State), the maintenance of concentration camps, the disproportionate number of blacks incarcerated, the greater percentage of blacks drafted and killed in



LNS

Song My, Viet Nam, 1968

Vietnam, repressive legislation like the no-knock and preventative detention laws of the D.C. Crime Control Act, increased monies for "law and order" equipment and tactical police squads while social service funds are cut, the revelation of the federally financed genocidal Tuskegee Institute syphilis study, and the institutionalized violence that keeps the infant mortality rate of blacks twice that of whites. But, it is with the war in Vietnam that the American sense of the legitimacy of violence has reached its zenith.

With US policy in Vietnam, the American commitment to violence has become a commitment to genocide. In meeting the new requirements demanded by imperialism and neo-colonialism, the skills of intimidation have developed into skills of liquidation. The primary purpose of American involvement in the Vietnam war, other than the desire to secure a Pacific line of defense to encircle China, is its admonitory value: to defeat a People's war in order to discourage similar struggles elsewhere where the US has direct, substantial interests. Because a People's war is grounded in the support of the populace (which provides the guerrilla armies with food, shelter, invisibility and troops), to the opposition the people become the enemy. To defeat the guerrillas you must destroy their base—the people. Thus, genocide (as defined by the Geneva Convention of Dec. 9, 1948)* has emerged as the effective anti-guerrilla strategy. In other colonial situations the direct economic interests of the colonial power serve to temper the instinct toward extermination. This is not the case in Vietnam. In fact extermination of the Vietnamese could only provide the optimum



LNS

Augusta, Ga., 1970

example. For the United States is determined to quiet Che Guevara's call, "We need more Vietnams." The US is anxious to demonstrate to Latin America especially, and Africa and Asia that the Vietnamese example is useless: the Vietnamese might prove to be valiant, but they'd also be dead!

The bombings—a major plank of this policy—might be viewed as white-mail or conditional genocide (submit or we'll bomb you to hell), but it is no less genocide. US bombs did, after all, aim at the systematic destruction of the economic base of the country, from the dikes to the factories, and of the morale, attacking mostly rural populations, hospitals, schools and places of worship. The escalation of the bombings to populated zones of Hanoi and Haiphong succeeded in its purpose of softening world opinion toward genocide. Thereafter, much of the public did come to view the bombings as a legitimate tactic to get the "enemy" to the bargaining table and to more readily accept massive extermination if negotiations did not ensue.

But the bombings of the North are not the only aspect of American policy that demonstrates

genocidal act and intent. In the south, the defoliation of crops and vegetation, the burning of villages, the shooting of livestock, and the subjection of the populace to massive bombing, indiscriminate shooting, murder, rape and looting equally fit the bill in the strictest sense. Similarly, the so-called strategic or New Life hamlets (the concentration camps), which foster the destruction of the Vietnamese social structure by separating families, causing a decline in the birthrate, suppressing religious and cultural life, and even denying work which might permit people to maintain themselves, are condemned by the 1948 Convention as genocidal. Of course, the destruction of whole villages like My Lai are the more infamous and blatant examples. But contrary to common belief, these kinds of missions, according to a number of Viet vets, are more frequently the norm than the exception.

Racism on the battlefield facilitates the implementation of this top brass extermination policy. It helps transform the frustration and discomfort of the GI's into the suspicion of every civilian Vietnamese, because they are the only visible targets. This is due partially to the GI's inability to grasp their enemy, physically and intellectually, and to their reception by the

Vietnamese as suspicious occupation troops, rather than as the saviors they had been instructed they were. Racism dehumanizes the people to be slaughtered—the gooks—thereby easing the executioner's job. Hence, the battlefield jargon, "The only good gook is a dead gook" and "A dead Vietnamese is a Viet Cong," prevail. And so in My Lai old people, men, women and children were killed precisely because they were Vietnamese. As I write this remark, the very incident is verified by a line from the Daily Oklahoman in the morning paper, "CIA orders massacre of My Lai in effort to wipe out the civilian population of the village as an example."

Our point is that this is America's Vietnam policy in a nutshell. As a policy, however, it does represent a departure from the past. Certainly, the US has engaged in genocidal acts in the past: American complicity in wrenching 50,000,000 black people from the African continent (less than half of whom arrived as slaves) is legion. This was an incidence of genocide which was primarily a by-product of the quest for labor. White folks killed 11,000,000 Indians for land. But this act of extermination was accomplished not from a blueprint, but periodically and often randomly over many years as the "need" for expansion developed.



(We cite the main offenses, but by no means the only.) However, the current anti-guerrilla strategy in Vietnam is a planned and premeditated policy of genocide, requiring military bases, budget appropriations, organization and the like. It is a policy of liquidation motivated not out of direct economic benefit, which is why the Vietnamese population is expendable. It is a policy of admonition designed to demonstrate that the rulers of 6% of humanity fully intend to control the other 94% of the world. In Vietnam the US wanted to prove that its wolf tickets are real, to establish that it is the wolf and to show that it will devour.

The recent withdrawal of the American presence from the Vietnamese conflict, unfortunately, does not signal US withdrawal from a commitment to genocide. Rather, the current policy towards negotiations and peace arose out of the contradictions and complexities of the war situation. First, Vietnamese intelligence and heroism did manage to limit the effects of the genocidal plan. Secondly, the war proved too costly to the American domestic scene. It ruptured the economy, causing inflation to soar and the dollar to weaken, produced social unrest and discontent at home, incited moral decay of the society at large and effected strife in the Service itself, which was manifested mostly in racial flare-ups and drug addiction. Even so, the wave of bombings that took place before the final announcement of the cease-fire, which excelled any historical precedent in intensity, was a demonstration of the commitment and will to exterminate.

What are the lessons? It should be clear that America has no conscience. It is committed to fight



where its interests are threatened. It is of particular import, we think, for black people within the US to recognize America's willingness to destroy those who challenge it and especially those who are superfluous to it. (Our labor is no longer needed.) But beyond this, the broker of imperialism is subjugating all people both to a nuclear threat and a genocidal threat. The world must understand the extent to which the US will go. Khrushchev understood and backed off. The Vietnamese understood and fought on for all of us. The prolongation of the war caused other contradictions to arise which made its efficacy dwindle. The key lesson is this: The price of liberation, of independence, of sovereignty is costly. But it is a cost we must bear. We have no alternative. Humanity has no alternative.

*The following first four articles of the Geneva Convention, December 9, 1948, codified the international definition of the crime of genocide.

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent or punish.

ARTICLE II

. . . Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.

- a. Killing members of the group.
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical

destruction in whole or in part.

- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

ARTICLE III

The following acts shall be punishable:

- a. Genocide
- b. Conspiracy to commit genocide
- c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide
- d. Attempt to commit genocide
- e. Complicity in genocide

ARTICLE IV

Persons committing genocidal acts outlined in Article III are punishable whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.



interview with Walter Collins:

on the military

Walter Collins was incarcerated in November 1970 for refusing induction into the Armed Services. His conviction followed a long track record in the Movement. An early participant in "sit-ins" and voter registration campaigns, he began organizing opposition to the Vietnam War and the draft in the summer of 1966 in the black community of New Orleans. He has worked on staff with the National Association of Black Students (NABS), CCCO, and SCEF and was the founder of the National Black Draft Counselors (NBDC).

His conviction was a direct attempt to thwart his political activities and those of his mother, Mrs. Virginia Collins, who has been active in organizing and politicizing workers in Louisiana and Mississippi. It was only after Collins publicized the facts that 85% of the draftees in New Orleans came from two predominantly black wards and that 90% of those from that city killed in the war were black, and after his mother refused to testify before the Louisiana HUAC, that both he and his two brothers (one of whom had a congenital heart condition) lost their student deferments.

His seemingly bizarre case--which drew national attention with the help of SCEF--is only another example of the special oppression of black resisters in the tradition of the SNCC resisters of the Sixties--Donald P. Stone, Mike Simmons, Fred Brooks, Cleve Sellers, Bob Moore, Larry Fox, et al.--and of their countless, lesser known predecessors and successors. Bro. Collins was given the wrong information when he tried to apply for C.O. status. He was issued six different induction dates. Twice, when he reported for induction and passed out anti-war literature, he was sent home. Finally, he was indicted on six counts of failure to report and submit to induction (although he reported each time he knew of an order). He was subsequently convicted on five counts, sentenced to five years on each count, to be served concurrently, and fined \$2000. His abrupt and gestapo-like arrest came just 11 days after the

Supreme Court had refused to hear an appeal of his sentence, even though his lawyers had 25 days to file his petition for reconsideration.

The repression of Walter Collins has only served to sharpen his already keen analysis and active commitment to the liberation of black people and the struggle against U.S. capitalism/imperialism.

The peculiarities and ironies of racism are revealed in the context of the military. On the one hand, blacks and other minority people are the prime subjects of economic impressment into the armed forces. This policy emerged full-fledged with LBJ's Project 100,000, a part of his anti-poverty program, when entrance standards of the Service were lowered in an effort to attract blacks, to get us off the streets, to let us fight the war in Asia and (if we survived) to teach us a skill. On the other hand, however, the recent wave of administrative discharges (52,000 in 1970 and 71 of "undesirables" alone, no figures being available for the even more common "general discharges") is an effort to whisk these same folk right out of the Service quietly (and often with no benefits). At the same time vigorous recruitment policies are being waged in the minority communities, especially since the spectre of the volunteer army, while incarceration continues to be laid on the overwhelming bulk of black war resisters. (The same was true during WWII when 95% of black war objectors were imprisoned as compared to 45% of white objectors.) Thus, racism is so entrenched in this society that it prevents the administration from being able to cope with black people justly enough even to get them to fight its wars. The consciousness of black troops gained from the battlefield is only perfunctory to that produced by the contradictions within the military itself.

The following interview was conducted in mid-January, two months after Collins' parole from federal prison. Unfortunately, it had to be edited because of our space limitations.

Southern Exposure: How did you view the war and the draft when you began organizing around these issues in the black community?

Walter Collins: My perspective was that the war, first of all, was not an aberration as so many people in those early years thought. It was a larger extension of a system that first of all needed people to exploit in order to function. Secondly, the area that it chose to battle in was an area very key to the exploitation of the continent of Asia.

In another sense, I think the antiwar movement begins to reflect the racism of the country. When the sons and daughters of the wealthier class in America began to talk about the draft more or less as an inconvenience to them and started hooking up with the draft, all the government did with that antidraft, antiwar movement was move it into the poor communities of America, particularly in the black community. The thing that finally woke me up was that I suddenly looked around me in 1965 and discovered not one person who had gone to high school and junior high school with me was around. If they had not been killed in Vietnam, they were on their way, with the few exceptions who had gone into the drug thing and were in prison. And that was sort of a shocking thing. I'm saying there was no real antidraft movement. All they did was move the draft from the white community into the black-American, Chicano community, wherever there was not enough of a political clout to begin to raise those issues.

My position is that the draft is genocide in the black community because it very clearly takes the very best, the most skilled, the most articulate, the most useful black men. It is not accidental. The people whom the Army instructors might teach some skills to they don't want. It's the people who clearly might be of use in terms of liberation struggles of black people who they drafted.

S.E.: In your own case, you emphasized the racism involved in the manner in which you were drafted and prosecuted, is that correct?

W.C.: Right. We proved two things about my draft board. I forced them to give me their records for the last 25 years. That area has always been heavily black, at least since the mid-50's, predominantly black. There were never any blacks on the draft board. And what was shown during the Vietnam buildup, from '64 clear on up to '70 (the period we have figures for) was that most of the whites of draft age, who were classified by that board, were either in the National Guard or had deferments. I showed in my case that there were eight people who were 1-A, who were older and

should have been drafted before me, who were not. No one ever gave any explanation of that. We also showed that none of the draft board members lived in the area. The chairman and another board member lived in another parish—a clear violation of the law. The government argued that it did not matter if the draft board was not made up according to law, because it was acting as a legally constituted board and should be treated as such. And I went to jail on the basis of that argument.

It was during this period of fighting that I got involved heavily in the antiwar movement there in the city and across the nation, in student issues and in a lot of workers' struggles, particularly in Mississippi in the Laurel area. In fact, I finally went to trial on July 9, 1969, just after the municipal election in Laurel where, though we lost, we were able to fuse the political unity of black and white workers and run a slate of candidates in opposition to the Masonite Co.—the biggest employer in the area.

The push for my indictment and ultimate conviction did not initially come from the federal government. It came from the state of Mississippi and from the state of Louisiana and, of course, in response to my mother's activities also.

The only people at my trial were the FBI, and the intelligence divisions of Mississippi and Louisiana. The guy who prosecuted me was not from the federal government. He was the Chief Legal Counsel of the Selective Service for the State of Louisiana. In my file on that whole period from '66 until '69, there was a series of letters backwards and forwards between my draft board and the governor and the Louisiana House UnAmerican Activities Committee and the State Selective Service.

Anyway, I fought my case all the way up to the Supreme Court, and they didn't hear it. I'm not surprised. For to hear my case and maintain their judicial integrity, they would have had to acquit me. But in acquitting me, they would also have destroyed two-thirds of the draft boards in the country, most of the draft boards operating in Third World communities. My draft board was not exceptional in terms of its makeup or its operation. It was the general pattern. I didn't give the government a way out. So I knew I was going to prison.

S.E.: Why do so many black men go ahead and enlist in or volunteer for the infantry?

W.C.: I don't buy the thing that blacks are in the infantry because they are unskilled. They're in the infantry for economic reasons. They can make



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"The reality of shooting your mother is what radicalizes veterans."

more money there. If you're on the front lines of Vietnam, particularly in the hot spots, you get all these extra kinds of dividends which you cannot get in the larger society. Essentially, the whole inducement even for volunteers is economics. If you look at it from a practical standpoint, most of the black homes in this country were bought through GI loans. Our statistics showed that 85% of all the black homes bought in this country from the time of that loan period through 1969 were bought on the GI loan. And a good portion of all the black males who went to school during that period went to school on the GI bill. Thus, given the racism and the whole economic structure of this country and the way it relates to black people, in essence a black man is more useful to his family, more useful to himself by killing for the rulers of this country or by putting himself in a position of being killed by them.

Also regarding the women in this society, particularly black women, and what they are supposed to be about in terms of fine houses and all the other junk that goes with it, the only way a black woman, in most cases, is likely to get that is through her husband's involvement in the service. So very clearly there is a push on that level for black men to join the service.

In a very real sense, the military is the economic stabilizer of the black family and the black community. It is in fact an economic leveler. And the more economically stable elements in the black community are people who have been involved in the military. That is why there was at one point the high number of reenlistments and also the large proportion of black men in the infantry.

S.E.: Did you find that a lot of men, a lot of black men were conscious of the economic dynamics involved in the draft?

W.C.: Very, very conscious. Before I went to prison in the summer of '70, we did studies in cities across the country, anywhere from 30% to 60% in some cases of all the blacks registered were not showing up for physicals and so forth—a very conscious rate. But, first of all there are no lawyers in the country who understand the black perspective on the draft and I speak from my own experience. Secondly, there are very few lawyers, black or white, willing to go in and battle on the political issues. People don't want to go through a hassle and go to jail. So if they get caught, they go

to the Army, where at least they will make some money and get a chance to travel and all the other arguments that go with that. But very few of the young blacks who go in, go in with any attitude that they're going in to fight for the country, or that they're going in to do something for democracy. Most of them are very clear that the economic inducement is what sends them in there. It's a job. And if he's married that's the option. The option for a young black man in this country is the Army, prison, or drugs. You can take your choice.

S.E.: What about the image that the Army projects about being the first truly integrated institution in the United States and that blacks have more mobility in the military than any other place?

W.E.: That's very true. But I don't think the integration argument really induces people. The second one I'll buy. The Army has replaced the corporations in the hiring of black people. But you've got to deal with the fact that in New Orleans right now 85% of all the veterans returned from the war don't have jobs. And with what's happening within the veterans' movement within the city, people stay out a couple of months or a year and no job. Then they reenlist for that very reason. There are absolutely no jobs for large numbers of black people, and they stay in the service for that reason. If the contradictions come they come in that reality, that the Army has only a certain level of job categories for blacks. But even that limited advancement is much better than the civilian economy affords. The conflict in the Army comes from the real fact that it is **not** integrated, that it is very racist like every other institution in this society.

S.E.: Now, you said the military stabilizes the black community economically, but what about the conditioning that the men go through. In resisting that, do they become members of the progressive element in the black community when they get out?

W.C.: I think two things happen with people going into the service for economic reasons. The Army offers a lot of the extra benefits: For the first time maybe you have a bed of your own. For the first time you have some semblance of privacy. For the first time you travel out of the region of your birth. Those are the very real things to people who have not been able to afford them. Of course, I think that sort of cushions people, initially, to the other reality of the Army—the regimentation, the

brutalization of the mind, the racism.

But, if that reality hits him, then he becomes very progressive for the simple reason that he is forced to become so, since his whole attitude from the get go was not in support of the Army as it was to gain the dollar that the Army can afford. What they see in Vietnam is the fact that the people that they killed and the people that they were fighting against, with the exception of the more obvious physical differences, could be your father, could be your mother, your brother or cousin or anybody at home. That in essence the peasants of Vietnam occupy in Vietnam the same role as black people in this country. The reality of shooting your mother is what radicalizes veterans. For that very reason, the Army pushes drugs. I'm sure they're aware of that. The Army attempts to block that reality and to take on its full political maturation by making drugs freely available.

And if a guy is hung up on drugs--the reality of a good portion of black service men, and, I guess, service men in general--he comes out and in most cases stays on drugs. No one begins to deal with him. He gets arrested and goes to prison. Or he becomes a pig.

I'd like to talk about drugs and agents in the black community because I think drugs are very key to understanding that. Clearly drugs are pushed by the United States Government in the service and on the street. The junkies I talked with during my prison experience very clearly say that drugs came to the black community in the massive way they did in 1964. As the Civil Rights Movement gained momentum, so also did the drug traffic.

Before that period, before '64, the drugs in the community were basically limited to a small segment of the population: the hustlers, the pimps, and the entertainers for the kind of lifestyles that they led. That changed in '64. Likewise, the people who sold drugs before that period were the hustlers--people who sold drugs to support their own habit. Now in the community, most of the people who are selling drugs aren't users. It is very clearly a business. And it is the only business in the country that black people can profit in and profit greatly. I don't know all the figures but in talking to some of the experts at the game, they tell me that it is possible to buy \$500 worth of drugs in New York City and in a week's time make

\$5000. The pushers are businessmen in the black community. It is no longer a question of drug users selling sufficient drugs to support their habit. It is a definite arm of control in the black community.

If you interpret that in terms of Vietnam, the military knows guys are using drugs. They push these drugs, and they let them use them until they're ready to bust them. Then they bust them and give them a choice. You can go to jail, or you can spy on black groups. It's blackmail. Since they haven't had too much of a political consciousness, given the choice of 15 years in Georgia State Prison, they choose to spy. They have not understood in any real sense what their struggle is all about. For them spying on the Panthers or spying on any group like that is not necessarily negative, because they don't really see that the Panthers are going to do too much anyway. I mean that in a general sense. It is not that they don't relate to what the Panthers are saying. They recognize the proportionate power of the the enemy as opposed to the Panthers, especially, in light of their military experience. So that's the other problem you have with the veterans.

S.E.: One of the functions of drugs really is to keep people who come back from telling their story.

W.C.: Exactly.

S.E.: So that the next generation doesn't learn about its experiences.

W.C.: That's why the most important thing any revolutionary can do in the cities of America is to fight drugs. And as far as my program is concerned, I don't see that we can compete with the government. We don't control the force. Obviously, the government brings the drugs in. If it wanted to stop it, it could. As long as drugs are available, people are going to use them, because in essence the euphoria that comes from drugs is much better than the reality of this country. Thus, I cannot see that you're going to make any convincing argument to people saying, "drugs are bad." But you can say, "keep the pushers out." Give them a date to get out. If they don't, leave them in the gutters. If there are no drugs then they can't buy them. That's my policy on drugs.

S.E.: How do you see working with vets in progressive ways?

W.C.: One way that we have worked with them is in just being able to explain the Army's role

"The draft is genocide in the black community."

to younger black men who might get involved in that situation. Vets are very effective draft counselors, but they are also very effective in explaining to people, who go in simply because the black movement cannot provide economic stability to stay out, what they're likely to experience. These people can begin to deal with that situation before it becomes a destructive force. One of the reasons why there are mass rebellions of black soldiers within the service now is the impact of the wave of veterans from the early sixties who came out of Vietnam at the height of the American involvement, and who explained to younger servicemen exactly what that experience was. That is the organizational ability. I am not talking about people going around the country organizing rebellions. From the Vietnam experience, black vets do understand the Army as an institution of imperialism, with a genocidal factor. And right away, as soon as that contradiction hits them, they fight, rather than trying to cushion it with drugs and all the rest.

S.E.: What has happened between say the Korean conflict, which was also military aggression against a Third World country in which blacks participated, and Vietnam? There are several

things in-between that, right? A lot of blacks that came out of Korea have been some of the strongest stabilizers to come back into the black community. But that is not the case with black veterans out of Vietnam.

W.C.: Right. One reason for that is that in the Korean conflict there wasn't a strong black movement in the black communities that would challenge some of the basic American values that obviously service men have.

With Vietnam there is a different situation. The Korean veteran came back as an exemplary black man who could make it, as a fabled figure in the black community, sort of like the American father image painted in black. I think he was very much looked up to. The Vietnam veteran comes back to America, to the black community, as a traitor, as someone who has betrayed black people, almost as an enemy.

I don't mean to say we hate black veterans, but his image is not that of a hero. His image is one of someone who killed another revolutionary people fighting against the enemy. It is that contradiction also that has forced them to have to come to grips with what they as servicemen represent. Take the phrase which more than anything else made black



people understand the war in a much more profound way, the phrase that was current in the mid-sixties: "No Vietnamese ever called me nigger." That spoke to the reality of the situation that black people had to come to grips with. From our perspective it was the most revolutionary thing we could say. I don't think there was really a black presence until that particular point was made evident. What everybody was thinking in his mind was suddenly codified, and everybody could relate to it.

S.E.: You mentioned using those veterans to inform the community of just what military service means. Do you see other programs?

W.C.: A lot of things you have to almost start before people become GI's or before they become veterans. One thing the black struggle should get into more consciously is the youth movement. I don't know exactly what form it should take, but it must clearly explain on all three fronts the realities for black youth to join the job force, to go to school, or to go into the Army, if you're a man and maybe even for a woman, if the Equal Rights Amendment comes into being. Because I think the struggle is about power. The struggle is about control. All three of those factors are control mechanisms. They really push within the psyches of black people the idea that you are Americans first and foremost, and if you are black people, then your blackness is secondary to that thrust.

I think you can begin to instill in black youth that the American military machine is used to blunt revolutionary struggles the world over. That's why it exists and that's what it will be doing. Essentially, it will be fighting Third World people; probably in the next five or ten years people in Africa. Black youth must come to grips with that. I'm saying it's that kind of program that the black struggle has to get into.

Concerning the GI's in particular, more support must be given to black servicemen to fight the racism within the military and to expose that whole myth of upward mobility. You are more mobile, more sustained economically in the service than in the civilian life, but the myth of upward mobility is clearly there. But just to say that it's a myth is not sufficient, that sort of restrained mobility in the service is much better. You're going to have to go from that consciousness into involvement in the broader issues. I think that comes from consciously involving the black struggle in the military. That means support legally. That means mass education in terms of what the military's impact is economically and so forth. More and more the



black struggle has to get into that.

S.E.: What kind of impact, what kinds of changes do you think the volunteer Army will make?

W.C.: I view the volunteer Army in the same way I see the antiwar movement, which prides itself on sort of ending the draft or lessening its impact. To a certain extent it can claim credit for that, but I really question on what basis it ended. Like I said, the draft moved from white middle class America into the black community, the Chicano community, the Puerto Rican community, and to the poor white community, too, in the South. Nonetheless its impact has been national on the black community, not just limited to a region which more or less in the country for whites has been in the South or in certain areas of the South. Whereas, for black people it has been a national impact, a genocidal impact.

Just looking at the volunteer Army from the standpoint of what a soldier is likely to make, the figure is anywhere from \$500 to \$700 a month. I don't know too many civilian jobs that pay that to a black man which means, essentially, that the proportion of blacks is likely to be higher within that voluntary Army than they are in the other. Except, I don't feel that imperialism can get enough people to fight a hot conflict. As long as things sort of stay like in Vietnam, where they got Vietnamese killing each other, and they have a fairly automated

battlefield, they can get by with that kind of Army. But as soon as things flare up again (and they're gonna flare up), the contradiction between capitalism and the people it oppresses are clearly going to resort to that kind of situation. They'll have to use the draft again. If the black movement, in particular, and the left movement, generally, has developed a broad presence on the impact of militarism, I don't think it will be possible to draft people in those large numbers again.


I think Vietnam has been a lesson to the country in a far more profound way than the left movement sees it, you know. I find it to be the most radicalizing experience in the black community in terms of just recognizing very consciously that the conditions of black people in this society are, first of all, related to the conditions of oppressed people the world over; secondly, that those conditions result from the way this society is organized and from the kind of political and economic decisions that come from that organization. It is no longer going to be the issue to get a black foreman or a black school principal or what have you. The issue is ultimately control. That means, essentially, fighting to control every facet of institutional life in America. I think Vietnam has done that for large numbers of black people.

S.E.: In thinking about conversion of the

military, it seems like we must think in terms of the whole political economy, of building alternative economic units which can both support us and alter existing institutions. If you have an economic cooperative that can take-over, or demand the use of a military installation for economic development, that would be the kind of program which could undercut the base of the military.

W.C.: I accept that. I didn't know that the Left was organized in a way, or people were organized in a way really, to force those bases to become that. Look at what's happening with military institutions. Either they revert to some other government agency and become counterinsurgency things rather than overtly military, or I understand a lot of them might become prisons. I see some of that within the Bureau of Prisons, like at Maxwell Air Force Base where part of that is a federal prison camp. The same thing is at Eglin Field. Part of that is a prison camp. And they are toying with some of the ones out in California in the same way. I know it's a model to see if it can work, but if they feel that's viable, then a lot of that might also happen.

In terms of conversions of the military, I think that people who use that term or think about that don't want to struggle, because they feel that



"The option for a young black man in this country is the Army, prison or drugs."

somehow we can through the democratic process take the machine from the monster. I don't believe that. In its essence the military in this country is a counter-revolutionary tool, and it's going to be used that way. The only conversion that is going to come is when you have an armed struggle and people are going to do battle with the military. Even to think in terms of conversion without that doesn't make sense to me. They're not going to dismantle the military. They're just going to dismantle those institutions that they don't need because they have found a different way to fight or something or other.

You have to talk about building up a base for struggle within the military which will literally fight on bases in that way. That's the only way. They're not going to say, "Oh, I think war is horrible. I think imperialism is horrible, and, therefore, I'm going to convert it to something else." They don't think imperialism is horrible. I don't like to look into the future too much, but I think what's going to happen is a continuation of what happened in '68 in Vietnam. In '68 there were more skirmishes between officers and enlisted men and between black soldiers and white soldiers than there were between American troops and Vietnamese. Basically, the same thing is going to happen inside the military, period. At that point you'll have a force on the inside and the outside that is battling for the same things. The military, essentially, has to turn on its own people.

S.E.: I'm wondering whether the contradictions for whites in the military are at the point where effective black and white alliances can develop?

W.C.: The contradictions for whites in the military are the same as the contradictions for the blacks in the sense that if you're not an officer or of the officer class, then you're shit on. But at the same time, it is also the separation from having lived in the larger society that you consciously bring with you to the military. I don't think the



forms of how to overcome that separate development . . .

S.E.: Between black and white?

W.C.: . . . right . . . have been developed enough that you can really begin to see unity on the other thing.

S.E.: The basic struggle is going to be around racism?

W.C.: More or less, if for no other reason than there is no white force that you can find to join with, because they have not come to grips with their racism. And they can recognize the contradiction between officer thinking in the military as in the larger society. The officers more or less move away from attacking any white folks in a mass way. They attack black folks and single out a few individual whites. Those are clearly the whites who are much more aware and, obviously, challenge them on a lot of things. But by and large, the contradiction of the military is the contradiction of being enlisted as opposed to being an officer and all that that means. At the same time, however, you have the other matter of having come from separate communities. You've had two separate existences basically, and all of a sudden you're thrown into the military together—I won't call it integration—with all of those values that you've developed that way. I think blacks in the service are more concerned about survival. Trying to build anything with white people sort of becomes secondary. I don't know if there are many whites within the service who are dealing with the racism.

LOCKHEED EMPLOYEE SPEAKS OUT WHITEWASH!

Henry Durham is an intense, patriotic southerner who blushes when he quotes someone else's swear word. He likes camping, fishing and football and John Wayne movies "because they're rough and tough and not, you know, dirty." Drive out to his split level home outside Atlanta in bustling Marietta and you'll find an American flag decal and a National Rifle Association sticker on the back window of his jeep.

Henry Durham used to work for the world's largest private defense contractor—the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Today he thinks Senator William Proxmire hasn't done all he could to punish Lockheed for its \$2,000,000,000 cost overrun on the C-5A airplane, and he calls the U.S. Comptroller General "a gutless bureaucrat" for issuing a report that "whitewashes" the mismanagement and collusion behind the overrun.

The original \$3.7 billion contract which Lockheed won ["everybody knew Boeing's design was better," says Durham, "but Lockheed had Senator Richard Russell"] called for 120 planes designed for moving troops and over-sized cargo quickly to brush-fire wars. At a cost of \$5.2 billion, the Air Force is getting eighty-one planes which have one-fourth the original design's life expectancy, won't be able to use rough runways as called for by their counter-insurgency mission, and are given to losing wheels and engines and wings. The first plane off the gigantic Marietta assembly line was honored in ceremonies by President Johnson and Governor Maddox, but, according to Durham, the plane had so many fake parts, some just made of wood and paper, that it could not fly. It later blew up on the runway.

For most of his 19 years with Lockheed's Marietta division, Henry Durham dutifully served the company. "I even neglected my family and tried to make it up the ladder, you know, to vice president. What was good for Lockheed was good for the world as far as I was concerned." When Lockheed won the C-5A contract, its employment, already the biggest growth factor in the area, mushroomed to 33,000. And in 1969, Durham was promoted to manager of production control activities on the flight line. From this position,



Durham learned how waste brought a giant company higher profits.

As a conscientious employee, Durham told his superiors about missing parts on planes and over-stocking of expensive parts; but his superiors ignored him, told him to shut up, and finally abolished his job. As a conscientious American, he wrote 86 Congressmen offering to come to Washington to tell them about Lockheed's shoddy performance and criminal use of taxpayers' money; no one was interested, even though Senate debate over Lockheed's \$250,000,000 loan guarantee was roaring.

Durham finally got Morton Mintz of the Washington Post interested in his well documented charges. When the story broke, Durham got more publicity than he bargained for. He started getting threatening telephone calls from his Marietta neighbors; signs appeared on Lockheed bulletin boards saying "Kill Durham"; the family's church even gave them the cold shoulder. "You can say something against the Lord and people would forgive you," says wife Nan Durham, "but not if you say anything against Lockheed." A dedicated Christian and Sunday School teacher, Nan sought help from Billy Graham—but he didn't want to get involved either.

The publicity did bring Durham an invitation to appear before Senator Proxmire's Joint Economic

Committee—but the hearing date was postponed until after the Senate passed the \$250 million loan by one vote. Finally, on September 29, 1971, Henry Durham went to tell his government a horror story in big time thievery. Proxmire asked the General Accounting Office to study the charges Durham made; five months later the GAO staff report confirmed nearly every charge.

But the staff report was squelched by GAO boss, Elmer B. Staats, the Comptroller General of the U.S. In its place, Staats presented an official GAO report to a new Proxmire committee hearing on December 18, 1972. Staats said some of Durham's charges were inaccurate, others were corroborated by the evidence, but he suggested many of these were isolated cases or remedied by Lockheed's own actions. When Durham got his chance to testify, he blasted the Staats report as a "whitewash" and termed Proxmire's acceptance of it "a cop-out!"

"People don't realize how rotten things are on the inside of some of these giant companies or how the federal government supports them," says Durham. "We've got to get the truth about this story out and get people moving." Here, then, is Henry Durham's story.



Shortly after I became general department manager over production control on the flight line, in July and August, 1969, I became aware of serious deficiencies in C-5A aircraft coming out of the assembly area to the flight area. When planes arrive at the flight line from the assembly line, they're supposed to be virtually complete except for a few adjustments and normal radar and electronic equipment installation, but I noticed these serious deficiencies. These weren't just minor deficiencies; these aircraft were missing thousands and thousands of parts when the Lockheed records showed the aircraft to be virtually complete.

At first I thought it was an error in the papers. Then I initiated an audit. I found it was true. I was amazed. But I still thought there was some kind of mistake going on.

Later I figured out that the company was consciously indicating through the inspection records that it had done the work so it could receive credit and payment from the Air Force when actually it wasn't on schedule and hadn't done the work.

Somebody in one of the production sections would fall behind, but they'd move the unit—whole

sections of the plane—down the line anyway. They'd close the paper work to show that the parts were installed, that everything was on schedule.

But, of course, when the people in the next area go up to install a tube or something there's no supporting bracket there. So what do they do? They throw the part in the corner or on the floor of the plane. Multiply that by the hundreds and thousands and you get a picture of what the problem was. These are everything from tiny parts to something as big as a door. A wide range of parts. Relatively inexpensive parts to very expensive parts. Our audit showed that over 67 percent of the parts issued were missing, the paper work had actually been closed out, and there was no evidence of any installation at all.

To get all the open items filled on the last stage is very expensive. Closing the missing parts necessitated overtime, paying premium prices for parts, having them shipped air express, people on the phone frantically calling vendors to bring stuff in.

The paper work would be in such confusion that I remember one case where we had 10,000 parts brought in for one airplane on the flight line, and eventually we didn't need 4,000. But these weren't used in the next airplane either, since they were recorded as ordered for a previous ship. So more new parts were ordered for the next ship.

We're talking about millions of dollars. Lockheed was continuously buying more parts than required. Parts would come in, but in a few days they would be lost. When the time came to build the assembly, the parts would be missing, so they'd go buy some more. So, they were doing what I call the "blind purchase." They would order stuff without even looking to see if they could find the materials somewhere in the plant.

There was also a problem with what I would call chaotic engineering. Everything was push, push, push, from the time the C-5A program started. The schedule was just so fantastic. For example, while one man was designing a part of the airplane, another man at the next drawing board would be making changes in the first man's design.

You'd actually go buy materials and build the parts, only to have engineering changes coming out within a few weeks, scrapping the parts you just built as being no good. There were constant structural changes on the C-5A and millions of dollars worth of material wasted as a result.

I remember when the wing cracking problem first came up. There was a fantastic amount of activity around the plant. Somebody came up with

a design change to repair the wing. It called for something like 250 new parts, as I recall, for each ship. So we negotiated with the California plant (Lockheed-California) to build those parts required for the 30 or so ships involved. Finally we got all the parts.

And then somebody else came along and said it would take something like 600 parts to repair the wings of each ship. So we went out on a big rush-rush basis. I remember it well. We were told to get it done, whatever cost it took. It required lots of overtime, premium prices, and meetings every morning with the suppliers.

A day or two after we finish I am saying, "Man, that was a good job, everybody did great." Then I get a call and it says, "Guess what, we don't need those parts after all."

Apparently there were two factions in engineering, one at Marietta and one at California. It was decided that only the 200-plus parts were needed. So we had those thousands of extra parts, 600 parts for each of say 30 ships, as well as all that overtime and other special costs. That was typical of what went on.

When I told my immediate superior about the missing parts and false reporting for progress payments I was told to shut up and hide the reports. This was in October, 1969. You see, I had released one of the reports to a man in charge of the flight-line production area. I wanted him to correct the problem at his end. Well, the fact that a copy of that report could get out must have frightened them very much, because I got a call from my boss telling me to get that report back and get it fast, you know. The guy didn't want to give it back. The next morning I got a call from his boss. He said, "Look, if you can't do anything else, get a stamp and mark it 'confidential material.'"

That was a typical reaction. The divisional level management people—people more or less on my own level—would stop me and look down their noses and ask me, "What the hell do you think you're doing writing about missing parts; why don't you be quiet; why don't you mind your own business, etc." But that really just made me more determined. I went to all levels of management. I wasn't afraid of any of them, and I took it to their boss.

Finally I attempted to make an appointment with Mr. Fuhrman, president of Lockheed-Georgia. I called one day, and got the secretary, and left my name and number. Within a few minutes, my boss was on the phone wanting to know what in the hell I was doing trying to contact Fuhrman.



I was told I'd have to talk to W. P. Frech first; he's director of manufacturing. I agreed and was able to see him after about a week. But it was very unsatisfactory. He ignored a report I gave him when I first walked into his office; it had the data on it, and I practically had to force him to read it. He talked about everything else except what I wanted to talk about.

Finally I got the problem across to him, I thought, so I decided to wait a couple of weeks. But nothing happened. So I called Fuhrman late one afternoon in his office and caught him. We made an appointment. I met him and we talked about an hour and a half. I gave him very much the same material I presented in testimony, a lot of it, dealing with mismanagement, waste, throwing away of parts, and all the other things. He listened, but that's about all. He never did anything about it that I know of. After that my job was abolished. I was pushed in a corner, ostracized. This was in April or May of 1971.

I sent a four page letter with substantiating documents to Mr. Daniel J. Haughton, chairman of the Lockheed Corporation. I received a short reply from Haughton promising to launch an investigation and advise me of the results. I am still waiting to

*"When I told my superior about
the missing parts and false
reporting, I was told to shut up
and hide the reports."*

hear from Mr. Haughton.

Approximately two months after my lay-off, I received an unexpected call asking me to come back to work for Lockheed. I initially refused to return, but finally agreed to accept a position in Chattanooga, Tennessee, a hundred miles from Marietta. I accepted this position on the basis that Mr. Haughton would follow up on the investigation he promised.

Surely, I thought, Uncle Dan, the venerable Lockheed chief, the dear old white haired patriarch of the Lockheed family would do something to straighten out the mess. I later learned, to my dismay, that he was also deeply involved in the shenanigans. At the time, my decision was to go to Chattanooga while I waited to hear from Haughton. I didn't realize that I was being sent to Siberia to be kept out of the way but still dangling on the string.

Unfortunately, conditions at the Chattanooga plant were as deplorable or worse than those at the mother plant. For instance, there were no inventory controls. The company was purchasing parts and materials from vendors at exorbitant prices when the same materials were available in Lockheed's own stores at a fraction of the price.

I couldn't stand it any longer. I hadn't heard from Haughton or anyone else. I could no longer live with myself. So, motivated by a deep sense of moral indignation, I quit. Before I left, however, the director of management for the company paid me a special visit. He apparently thought I might be planning to go outside Lockheed to publicize conditions in the company. He asked me, "Do you know what happened to A. E. Fitzgerald who went to Washington with some Lockheed problems?" When I said I did not, he said, "Well, I'll just tell you: Fitzgerald is now chief shit house inspector for the civil service, and will never be able to get a good job as long as he lives." He indicated that anybody who bucks Lockheed or the system is in for a rough time. He is right on that score for I have

been blacklisted and have been unable to secure a meaningful management position anywhere.

I'm convinced that if some kind of protection from economic loss, physical reprisals and job loss were given to people who wanted to come forward out of industry or government, they would come, and you would see a lot of things cleaned up. But right now people are afraid. When you stay with a company for, say, nineteen years, you're not trained in anything else; it's hard to find another position. And there is literally fear of people in the community. A guy called me one day and offered to bring me--then he changed that to send me in the mail, anonymously--some material to take with me to Washington that was of vital importance. I said I'd be glad to have it.

A few days went by and I called him. He said, "You know I'm living out here among a lot of Lockheed people, I've got a swimming pool and have put a lot of money in this house and I don't want garbage thrown in my swimming pool and all. I've decided the best thing to do is not send it."

Another guy came by and gave me a written statement. He went back to work the next day. He called me up and just begged me, "Please don't put that statement in the evidence." He was afraid for his job. So I didn't use it. I didn't want to jeopardize anybody. You see, he went out to the plant and heard the management talking and saw the "Kill Durham" signs in the restrooms. They even had my name and address and phone number on the bulletin board. And several people called me saying, "Kill Durham."

But I was determined that I was going through with this anyway. It's time that waste and corruption be stopped. Of course, being just an average citizen, working hard all your life, trying to be company vice president--when you see something like this you think it's localized. But that's not the case.

For example, right after my story appeared in **The Washington Post** of July 18, I received a call from a Lieut. Col. Tyce, who is deputy Air Force plant representative at Lockheed. He was all excited, and said it needed to be investigated and would I be willing to talk to Dr. Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force.

I said, of course. He said, "O.K., I'll call you right back." I never heard from him again.

Then when a date was set, and I was first going to testify before Proxmire's committee Aug. 4, the colonel in charge at Lockheed--the chief Air Force representative--called me and asked me if I would talk to him. After reflecting on it, I told him

I would talk to him after I testified.

After I testified, a man named Sither, of O.S.I.-Office of Special Investigation in Washington-called me, said he was very concerned about the matter, and wanted to come down and talk to me about it. I said, "Fine, be glad to help you in any way." After that I got to thinking. I decided I'd better call somebody and get advice on this.

I found out that I should not talk to him by myself, that I should talk to him with a witness. So I called him back and told him that I wanted to talk to him in front of a witness. He said, no, he didn't see any need to talk in front of witnesses, but he would call me back.

A couple of days later Sither called me and said he had read the testimony two or three times and felt that at this time there was no need to talk to me. If he ever needed me, he would get back in touch.

It would seem to me that the O.S.I. would be alarmed about a situation like this and want to lay all the cards out on the table. But according to certain people in Washington, they are engaged in covering up this type of thing all the time.

They're supposed to look after this sort of thing-not to hide it. Why would they want to hide it unless they are part and parcel of the whole thing? This bothers me a great deal; this covering up, this hiding. They're supposed to be representing the people.

After I appeared at the Proxmire hearings in September 1971 and Proxmire asked the GAO to investigate, the General Accounting Office in Atlanta made an "in depth" investigation over a five month period. Their report contains positive, irrefutable substantiations of practically every charge I made. Yet the Washington GAO office


attempted to down-grade the report calling it a staff study which had not been reviewed by Lockheed and the Air Force.

On December 2, 1972, I received a letter from Proxmire requesting my presence at hearings on December 18th, and with the letter came the Comptroller General's final report on the charges. When I read the Comptroller General's report, I was shocked. It was a whitewash! It ignores, obscures, or reverses the findings arrived at by the GAO's own conscientious investigators. I set out preparing testimony that compared the two GAO reports point by point.

When I got to Washington, I smelled a rat immediately. I could sense someone was more concerned about upsetting the Comptroller General than exposing the whitewash. In fact, a key member of Proxmire's staff attempted to talk me out of submitting my verbal testimony into the record. During the hearing, Senator Proxmire, who must rely on the GAO for most of his subcommittee investigative work, rose to the agency's defense. He said I shouldn't feel the GAO's report was a whitewash since a substantial number of my charges were supported by it. His remarks were obviously tailored to salve my feelings while at the same time support the Comptroller General. It was a cop-out! Another example of political shenaniganism.

But I will not be deterred, because the principles of integrity and honesty are involved. Suppose everybody turned their backs on corruption, dishonesty, waste and collusion between big business and big government? I refuse to quit.

The Comptroller General is supposed to be the chief watchdog for Congress and therefore the people. The fact that he would release a dishonest



report calculated to conceal disastrously rotten mismanagement and complicity between a large corporation and a powerful government agency means to me that he is a gutless bureaucrat. The American people must not let this be tolerated. We can't let these people who deal in corruption and dishonesty be supported by the federal government.

Even President Nixon brashly brags that he was the one who fired Ernest Fitzgerald [the man who first exposed the C-5A cost overrun]. Why didn't he fire the people in the Air Force and Lockheed who made the situation possible instead of the person who reported the corruption? Because he wants the votes of Lockheed workers, and he wants campaign money from the big corporations. And now Nixon has made Roy Ash Director of the Office of Management and Budget, which may be a prelude, I think, to bail-outs of all wasteful, corrupt and mismanaged defense contractors and corporations to the detriment of the common man. Maybe Nixon should appoint Dan Haughton, Lockheed's chairman, as Secretary of Defense so that all the taxpayers' money could be squandered!

In my opinion we no longer live in a society in which responsibilities are shared and general welfare is a common goal. We seem to be rapidly deteriorating into a type of society where it is every man for himself, where profits are more important than honesty and public welfare. I choose to be a citizen first and an employee second. The true

citizen will decide that his primary allegiance is to his personal integrity rather than to his powerful employer.

We no longer have a government by the people, for the people, but a government by the corporations, for the corporations. I think it should be apparent to every American, but it isn't. Very few Americans know that approximately 200 conglomerates control the destiny of our country. Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen said it very well in **America, Inc.** Mollenhoff (author of **The Pentagon**) brought to light the tremendous power of the Pentagon. When you put those two things together, you have an awesome power. You see a picture of the huge military-industrial complex. The oil companies, too, have a tremendous power over elected officials in our country. It's a very awesome and terrible thing that is happening to us and I think we are going to have to do something about it.

But as I say, the people, the average workers, don't know this. Somehow or other the message never gets across to them. They just go and vote Democratic or Republican or something like that.

I think the only way to save our country is through the power of votes--not rebellion or anything. I think young people, in particular, are concerned. I think we should go and start at the state level or city level and throw out the old and bring in the new.

The Georgia Power Project, an Atlanta consumer action group, is convening a regional conference on the energy crisis, April 28 and 29 in Atlanta. Conference topics include:

Who Controls the Energy Companies and How Sources of Energy Are Manipulated for Profit;

The Social Consequences of Energy Exploitation such as strip mining and pollution;

The International Implications of the Energy Crisis: How US Energy Needs Affect US Foreign Policy and Development of Third World Countries;

Public Control: An Examination of Past, Present and Future Efforts/Plans.

Speakers and participants in the conference include James Ridgeway, author of The Last Play, Barry Weisberg, author of Ecocide in Indochina and The Ecology of Capitalism, the Environmental Action Project, the People's Appalachian Research Collective, the Atlanta Labor Council, and the Media Access Project, plus southern groups involved with energy and utility issues.


The Georgia Power Project was organized in June of 1972 to fight a proposed rate hike by the

Georgia Power Company, the electric utility in the state. In addition to participation in the Public Service Commission hearings on the rate increase, the Project has done considerable research on the Georgia Power Company: its prime stockholders and finances; its parent holding company, the Southern Company; its race and sex discrimination; environmental pollution; and worker/management relations.

The Project publishes a bi-monthly newsletter called "Power Politics" which is distributed to workplaces and consumer groups in the Atlanta area as well as limited distribution throughout the state. The project is continuing its participation in the rate hike suit which is currently in the state courts. In addition it has filed a fairness doctrine suit with the Federal Communications Commission claiming that opponents to the views expressed by the company in their TV advertisements should be allowed time to air their views.

For additional information about the Project, or specific details on the conference, write The Georgia Power Project, Box 1856, Atlanta, Georgia 30301. Or call (404) 523-6078.

The Situation:



by
howard
romaine

fact or fiction. . . .

Come inside seminar room University of California, Berkeley. Sign on door says, "Reserved for Military Use Only." Man at the head of the table only one in non-military uniform. Twelve Generals, Admirals; Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines, all represented at the table. Mahogany. Board of Directors chairs. Meet the man at the head of the table. He is a professor . . . Zantzinger, Dr. William Zantzinger.

Maybe middle-aged Anglo-Saxon, blue serge suit, heavy brown-rimmed glasses, reserved know-it-all smile somewhere between banker and undertaker on social scale, physiognomy at midpoint too. Or maybe funky old Jew, ex-socialist, or secret socialist (see Portnoy's Complaint for in-depth profile). Really revolutionary at heart, but now in drag, middle class coat and old dark narrow tie disguise. Writing equations on green blackboard—courtesy National Science Foundation, or DoD—different name, same soul—which formulae explain the marginal utility of regrouping refugees from occupied Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in safe areas of Thailand. He calls it "planned urbanization." Of others in room, Admiral Rickwalt, clearly, in physique and mystique, dominates. But Air Force General C. Letme has much favor among straight talking Texans and other civilians. (He mumbles under breath, "Urbanization, hell, just roundin' up the Gooks.")

Of course, the idea of planned urbanization is not Zantzinger's. It comes from other men, other institutions, other long histories that some say are much heavier than either Zantzinger's or the men from the Pentagon. These are the Texans. Let me tell you about them.

These particular Texans run the TPD Corporation (short for Texas Pen Designers). These are the ones who invented, perfected and sold to the military the concept of Refugee Ranches as asylums in Thailand for "friendlies." They are direct descendants of the Texans who won the Alamo, recruited Africans for cotton picking chores and Mexicans for lettuce picking, who got aircraft industry for supporting Roosevelt's war mobilization, and aerospace from their home-grown Vice President, home-made President. ("I have seen the future, and it is Texas," John F. Kennedy, Dallas, November 22, 1963.)

TPD's coordinated Pen development, or Asian

Acres as it would be called, was bringing Texas entrepreneurial skills up to date, maintaining full employment economy with Pentagon bucks and modern technology. They manufacture means to cut down, keep down, population explosion in Asia, which, while cutting down Gooks, keeps Crackers working. At the same time they conserve scarce resources of Asian and Texas oil for Texas and New York Cadillac drivers of 1990's, build Model Cities for our Asians, and develop (also under DoD contract) long range, quick-fattening, pen-to-plate cattle raising processes for beef export to Asia—preferably using large transport planes or quick refrigerated ships (cf. Lockheed C-5A or Litton FDL) to simultaneously aid balance of payments, economic development in Georgia, Mississippi and California, primarily, but 43 other states secondarily—while increasing protein intake in our Asians, integrating them not only economically but nutritionally into American Way of Life so they can ultimately beat their Asians.

Asian Acres . . . development

by Texans, which, while cutting

Gooks down, keeps Crackers

working.

This particular charity also helps Texans maintain and increase city-building technology developed in sixties by defense-dependent corporations (threatened by conversion) to meet problems in daily living encountered by darker residents of dingy inner slum areas. Now that Terminal Final Solution clear pattern of response to Black Rebellion, quiet grows in ghettos. Like only disturbance now swish swish of junkie head nodding in corner quiet room. Sometimes sounds of silence disturbed only by rat eating passed out junkie carrion flesh. Logic of Nixon-CIA game plan: fly in free dope, give out needles at schools. (Watch Government Men in Cadillacs.) They pick up loads from low-flying helicopters of local bank cooperating with CIA dope-runners bringin' it into Ft. Benning. . . . Meanwhile Government eliminates rat control funds so solve half-dozen problems at once: what to do with black junkie carrion, what to

feed rats, how to cut nigger money, how to keep em quiet, distracted, etc. Swish, swish, gnaw, gnaw, swish, swish, gnaw, gnaw. The sound of our Civilization. (There's no nigger like a dead nigger, they say, and anyway, Asians got oil and niggers ain't.)

Anyway, that sums up Texas Ruling Class in their present, past relation to culture, economy, politics of Nation—and don't forget, future: Top TPD director now figuring out which Party should be honored by his assured Presidential victory.


But Dr. Zantzinger is quite different from these unruly and crude and materially determined Texans. For he is interested in cooperative developmental economics. He thinks the critical need of the 20th Century is a theoretical alternative to the Calvinistic individualism which drives the Capitalist World, or the Marxian socialism which has developed as its alternative. The search for this middle course is his own professional preoccupation. So it is not oil lust, or profits, that is on his mind when he taps the long line of equations on the seminar board with his professional pointer, or stops and steps back to reflect, while twirling the cane round his Harvard ringed finger.

Yes, Harvard, class of '36, major math, then Ph.D. in economics, Columbia '42. A member Young Socialists at Harvard, then the Communist Party U.S.A. briefly during the anti-Fascist United Front days. He went with O.S.S. after Columbia, then taught at newly formed National War College. When Truman began poking into political pasts of government employees under prodding from big

business militarists and Americans for Democratic Action, a friend who knew about his past suggested he move into C.I.A. Later he took one year out from Agency to teach at Center for International Studies at MIT.

Because he enjoyed working with young people, and they seemed to enjoy him, Zantzinger took another leave 'outside' Agency teaching at the University of North Carolina, but actually acting as 'unofficial' advisor to newly formed National Student Association. Of course, the Agency arranged for a foundation grant to cover his salary at U.N.C. and gave him expense money to travel. He was widely attacked in the southern press along with N.S.A. as 'communistic' on the race question. It was one of the most exciting years in his career. In many cases he was working on campus with veterans just returned from Korea who had had the experience of fighting with Negro G.I.'s for the first time in American history, and many of them agreed that it was time the country live up to its commitment to all its citizens. The Agency felt that developing a group of young southerners committed to peaceful and positive change in race relations in the South was absolutely essential to maintaining our worldwide image—especially in Africa and Asia—of the possibilities within our system for democratic change. Dr. Zantzinger preferred being in the South, anyway, working as it were, on the front lines of Freedom, rather than doing intelligence and logistics work as he had for the Agency during the Korean campaign.

Actually, after Korea, he had been assigned by the Agency to work on logistics planning to remove



The search for the middle course is

Zantzinger's own professional preoccupation. . . .

the communistic Arbenz government in Guatemala. When he discovered that Arbenz was actually more of a socialist like himself, and had been democratically elected, he prepared a memorandum arguing against the coup. This caused a number of his colleagues to begin to mutter about his 'loyalty to the team,' so Zantzinger shut up and went ahead on the Action Plan, although he did hear that some parts of his memo were used by a higher official in arguing against the invasion in a presentation to Eisenhower. That made him feel better. After all it wasn't his decision, and by staying in he'd gotten *The Other Side* of the issue presented to the President.

It affected him though. He had to admit it did. So when the Supreme Court ruled in May of '54 that school segregation was no longer legal, and he heard some talk around the Agency that many of the social change techniques they had been developing around the world were probably applicable in the South, and the Agency might get involved, he let it be known that he was interested in the project. By the time Arbenz was successfully overthrown by the Agency in June, Zantzinger was already making plans to move to the University of North Carolina as a "Visiting Professor in Developmental Economics."

After he'd already made his decision to move and the details had been worked out, he was offered a full professorship at Harvard. He was certainly flattered by the offer. After all, Harvard was the most prestigious University in the United States, perhaps the World. It was also his Alma Mater. Filled with nostalgia at the possibility of returning to the University to which he had just barely gained admittance, but from which he had emerged as one of the most distinguished students in mathematics and economics, he was very crestfallen, and even a little insulted, when he discovered that the United Fruit Company, which controls most of the Guatemalan economy and is headquartered in Boston, had approached Harvard and offered to establish a chair for him because of his virtuoso planning work on the Guatemalan invasion. The Company Representative made it clear to him that he would be guaranteed substantial fees in addition to his generous salary at Harvard for consulting with them on maintaining the security of their banana properties in the Caribbean. The Company

wanted to prevent the necessity for future violent coups.

Despite his immediate disappointment that it was business recognition of his skills, rather than his professional colleagues' respect for his theoretical contributions to the discipline, which had resulted in the job offer, he had to admit that he was tempted. For he too abhorred violence. There were better ways to get things done. There was that middle course of development, and a position at Harvard would be an ideal place to pursue his research.

But his role in planning the Guatemalan invasion still did not sit well with him. He talked the Harvard offer over with his wife. She much preferred the idea of moving to Boston, with its large academic and cultural community, than to Chapel Hill, North Carolina. But, as he explained to her, he thought his theoretical work on Alternatives to Communist Development in the Third World would be more credible if he wasn't Professor of the United Fruit Chair for Social Change. His wife reluctantly agreed with him. (She's always been wonderful that way, sacrificing her own interests to his career.)

So Zantzinger went to Carolina to work with the exciting young students across the region who wanted to build a More Progressive South, and saw Student Action through the United States National Student Association as the way to achieve it. He also ran a graduate seminar on Developmental Economics. It was a busy, fulfilling time. Though he was at U.N.C. for only a few years, his erudite and up-to-date conversation, not to mention his widespread contacts--became very well known throughout the campus. In fact, he helped put together a proposal to fund a major regional economic study, the first really since the work of Howard Odum's regionalism school at U.N.C. back in the '30's. He helped pick the people who wrote the major pieces, and, of course, through his contacts at the Agency was very instrumental in getting a large Ford Grant.

Zantzinger's insistence that the racial problems of the South could never be solved without forward movement to ameliorate the existing and persisting economic discrepancies between the various races, ethnic groups in the region, and his superb salesmanship in accumulating and presenting data

to this effect to the right people at the right time gave him a reputation for dynamic leadership of academic and social problem-solving not only in the South but back at Agency headquarters. Having certain problems with integrating diverse ethnic groups into a dynamic and forward moving new Nation, etc. in South Vietnam, the Agency asked Zantzingler if he would come back to Washington, maybe spend some time in Asia, apply knowledge of integration, forward economic movement, etc. learned in underdeveloped South to underdeveloped South Vietnam. His wife wanted to move back to metropolitan USA and he was ready for a Bigger Challenge so back they went to D.C. And shortly Zantzingler was working on interdisciplinary, inter-college combined Agency-A.I.D. Team for Forward Movement in Vietnam--which group provided many of the most innovative and humanistic ideas which led the new and dynamic Kennedy administration to make the Commitment to Save Vietnam from Communism.

But as the effort in Vietnam slowly disintegrated from Nation Building, to shoring up an ever-more-obvious police state with ever-increasing military power, Zantzingler's confident continence turned slowly into a determined resignation that the Salvation of Vietnam was not possible. Indeed, so discouraged did he become with the massive destruction of that land, he increasingly turned his analytical attention to the problems of refugees. It was not a position at the center of an evolving policy dynamic, but he had come to the conclusion that a successful resolution of the situation was impossible; that, in fact, the policy, as it came to be dominated by increasing American military power, was a counterproductive use of American energy, treasure and blood. So he was content with trying to minimize the pain of a failed policy, rather than shouldering the burden for revising or resuscitating that which he felt to be beyond either positive revision or ultimate success.

But while he tried to cope with the refugees of Nation Building abroad, the Rebellion against the Vietnam effort grew at home. And he found himself watching in wonder at the TV images spun across the Pacific, of fires in central cities and assassinations in unending numbers. And always as he watched the "lone" assassins do their work, the memory of the Arbenz incident ate an uneasy illness in his insides. But it seemed increasingly there was no one to talk to, there were only more problems, more refugees to plan for. And if his work was not the progressive, hopeful thing for Asians as he had hoped it would be, neither, he

reconciled himself, was his role primarily destructive, like some. Someone had to be there to put America's best foot forward even if the world seemed increasingly to think we had given up our ideals. If sometimes he almost felt the same way, he cautioned himself against the mistake of confusing the exigencies of the exercise of power, that the United States must maintain to demonstrate a consistency of policy, with criminal or malicious intent, or action, as the more irresponsible war critics increasingly suggested was the corrupt core of our effort.

So at times it was with a great reluctance, a great sense of the difficulty, even tragedy of his role, that he persisted. For the moderate alternative within a misconceived policy may seem irrelevant to outsiders, but for the refugees he had known and helped, he knew his work was worthwhile. And besides it was an important, intellectually stimulating problem to solve. So it is in this role that we find Zantzingler standing at a DoD/NSF greenboard running down his calculations for neat, very neat, and modern New Cities (of 100,000 population each) to be built just inside Thai border, well sealed off by electronic fences and ultraviolet scanners (more products of TPD Corp. via Pentagon contract).

Here's Zantzingler: "According to my calculations these New Cities can be created at a cost well within our National Capacity for Foreign Aid, South East Asian Region Fiscal Year 75. I let this total figure be signified NCFASEAR-FY 75. Divide the number of Asians per city by the number of acres available to each new development to get the Asian acre number. Let that be signified Aa. Now the sum of the Aa . . ."

Air Force General rudely interrupts: "The hell with this regroupin' stuff. We've done that already twenty times. I say bomb the muthafuckers off the face a' tha earth. That's all they understand. How the hell you think we ever got 'em to the table anyway. Let's just say they ain't keepin' up the agreements. Wipe those yellow card carryin' slanteyes off the face of the earth once and for all. And it doesn't cost a penny more. Anyway you know we've got all this unemployment in Seattle. The more B-52's we use in Asia, the more we gotta make in Seattle. And I'll tell you somethin' else too. A guy like Scoop Jackson'll stand by you when the goin' is tough. Them Model Cities type moderates, guys like this Tunney from California, or Hart from Michigan, they're for ya as long as you're payin' Lockheed or GM to build these Modular units for these New Cities. But what do they do when the

fuckin' commies start burnin' the damn camps? They start burnin' the military! Yappin' about cuttin' the military budget, givin' us hell, for what was their doin' in the first place! I say bomb 'em now and get it over with."


Zantzinger: "Well, General, I think you're underestimating our ability to stabilize the situation given the new world balance of power, our new negotiating strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Red China which will prohibit them from encouraging or supporting any rash new tactics by the North Vietnamese. Also there is the factor that this camp will be totally within a country that is a) stable and b) totally controlled by us, therefore limiting the amount of outside attacks that might be mounted. Also, as you quite properly point out, the B-52's should not be forgotten, but the factor of critical importance is to use them in a surgically precise and controlled manner."

AF General: "Oh, bullshit, Doc! You guys think you got an answer for everything."

Navy Admiral (A Southern Gentleman Villain, large smile, low persuasive voice, like blond band leader in "Lady Sings the Blues"): "Now, General. I don't see any need to be rude about this. I think we could carry on our differences in a more civilized manner, don't you? After all, this is the greatest University in the West, the University of California at Berkeley, and if we can't resolve our differences here, where can we? (searching slow smile around room) Dr. Zantzinger has worked very closely with Dr. Kissinger and has a very good sense of what direction the President and his Top Assistant want to move toward. And we all agree, of course, that it is the proper role of the military to fit our needs and plans into the overall evolving strategic concepts of the civilian sector of our society and not impose our own Service Interests in any way that might conflict with the National Interest as Dr. Kissinger and the President, (smile again and pause) are evolving in their unprecedented and innovative New Strategy for World Order (smiles again directly at Zantzinger who nods back weakly).

AF General: "Oh bullshit, Doc!

***You guys think you got an
answer to everything."***



Admiral continues: "And as everyone knows our role is chiefly to complement (draws out syllables emphasizing each one) the plans of the Commander-in-Chief. It's a big job to integrate the solution of the enormous social and economic problems at home with our responsibilities abroad. In my own case, for instance, I feel that the work Litton is doing for the Navy in Mississippi is critically important, and not least for the ships which are being built there and which will ultimately be our last and most impregnable line of defense in Asia. We should never forget that most of the oil in Southeast Asia is offshore and while rubber can be synthesized, Tungsten can be gotten from our secure ally in South Africa, and we could even remove our Asians from the mainland if necessary, oil, gentlemen, on which our whole economy depends—not to mention our Navy and Air Force too (smiles at the Air Force General whose brow is now knotted and teeth gritting in jealousy at his colleague's virtuoso performance)—is an irreplaceable resource which we cannot and shall not, be denied.

Admiral continues: "And in the context of that resource and of the civilian sector's plans, and needs, we should think of our own contribution. In

that light I would like to mention to Dr. Zantzinger that the new technology that Litton is developing in its Mississippi shipyard of modular synthesis of shipbodies, is not only of particular application there, but may very well be the basis for mass produced housing which in the short run could very well dovetail with your evolving plans for New Cities in Thailand. Of course I think we could get substantial support for such an expansion of Litton's contract from Senator Stennis, and although Roy Ash clearly will make no direct move to help in this regard, I think the prestige of his position would do nothing but help your plan for modular development of New Cities in Asia for the Temporary Solution to the Asian question (smiles at Dr. Zantzinger).

"And I think the liberals who might be tempted to attack Ash could easily be satisfied if some of the business could be allocated to them, to California

for Tunney for instance, and also if we had a vigorous recruitment program for blacks in Mississippi, that would even appeal to that community. This could be seen as a necessary forerunner to domestic development. I think many Negroes would see such a development as very positive. They have a great sentiment for Mississippi, you know, and Progress there through Private Enterprise, would be viewed as Progress for Negroes all over this Nation. I think such a budgetary increase, going as it would to the private sector, and moreover to a region of high unemployment and low development, would very much complement what the President is trying to accomplish both at home and abroad."

Fade out: Zintzanger smiling faintly, AF General frowning . . .

NOTES

If one can read only one book on militarism, see Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer (eds.), *The Pentagon Watchers: Students Report on the National Security State* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1970). In it, Robert Borosage's essay, "The Making of the National Security State," is the best analytical summary of 'the situation.' Especially good is his discussion of the historical and sociological causes of the elimination of critical (i.e. Marxist, socialist or anti-imperialist) scholarship in the post-WWII US.

That the problem is much deeper than either the critics of capitalism or the "National Security State" may realize can be best discerned from the Black perspective on American history. See, for example, W. E. B. Du Bois, "The White Masters of the World," in John A. Williams and Charles F. Harris (eds.), *Amistad 2* (New York, Vintage 1971).

Of special interest to southerners, or sociologists of dying or threatened societies, is the analogy between the elimination of intellectual opposition to slavery in the ante-bellum South, and the purging of American society of critics of capitalism during and after World War II as described by Borosage and lived by Zantzinger. For the story of the Old South purges see Clement Eaton, *The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South* (New York, 1964).

Academic economists are only now realizing, and recanting, their role in supplying the 'crackpot Keynesian' rationale for the warfare state. See James L. Clayton's introduction in his *The Economic*

Impact of the Cold War (New York, 1970), for a summary of the history of academic thought on the subject. A collection that emphasizes more radical perspectives, no less 'intellectual,' but definitely less academic, since many of the authors either have been kicked out of, left, or were never allowed in the American 'academy' in the first place, Michael Reich and David Finkelhor, among others, argue that the Military-Industrial Complex is essential to American capitalism's stability. See their essay, "The Military-Industrial Complex: No Way Out," in *Up Against the American Myth, A Radical Critique of Corporate Capitalism Based Upon the Controversial Harvard College Course, Social Relations*, edited by Tom Christoffel, David Finkelhor, Dan Gilbarg (New York, 1970), pp. 148-149. For the most thorough and profound discussion of all these views see Richard Barnet, *The Roots of War* (New York, 1972), esp. Part II, "The Political Economy of Expansionism," pp. 137-240.

The best introduction to the institutional interests and ideological inertia propelling the economy of war can be found in David Horowitz (ed.), *Corporations and the Cold War* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969).

For the role of big capital in the population control issue see Steve Weissman, "Why the Population Bomb Is a Rockefeller Baby," in Ramparts's special ecology issue, May 1970. See Barry Weisberg (ed.), *Ecocide in Indochina: The Ecology of War* (San Francisco, Canfield Press,

1970), and back issues of Ramparts for color pictures of the many means the Military-Industrial Complex has invented to kill Asians, Africans, etc.

For a discussion of the most important of the economic interests (namely oil), which fuels the American Empire, see Barry Weisberg, *Beyond Repair, The Ecology of Capitalism* (Boston, Beacon, 1971), especially Chap. 5, "Oiling the Machine: Automobiles and Petroleum." On oil and Southeast Asia in particular see pp. 140-145.

For an inside view of how the Pentagon views the socio-political impact of a major weapons system, the C-5A, see Jack Raymond, "The Growing Threat of Our Military-Industrial Complex," *Harvard Business Review*, vol. XLXI (May-June, 1968), pp. 59-60. The essay is included in James L. Clayton's *The Economic Impact of the Cold War* (New York: Harcourt, 1970).


On the incentive for, and difficulty of, converting Defense Industry see Seymour Melman (ed.), *The War Economy of the United States*, (New York, 1971), especially the article "Whither California" by Martin Gellen.

On heroin traffic in the South see Gene Guerrero, "Heroin Epidemic Takes Southern Toll," in *South Today*, Oct. 1972. Robert Browning and the editors of Ramparts have collected a great group of magazine articles called *Smack* (New York, 1972). The CIA tried to suppress Alfred W. McCoy's *The Politics of Heroin in Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

Texas, because of its size, has played the most critical role in national Democratic Party politics in this century. Since the industrialization of the South has been carried out largely through Federal War Contracting, under Democratic auspices, Texas has gotten an outsized share of the boodle. See William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York, 1963), esp. p. 71 for the role of Jesse Jones. See also Eliot Janeway, *The Struggle for Survival* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 167, which is a good warfare liberal interpretation of the WW II mobilization. It should be read with I. F. Stone, *Business As Usual* (New York, 1941), and Bruce Catton, *The War Lords of Washington* (New York, 1948), to understand how the class struggles of the 30's ended in the warfare state.

Anyone who has a problem with the concept of 'the ruling class' should read periodicals of this period, both liberal, like *The New Republic* and *The Nation*, and conservative, like *Fortune*.

For the CIA/USNSA connection read Ramparts, February, 1967.



To the author's knowledge no one has yet explored the role of the CIA in the civil rights movement. Most of my black friends active during that period suspect the Agency was involved in the assassinations of John Kennedy, Malcolm X, and Martin King, among others.

The Guatemala episode is detailed in Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution* (New York: Meridian Books, 1968), pp. 229-236.

A Ford funded study edited by Melvin Greenhut and W. Tate Whitman, *Essays in Southern Economic Development* (Durham, 1964), features a lead essay, "Four Decades of Thought on the South's Economic Problems," by Clarence H. Danhof from the crackpot Keynesian perspective including a debunking of the very important "Report to the President on the Economic Conditions of the South" by the National Emergency Committee (Washington, 1938).

The inadequacy of liberal Congressmen to deal with the power of the Pentagon is well analyzed in Derek Shearer's "Reorganizing the Lines of Power," *The Nation*, May 17, 1971. Generally *The Nation* has the best continuing critical coverage of Pentagonism of any publication in the country. Robert Sherrill, its present Washington correspondent, has written the best book on southern politics, *Gothic Politics of the Deep South* (New York, 1969), done to date. The Nation's previous Washington correspondent, I. F. Stone, also does an adequate job on these topics in *The New York Review of Books*.

On Roy Ash and Litton see Les Aspin, "Another Pentagon Bailout: the Litton Ship Fiasco," *The Nation*, December 11, 1972. Also Les Aspin, "The Case Against Roy Ash," *The Nation*, February 26, 1973.

BUYING DEATH POWER

Robert Sherrill interviews Les Aspin and William Proxmire

Even a casual newspaper reader in one of the most out-of-touch cities in America will be aware that there are really only two men in Congress who watchdog Pentagon spending on behalf of the general public. These two men are, of course, Congressman Les Aspin, a junior member of the House of Representatives, and Senator William Proxmire, both of Wisconsin. Proxmire is probably best known to the South as the fellow who blew the lid off the Lockheed scandal and disclosed that the flying hernia, the C-5A, would cost at least \$2 billion more than Lockheed and their allies in collusion, the Air Force, had admitted. Aspin is best known, and hated by defense contractors, for his role in exposing the hilariously inept and costly goings-on at the shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, where Litton Industries is floundering around trying to manufacture some 35 landing helicopter assault ships and 30 destroyers. Litton's waste may soon rival Lockheed's.

The marvelous thing about these two politicians is that there is no logical reason for their successes as watchdogs. Aspin is just about the lowest ranking Democratic member of the House Armed Services Committee, a committee that traditionally has reserved all power to the old bulls. As for Proxmire, he is chairman of a committee that has no legislative powers (no bills come out of the Joint Economics Committee) and that can only obliquely

excuse its interest in defense matters. They must rely very heavily on their staffs to turn up the Pentagon's dirty work, and yet each politician has only the barest skeleton staff to work with—each has only two men who can give only part-time attention to defense budget investigations. Then how do they uncover so much? The answer is in two parts: First of all, both Aspin and Proxmire are born troublemakers, bless their hearts, and they have been around long enough to make friends in the right circles—meaning those circles in which leaks are sprung and secret information comes pouring out. Aspin, for example, made many valuable friends in the Pentagon when he was an aide to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara; many of these old friends nowadays “brown bag” information to him on the sly. The other half of the answer is that they really don't uncover that much scandal. But because everybody else in Congress is sitting on his ass and not uncovering any at all, it only seems that Aspin and Proxmire are doing so much!

In the following interviews, the dull, lethargic, stupid, oppressive, secretive, undemocratic atmosphere hanging over Congressional-Pentagon relations comes through all too clearly. If you wonder why Congress goes along so easily with the Pentagon's budget, perhaps the mood that rises from this interview, like unclean fog rising from the swamp behind a Standard Oil tanker dock, will give part of the answer.

But there is one other rather chilling note that comes out of the interviews, and it is this: Excellent as these men are, their interest is in getting “the biggest bang for the buck”—not in slashing the defense budget by, say, one third, as it could certainly stand to be slashed, with no loss to our security. They want to get a dollar's worth of killing power for a dollar. That is their basic interest. They are thrifty shoppers, not radicals. And yet, such is the benighted mentality of Congress, they are considered radicals.

Robert Sherrill is a precocious southerner, presently living in Washington, who writes with a critical and ironic eye about the shenanigans of our elected “representatives”—reducing them always to the status of mere mortals with feet of sand. His book, *Gothic Politics*, is an excellent documentary of the Dixiecrat legacy. He writes regularly for *The Nation* and a number of other publications. He is the author of *The Accidental President*, and more recently, *Why They Call It Politics: A Guide to American Government* (Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich).

RS: What is your feeling about the expertise of Pentagon officials who come up here to Congress and say they need so much money for so many weapons? Everybody assumes that the Pentagon has oodles of experts and that it would be almost impossible to out-think them. Is this true?

Aspin: No. There are a couple of reasons this assumption of Pentagon expertise isn't true. First of all, they don't have the quality of personnel they used to have. In other words, I think it's mostly military judgment that is at the root of a lot of the requests. There isn't any backup of any sophistication. I think the present defense department is very different from the Bob McNamara defense department. Under McNamara there was some kind of an attempt to make a choice on rationality. When the Pentagon came up with a decision in McNamara's day, there was at least some kind of an attempt to back it up with a rational argument. I don't think that kind of effort exists now.

But secondly, this whole business about the extent of expertise involved in defense planning is terribly overstated. I think a lot of people believe it's a highly computerized kind of scientific process. In fact, you know, it's based upon some very, very simple rules of thumb to determine what our force structure is. If you question those simple assumptions, the whole thing crumbles.

The military mind is one big rule of thumb. They haven't got any justifications for their budget requests. They say we need 15 carriers. The Navy always says we need 15 carriers. And they say this because the Navy for as long as they've lived has been saying we need 15 capital ships. In the old days the battleship was the capital ship, so they said we needed 15 battleships. Now the carrier is the capital ship so the Admirals come to Congress and say we need 15 carriers. Nobody seems to know why 15, but it's based on history, not on

anything rational. You're laughing, but what I tell you is absolutely true. Fifteen is sort of a standard number. I don't know how far it goes back. There is an unpublished thesis up at MIT that says it goes back to the Treaty of 1922 in which we were allowed 15 capital ships. Now we're trying to justify 15 carriers on the basis of that treaty signed two generations ago.

Another thing—it's a rule of thumb that a division can defend 30 kilometres. Any old idiot can look at a 900 kilometre range and divide by 30 and tell you how many divisions are needed according to that rule. Brilliant. Yet everybody thinks there is some kind of computerized programming that tells you how many divisions are needed. I use the word "needed" loosely. These are World War II standards, as modified slightly perhaps by the Korean War. They're always based upon the last war. The rules of thumb are based upon the last war.

RS: Wouldn't the kind of weapons available to the division alter the number of divisions needed? After all, weaponry has improved considerably since World War II.


Aspin: It should—you'd think so, wouldn't you? But nobody over there [at the Pentagon] has ever questioned the number of divisions needed according to the weapons available. They don't tell you why they need so many divisions, or how they made their decision. They just say that they need 15 divisions, or three.

The whole manpower thing is the most underdeveloped area of defense analysis. We've got Rand and Brookings and a lot of universities doing studies on the defense budget. They've studied the strategic weapons question until hell won't have it, with calculations and formulas. Strategic weapons is fun to study; it's much more scientific and much neater than the manpower question. Nobody studies the manpower question.



They are thrifty shoppers, not radicals. Yet, such is the benighted mentality of Congress, they are considered radicals.





"I pledge to you, in Mendel Rivers' name,
that this fight for an adequate number of
nuclear frigates goes on."

—*The Honorable F. Edward Hébert*
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

Consequently, what's happened is that the support structure has gone up fantastically—the number of backup guys you've got for every guy who's actually out there toting a rifle. And that's killing us [killing the budget, that is], and it will kill us more with a volunteer army.

With manpower, we're bogged down with tradition again. Take for example, there are 11 guys in a squad. So why, we ask, do you need 11 guys? Why not 10 guys? Think how many more squads you could have if you made a study that showed you only needed 10. You ask the Pentagon, why do you need 11 guys in a squad, and they have no answer. They tell you Washington used to have 11 in a squad, or 11 looks great on the parade ground when they're marching columns. It's unbelievable. Nobody knows why 11. Suppose you only needed 8; suppose you need 12. Suppose you could make a squad a lot more effective by adding only one more guy. Nobody at the Pentagon ever studies the question. It's the most underdeveloped expertise and the most expensive part of the defense budget. The thing that they put most emphasis on is strategic weapons, which is really a small part of the budget, money-wise. If you're worried about the size of the budget, don't look at strategic weapons, look at manpower.

RS: *You're on the Armed Services Committee. Do you get a chance to ask Pentagon witnesses why they need a certain weapon, or a certain number of weapons, or a certain number of divisions?*

Aspin: You don't get very far in the questioning. You've got five minutes to ask. You can get filibustered for five minutes by the guy answering. They do it all the time. You don't get

any answers.

If you want information, you don't rely on the committee testimony. It's useless to ask them big questions like that. You ask them much more specific questions: Is the Mark 48 torpedo operational yet? What do you mean by operational? How many volts is it working on? The questions you ask have nothing to do with need. There are certain kinds of questions Congress is concerned about and certain kind they aren't.

What Congress is worried about is where are you buying it? Does it live up to what it's supposed to, does it do what it's supposed to? Those are the kinds of questions Congress concerns itself with. Is it being produced on time? Is there a cost overrun? If you look at Armed Services Committee hearings you'll see the members are never worried about should we buy 700 F-14's or 350 F-14's. The question is, does the F-14 work like it's supposed to? Is it coming in on a cost overrun? Is it performing right? Who's got the contract? Are we going to the right contractors?

RS: *How many on Armed Services would like to address themselves to the question of need?*

Aspin: I'm the only one. Well, maybe a couple of others would be interested. But virtually all the people on the committee represent areas which have defense contracts in them. The questions they ask are relevant for guys representing those kinds of constituencies.

RS: *If you do sneak in a question of need, do the Pentagon witnesses lie to you?*

Aspin: No, they just don't answer it. They filibuster for five minutes. Let's take a case: The Navy is buying some new kinds of submarines—not

nuclear, not ballistic. How many should they have? We did some studies when I was in the Pentagon on how many subs we should have, and based on the kind of assumptions you make about what they're for, basically you should have 60 to 65. It depends on what you want to do with them. We now have 105 submarines of the older kind that these SSN688 attack submarines are replacing. So the hassle has always been between the Navy, which wants to replace them all on a one for one basis, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which wants about 60 subs. I asked Admiral Zumwalt how many he wanted to buy. He said it depends on how many the Russians have. That's the kind of non-answer you get. It doesn't depend on how many the Russians have. So back and forth we went, chewing up my five minutes, and we didn't get anywhere. Finally, he supplied something for the record in which he talked about the number of submarines and implied that 105 was the minimum and that he wanted to go above it. There's no answer. You can't pin him down. Zumwalt is a savvy person. He understands what you're talking about. He understood my question. He just didn't want to answer it. He's not like some of the chiefs who don't understand systems analysis, don't understand the reports. Zumwalt understands the systems but doesn't want to answer. He wants to keep his options open, so every year we authorize four additional SSN's or six additional SSN's or five additional--we don't know how many we're ultimately buying but every year we buy three, four, five, six more. But we can't find out what we're building towards.

RS: In other words you would like to hear Zumwalt's reasoning for saying we need so many submarines to face off the Russians?

Aspin: Yes, and you never get the answer. If I were chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I could find out. But I'm number 41 out of 41 members. I get five minutes. But the fact is, I don't need to ask Zumwalt how he gets his numbers. I can go and ask other people. I can go over to the Center for Naval Analysis and talk to them. I can go to the people at Rand, at Brookings, ex-Pentagon people. There are guys who will tell you what you need to know, but nobody will tell you in the hearings.

RS: Okay, so you can find out some of the real answers to some of the real questions if you go outside the government or establish leaks within the Pentagon. How many people on the committee do that?

Aspin: Well, I would guess four or five.

RS: So the rest of them pass these things in ignorance. They don't know what the answer is in terms of meeting a threat.

Aspin: Yep. The only exception to that is in the case, I think, of missile strength, vis-a-vis the Russians. In the strategic balance area, there is some concern about how much we need and where we're going and whether we're building more or less. This does get discussed. But in any of the general purpose programs, nobody knows. For example, the Navy has a long-range program to buy 30 DD963's--thirty destroyers out of Litton in Pascagoula, Miss. But nobody has ever, to my knowledge, ever justified why we need thirty DD963's. Nor have I ever heard within the committee any rational justification for why we should build another carrier.

RS: So what does the lack of rational discussion of weapons needs mean to the people in terms of national defense? Do we have enough, too much, or too little defense?

Aspin: The real problem is that costs are going up faster than effectiveness. For example, the F-4, which is the current fighter plane, costs roughly \$4 million apiece. The F-14 which is replacing it will cost 116 million apiece. Nobody in their right mind is suggesting that the F-14 is four times better, but it's going to cost us four times more. That's the real problem. I don't know how to solve it. One way to deal with it, and the way the military and defense departments deal with it, is just to cut back the buy. We buy fewer than we need but at the same costs as the original program. That's how people like Proxmire can say that we can both cut the defense department budget and increase strength:



Watchdog



"YUM YUM!"

he's talking about this problem. When cost growth goes into the budget, automatically the thing pushes toward the panic point. The program goes beyond accounting control, so they cut back. I don't know how many C-5A's we were going to buy, but we cut back to 81. The F-111's were cut back. They were going to buy nine of Litton's LHA's and now they're going to buy five. Gets to a point where costs get so high that Congress starts to lean on the Pentagon and they panic and cut back.

RS: Which makes their original argument for the necessity of buying nine rather meaningless.

Aspin: Totally kicks it right out. We originally were going to buy 700 F-14's. Now we're buying 300 some odd. But what does that say? It says the defense of the country is really a lot weaker.

RS: Either that or they were lying to begin with.

Aspin: Yeah. But in any case, it's weaker than it could have been had costs been cut down.

RS: Is Congress kept pretty much in the dark as to what kind of thinking the Pentagon puts into the defense budget? How it arrives at certain budget requests, in terms of the threats to be met?

Proxmire: Yeah, Congress is kept in the dark. There should be public hearings in the executive branch before the budget is finally arrived at and sent to the President. The testimony should be given in hearings before the Office of Management and Budget. The reason there should be public hearings on the public's budget before the OMB sends it to the President is that after the President puts his okay on the budget, Congress only marginally modifies it.

Another reason the budget should be thrashed out publicly before it gets to the President is that when Congress does make changes in it, the

President just ignores the changes. We have frequently pointed out that Congress has cut Nixon's defense budget by about \$16 billion total since he's been in office, yet spending has remained at about the same level every year—around \$76 billion every year. The reason the executive department is able to maintain the budget at any level it wants is that they have these accumulated balances from the past. It's very confusing. We pass an appropriations bill for maybe \$76 billion, but they spend more or less as they choose. What we appropriate doesn't limit the amount they'll spend in that year.

RS: How hard is it to get Pentagon witnesses to give you information when you ask why they want a certain weapon?

Proxmire: You're pressing into an area that we haven't gone into. This is a Joint Economic Committee, not a military committee or a foreign relations committee. Therefore, we don't really feel that we have the same kind of responsibility or the same kind of expertise or the same kind of justification to be getting into the strategic foreign policy and military justifications. We are an economic committee. However, when you buy billions and billions of dollars of these things, then the military's effect on the economy becomes quite obvious and we get into the general question of weaponry need.

On the C-5A, for example, we got into the fact that we had a big cost overrun and that the thing isn't working, that there were all kinds of mistakes, that procurement was handled very badly. We also in the course of that investigation got some justification of the use of the C-5A. Many people still feel that it is a troop carrier, and of course it isn't a troop carrier. It is designed to carry out-sized equipment that can't be carried in the great surplus we have of other military transport planes. You can't carry big things in anything except a C-5A. There was a very limited purpose for it, and all they needed was 40 of those things and they ordered 120. Why they ordered 120 they never were able to justify.

RS: Was this the first time the question was asked the Pentagon? That is, when they appeared before the Joint Economic Committee, was this the first time they were publicly asked why they needed and why they wanted the C-5A, that you know of?

Proxmire: Yes, and as a matter of fact, I think there were even some members of the Armed Services Committee who didn't know what the C-5A was supposed to do. Some of them, I think, thought it was a transport for troops.

RS: So Congress is rather ignorant of the things they are asked to spend billions on?

Proxmire: I think that's right. But I think we're getting much better. For instance, on the close support aircraft. We developed in the Joint Economic Committee--and by the way, it shouldn't have been done in the JEC, it should have been done in the Armed Services Committee--we developed information that showed gross duplication on this aircraft. We have a very good, young analyst, Roxx Hamachek, a hell of a bright guy, who did some good hard work in determining that there were actually three different planes being requested--one for the Marines, one for the Air Force, one for the Army--all of which were designed to do the same thing. Two of these planes cost more than the third and were far less efficient than the third. But each one of the services was trying to get its own plane. We testified before the Armed Services Committee, and as a result they accepted our position *en toto*. Now, that discovery shouldn't have been left up to an economist, which Hamachek is, and a chairman of a committee like the Joint Economic Committee. We shouldn't have had to come before the Armed Services Committee and testify. It should have been done by the ASC in the first place. But they do deserve a lot of credit for changing their mind.

RS: Obviously part of the Armed Services Committee's ignorance comes from an inadequate presentation by Pentagon witnesses.

Proxmire: I agree with that. Let me give you a couple of examples. There is a hell of a lot of money in the defense budget--people say \$2 to \$3 billion--for the CIA. The damn thing is so poorly analyzed that this never comes out. Or nobody seems to know where it is. There is a lot of money in the budget for military foreign aid. Military foreign aid is now \$6 billion. Only about a billion of that, a little more than a billion, is in the regular foreign aid budget. Much of the rest of it is in the defense budget, and yet it is so badly analyzed that an enormous amount of the money is never discussed when their witnesses come to Congress.

On the other hand, when McGovern comes forward with a budget--as he did during his campaign--or Urban Coalition with their Counter-budget or Brookings Institution, they start with what our defense responsibilities are. Our security responsibilities. We have certain responsibilities in regard to NATO, certain responsibilities in regard to the continental United States. We have a demand, therefore, for certain general purpose forces. We have a strategic deterrent we have to

build. You start from the bottom and say how much does it cost to do this and this and this. Brookings does that. Urban Coalition does that. McGovern does that. But we don't get that from the Defense Department when they come up. They don't break it down into its basic, fundamental military ingredients. They are afraid to do it because they are hiding a lot of stuff in this big budget which was never really discussed or examined publicly before.

RS: Do you think the Pentagon has any better analysts, defense experts, than you have or that the chairman of the Appropriations Committee has?

Proxmire: One of the unfortunate aspects of the Appropriations Committee is that they just don't have anybody to do this job [*appraise the defense budget*]. They have two people to handle the entire defense budget. These guys are damned competent people, but they are really harried.

RS: How many do you have on the Joint Economic Committee?

Proxmire: Well, on the Foreign Aid Appropriations Subcommittee we have one-half guy, on the Joint Economic Committee we have two guys, but of course they are doing other things, too. They just work on the defense budget part time.

RS: How many do you need?

Proxmire: I've been trying to get . . . Let me tell you a story because I think it's pretty interesting. We had a leak out of the Pentagon. I forget what weapons systems we were challenging, but at any rate we found out that their own Office of Systems Analysis said it wasn't efficient and wouldn't work. We got this leak that the Office of Systems Analysis had recommended against the weapon.

Mel Laird called up. He was very nice about it, but he complained, 'Now, look, Bill, you are just going to destroy the Office of Systems Analysis. You used what they told you and now I'll never be able to use them again.' He said, 'Why don't you develop your own office of systems analysis? You wouldn't need a lot of people.'

I thought that was a pretty good idea. At least we would be independent. I thought we could do it with three good people. For that we'd need \$125,000. So I asked for that, and I got \$30,000. What always happens when you get \$30,000? What the hell, you hire another economist, which helps a little but not nearly to the extent that you had been planning. It's hard to set up something like that. The other committees say you're building an empire. They say you're getting into their area. So they cut you down.




Photo by Bill Fibben

Rather than giving private industry more control over society, conversion could mean greater public control of the economy.

CONVERTING THE WAR MACHINE

by Derek Shearer

© by Derek Shearer

The discussion of "conversion" reflects a concern that the military-industrial sector of the U.S. economy has monopolized the country's resources, while the pressing domestic needs continue to go unmet. But translating this legitimate anxiety into political action has been plagued with difficulty; not the least of reasons for this is the lack of a coherent plan which could combine political and economic considerations into a program of alternative uses for defense money and facilities for meeting domestic needs.

Thus far all the talk of conversion has failed to yield such a carefully conceived program. In fact, some plans offered in the name of conversion may even push the solutions to America's domestic inequities further from our reach. For example, one policy seriously proposed is to use the savings from a reduced military budget to contract with defense firms for solutions to social needs. Many large defense companies have already started devoting part of their operations to winning government contracts in such areas as drug abuse education (Lockheed), waste treatment systems (General Dynamics), urban renewal planning (TRW), teacher evaluation systems (Aerojet-General), criminal record systems (Lockheed), and transportation planning (North American Rockwell).

There are inherent difficulties in applying the aerospace industry's systems approach to problem-solving to the social and political dimensions of our society. The comment of one

aerospace company president illustrates the point: "Creating a system to warn a field army that the enemy has launched an attack of germ warfare is basically no different from creating a system to control juvenile delinquency." If America turns its domestic programs over to a new socio-industrial complex led by defense contractors, its chances of preserving democratic structures seem even more problematic.

An alternative approach is to follow the maverick economist Ben Seligman in viewing conversion as an opportunity for the "reorganization of the lines along which power is disposed; it means a new political economy." Rather than giving private industry more control over society, conversion could mean greater public control of the economy. Under this approach large defense budget cuts could offer the opportunity for transforming military facilities—defense installations and "private" production plants—into community-controlled economic development cooperatives and publicly-owned production authorities at the local, regional and national level.

Derek Shearer writes a regular column for Ramparts magazine called "Poor Derek's Almanac," which features a review of alternative groups, notices of new publications and films, and other essential information. He is co-author of *The Pentagon Watchers*, a collection of essays on the military establishment.

The obvious and undeniable public nature of the military business (see box) provides immediate legitimacy for such a program of alternative, nonmilitary use of existing facilities under public control and ownership.

Plans

Similar alternatives have been proposed in a general way before. By the end of 1943, Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers had suggested creation of a peace production board to be composed of labor and management to oversee reconversion to a post-war economy. Reuther talked of publicly-owned and operated corporations to produce mass housing and transportation. **Business Week**, in January, 1944, claimed the Reuther plan had "socialistic earmarks." "It proposed," wrote the magazine, "that resumption of civilian goods output should be conditioned by social needs rather than free competition."

Angered by the closing of aircraft plants in Michigan as the war came to an end, Reuther published a proposal in mid-1945 titled "Are War Plants Expendable?" In it Reuther suggested establishment of a Housing Production Authority and a Railroad Equipment Authority modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority; he described in some detail how government-owned aircraft and aircraft engine, magnesium, aluminum, electrical equipment, ball bearing and tank plants could be organized to produce light-weight rolling stock and low-cost housing.

Reuther's proposal was never given serious consideration by the government. Instead, wartime

facilities were either sold at a loss to taxpayers, large private firms, or kept in reserve and made available to military contractors when the military budget rose with the onset of the Cold War.

More than two decades later economist John Kenneth Galbraith, writing in the **New York Times** Sunday magazine, noted the public character of military contractors and proposed nationalization of major defense firms. Galbraith's proposal elicited little public interest either in the press or in Congress. Galbraith neglected to couple his proposal with a discussion of a reduced military budget and alternative, non-military uses for the nationalized firms. As Richard Kaufman, staff economist for the Joint Economic Committee, pointed out in his book **The War Profiteers**, simply nationalizing the military firms without reducing America's military profile would increase the power of the Pentagon.

Certainly this was not the intent of Galbraith's proposal; he was concerned with controlling the military-industrial complex and thought nationalization a way to achieve his goal—but by neglecting to discuss what uses would be made of the nationalized firms, Galbraith made it difficult for potential supporters to see any real difference between the way these firms operate under the current procurement arrangements and the way they would operate under outright government ownership, especially if they would still be primarily concerned with military production.

It is not difficult to understand why neither Reuther nor Galbraith's proposals received much support. While the U.S. government has, throughout the country's history, provided a variety

Maintaining a steady stream of new weapon systems that keep the defense dollars flowing is one familiar way the government supports the defense industry. But the taxpayer is subsidizing hundreds of military contractors in many other ways:

Defense contractors utilize, often at no cost to themselves, some \$14.6 billion worth of government-owned property (land, plants and equipment).

\$2,600,000,000 worth of taxpayer financed equipment is in the hands of private contractors. GE, North American Rockwell, AVCO, General Dynamics, GM, and Lockheed each had over \$75 million in equipment at their disposal.

Following a policy of "socialism for the rich," public money, through loans and stock purchases, is used to cushion failing defense businesses. In recent months, the government thwarted Lockheed's bankruptcy with a \$250

million loan guarantee; the maker of the F-14, Grumman Aircraft, got a \$15 million loan from the Navy in December, 1972.

Private shipyards are anchored by the taxpayers' dollars with the US Navy accounting for 70% of their business. Nine more yards are owned outright by the public and used by private firms.

Government money also accounts for half the net worth of airframe manufacturing firms, half the business of the entire electronics industry, and one third of the engineering and scientific jobs in private industry.

Of the thirty-five companies with the highest cumulative totals of defense contracts (1960-67), eleven got over 60% of their sales revenue from the Pentagon; twenty-one had 35% or more of their sales come from the taxpayers' dollars via the military.



Photo by Bill Fibben

of subsidies to private enterprise, the government—except in the case of TVA and a few ammunition arsenals—has rarely engaged in the production of economic goods.

Economist Emile Benoit noted in 1962 that a “block to the acceptance of a satisfactory adjustment program (to disarmament) is the widespread hostility to an expansion of federal nondefense programs.” (Nonmilitary federal purchases of goods and services were only 2.3 percent of GNP in 1970, in contrast to 4.6 percent in 1938.) Increased defense spending does not threaten business interests precisely because the money goes to private firms and the products—weapons—do not compete with private enterprise.

This is not to say that the government, even in an economy where capitalist relationships predominate, could not produce some economic goods. However, as economist Paul Sweezy explains, “There is no end of useful projects which government could undertake at any given time—if it were free to compete with private enterprise; but of course government is not free to compete with private enterprise; in fact it is here that the resistance of the capitalists to the extension of government activities is at its maximum.”

To overcome the hostility and opposition of American business is not easy and can only be

done by mobilizing political support for alternative public programs which are clearly spelled out and carefully defined.

Such a program of conversion would be the kind of “non-reformist reform” that Belgian economist Andre Gorz discusses in **Strategy for Labor**. A non-reformist reform, writes Gorz, “is one which is conceived not in terms of what is possible within the framework of a given system or administration, but in view of what should be made possible in terms of human needs and demands.

“In other words a struggle for non-reformist reforms—for anti-capitalist reforms—is one which does not base its validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria and rationales.”

In sketching such a transitional program for conversion, our first assumption is that at least four-fifths of the military budget is not necessary for the defense of the U.S. The National Urban Coalition, surely no radical outfit, revealed in its **Counterbudget** that “pure defense of the United States actually costs very little in comparison to the total size of our so-called ‘national defense’ budget.” The following chart, derived by commentator I. F. Stone from the military figures for fiscal year 1972 shows that what the military budget really goes for is the overseas military empire that the U.S. has erected since WWII for the purpose of “containing communism.”

Nuclear Deterrent for Defense	\$16.3 billion
Pax Americana	\$44.0 billion
Vietnam War	\$14.8 billion
 Total	 \$74.5 billion

Most of the money in the budget, listed above in the category Pax Americana, is spent for conventional forces which are geared to the defense of other countries. These troops are stationed throughout western Europe and Asia to support America's foreign policy commitments. The funds included in the category of Nuclear Deterrent provide for a strategic arsenal that is more than sufficient to deter attack on the U.S. Former Defense Secretary McNamara, and a number of ex-presidential science advisors have frequently testified to the "overkill" capacity of America's nuclear arsenal. Professor Seymour Melman has calculated that the U.S., given a radical change in foreign policy, could provide for national defense and allocate soldiers to participate in UN-sponsored police actions for approximately \$10 billion annually.


Given this perspective, what sort of alternative programs are feasible, using the military-oriented facilities that would be made available by the shrinking of the U.S. military-industrial complex?

Military Installations

Some federal planning has occurred in the past in the conversion of surplus military bases. As part of Defense Secretary McNamara's cost-reduction program an Office of Economic Adjustment was created in the Pentagon to aid communities effected by Pentagon cutbacks. (The actual military budget did not decline, but attempts were made to save money by closing excess bases and raising efficiency in the Pentagon.) The OEA's role is one of a catalyst: it endeavors to stimulate action at the local level to plan for adjustment to the cutbacks, not to fight the closings. OEA officials bring various federal experts to the community and through meetings with community officials try to identify federal programs which the community might participate in.

A semi-official history of OEA by John E. Lynch of the Institute for Defense Analysis states that through August, 1968, OEA had participated in the establishment of twenty-five industrial parks, eighteen educational centers, and eleven municipal airports at former military installations. These developments were aided by McNamara's institution in 1961 of an "excess package" disposal

Assignment: Communications in Saigon



The Bell System is often consulted by the Armed Forces for advice on communications. Recently, when communications problems in Saigon were handicapping joint efforts there, we sent a team of experienced Bell System men to help find the answers. After a survey of the facilities and operations, our men came up with answers that will help increase efficiency of military communications in the area.

Wherever our Armed Forces serve, men and women of the Bell System are ready to cooperate in every way possible. Right now, they are working in military installations all over the world.

It is another implementation of our basic policy. "In communications, the defense of the nation comes first."

AT&T Bell System
American Telephone & Telegraph
and its subsidiaries

policy in which most of the office and production equipment not needed to satisfy other Pentagon purchasing requirements remains in place and is disposed as a package deal.

After an excess military installation has been offered for use to other federal agencies through the Government Services Administration (GSA), first priority for the facility goes to the local community, which is able to acquire the facility without bidding against private developers. Moreover, when the facilities are to be publicly owned, there are a number of discounts made available by the GSA to the community. The discount for educational institutions, hospitals, airports, and conservation facilities is 100 percent; for use as parks and recreation it is 50 percent.

In its publicity booklets OEA proudly notes the successful adjustments made to base closures by such communities as Presque Isle, Maine, and Salina, Kansas. For example, Schilling Air Force Base in Salina, a former Strategic Air Command post, was converted into a technical institute used for expansion of Kansas Wesleyan University and

as a site for a new municipal airport.

OEA has also been instrumental in making available to communities new federal programs. The Labor Department's Manpower Training Act financed job training in Presque Isle, Maine, Mobile, Alabama, and York, Pennsylvania. The Commerce Department's Area Redevelopment Administration (now called the Economic Development Administration) provided Presque Isle with over \$10 million in loans for establishing new businesses. The Commerce Department also made loans to non-profit industrial development corporations in some communities, as did the Small Business Administration.

The success of OEA is, of course, related to the scale of its operations. For the most part it has not concerned itself with the development problems of large urban areas or of communities affected primarily by cutbacks in employment by private military contractors. Because OEA is a creature of the Pentagon, called into being not by the desire for conversion, but by political expediency to soften the political repercussions of McNamara's base closings, it has not taken an advocacy role and has not, consequently, encouraged state and local areas dependent on military spending to plan for conversion in advance of announced cutbacks. Instead, by the nature and size of the organization (it has 10 or so employees and a professional staff of 4) it is dependent on the decisions of the Pentagon.

Nevertheless, the practical experience generated by the OEA since 1961 suggests that decentralized economic development of former military facilities in which the federal government provides resources, but leaves the development planning to the local community, can succeed. Such an approach offers possibilities which, when

applied on a much larger scale and with a preference for public ownership, could be useful in assuring democratic planning and establishment of state and local public enterprises.

There is one example of the conversion of government-owned military production facilities to non-military uses under public ownership: the nitrate plant at Muscle Shoals, Alabama. This plant, which had been constructed for the production of munitions for World War I, was turned over to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933. It became the nucleus of a fertilizer research and development program. With this facility and additions made over the years, TVA maintains a National Fertilizer Development Center, which is a major source of new fertilizer technology for the country.

Technological breakthroughs pioneered by the center have aided small businesses and farmers' cooperatives in the Tennessee Valley region. In addition to work in the area of fertilizers, TVA provides technical assistance on pollution control to cities and industries in the region. Working through state and local agencies, TVA aids in research on economic development of the area; it

*... our first assumption is that
at least four-fifths of the military
budget is not necessary for
the defense of the U.S.*



specifically assists local government in carrying out community improvement projects.

All together there are over 500 major military installations in the U.S. worth approximately \$20-30 billion in initial investment. Under the proposed reduced military budget most of these installations would become available for use in stimulating economic development, either as research and development centers or as production facilities owned and controlled by the local community through a community-development corporation.

Shipyards

The Pentagon owns and operates nine shipyards including six ship-building yards. Private shipbuilding yards, which have decreased in number from 50 in WWII to 13 today, are heavily dependent on government contracts and subsidies. But U.S. shipyards are in trouble. While U.S. foreign trade is 25-30% of the world total, less than 7% is carried in U.S. ships. The primary reason is that the shipbuilding industry cannot compete in the world shipping market. (Higher labor costs and costs of materials mean U.S. yards must be more productive in order to make up for the higher costs of production.)

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Ships produced for the Pentagon are among the most technically advanced in the world, but they are produced at costs not even close to competitive standards in the nonmilitary market. One of the newest shipyards—the Litton “Shipyard of the Future” at Pascagoula, Mississippi—was made possible only by military contracts and is already plagued with cost overruns and delays.

One of the consequences of the lack of competitiveness of U.S. shipyards has been the deterioration of the U.S. fishing industry. The U.S. fishing fleet is characterized by a high percentage of obsolescent, small-sized vessels which have limited capabilities for operating over long periods at sea and which carry outmoded equipment. Research and development on the design of fishing vessels is minimal.

A program of replacing old, outdated ships with new, modern fishing vessels could well be one




Photo by Bill Fibben

use to which military shipyards could be put. Such a program might be run under two regional coast shipping production authorities, one for the east and one for the west coast. The ships produced could then be leased to fishermen's cooperatives in various states.

Shipyards also have facilities which can fabricate large metal structures. For example, Japanese shipyards currently manufacture for export complete steel mills, oil refineries and even complete shipyards. They have teamed up with electrical firms to produce generating plants and hydroelectric equipment. Shipyards can also manufacture heavy tools such as giant presses and drop hammers. Other possible products of shipyards include: barges and floating equipment, hydrofoils, sea mining equipment, desalination plants, prefabricated housing and industrial plants, supertankers and bulk carriers.

Attempts have been made to convert a few excess shipyards to nonmilitary uses. At the former Brooklyn Navy Yard a 37-member board—the Commerce, Labor and Industry Corporation of Kings (CLICK)—has been set up to establish an urban industrial park on the site. However, development of the navy yard has been halted by much bickering between political and labor leaders in New York City and by attempts to “save the yard” and regain Navy contracts. And the industrial plans for the yard rely primarily on bringing in private enterprise to use the facilities, not the establishment of public authorities to run the yard.

Aircraft

Except for the technical work in designing a plane, the methods and production equipment utilized by aircraft manufacturers are similar to those in a job shop performing most large metal-working tasks. This is an important factor in possible conversion of this industry since the potential growth of the civil air transport market—whether publicly owned or not—would not be enough to offset a reduced demand for military planes. Even increased production of smaller planes, such as short-take-off-and-landing aircraft for domestic runs, would not nearly utilize the available production facilities.

A technical study by McConogh and Zimmerman concludes that air frame facilities could be used to produce rapid transit vehicles, low-cost housing units, bridges (especially for less industrialized countries) and hydrofoils. These products, though in small quantity, are being produced by some airframe manufacturers today.

For example, United Aircraft is making a prototype high speed vehicle for the Dept. of Transportation and Rohr Company has produced mass transit units for the San Francisco Bay Area Transit system.

Facilities of aircraft engine manufacturers also have nonmilitary uses. Turbine engines used in jets can be used to power mass transit vehicles, ships, and electric generator plants. Such uses are already being made. Engines developed originally for military use are now being sold by General Electric in the commercial market. GE's T-58 military turboshaft, used in a variety of helicopters, has been adapted into the LM100 gas turbine for marine and industrial uses. The engine provides propulsion for hydrofoils and is used in oil well fracturing units, gas pipeline pumping, and emergency power application. The TF 39 turbofan developed for the C-5A transport has been adapted by GE into the LM 2500 marine gas turbine. Gas turbines are also becoming important in generating electricity for utilities.

It is conceivable that airframe and air engine facilities could be organized into regional production authorities to produce mass transit vehicles for metropolitan areas and low-cost, mass housing, engines for ships, and generators for public utilities.

Electronics

The military's missiles, communications systems, and space program are three of the largest single markets for the electronics industry. Firms vary greatly in size, but in each field there are a few very large producers such as IBM, RCA, or GE. Many smaller firms have grown up in industrial parks around universities such as MIT and Stanford.

A study by John E. Ullmann of Hofstra University estimates that new markets for electronics products include: road traffic automation, rail automation, air traffic control, satellite communications, education, electronic libraries, medical diagnostics and monitoring and medical prosthetics.

The fact that most electronics firms use their own property would entail judgments about what plants should be nationalized and what the scale of ownership and control should be. One possibility is for the federal government to provide technical aid and loans to unions and/or community groups to take over and run electronics plants which have been closed by American firms fleeing to plants in Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico. These new firms could be given contracts to develop nonmilitary products

and components for work undertaken by the new shipping, housing, and transportation authorities and on projects for state and local institutions.

Research and Development

In 1965 a House Government Operations Committee estimated that two-thirds of all scientists and engineers engaged in research and development (R&D) in the U.S. were employed on federally-funded projects. And 80 percent of federal funds are supplied by the Pentagon, NASA and the AEC. Almost all of the R&D work in the nation's universities and think tanks is sponsored by the Pentagon—and most of what is called R&D in private industry is not so much research as product design, such as model changes in the auto industry. Studies and some actual experience in conversion of lab facilities from military to nonmilitary work indicate that a transfer of R&D energies would have enormous benefits in such fields as pollution control, medicine, and recycling.


Such conversion is mostly a matter of shifting funds and priorities. For example, Professor R.F. Probst, in a speech at the March 4, 1969, "Research Stoppage Day", related how the Fluid Mechanics Lab at MIT purposefully began to convert from war-related to civilian-oriented research. Among the lab group were James Keck, a nuclear physicist who had done research on the development of atomic bombs and ballistic missiles; Ascher Shapiro, whose field had been jet aircraft; and James Fay and Probst, whose work had centered on ballistic and anti-ballistic missile systems.

Probst and his colleagues turned their expertise to research on air and water pollution; on how to prevent oil spills on water; the fluid mechanics of assisting a weakened heart; and the desalting of water by separating ice crystals from sea water. These problems, Probst noted, "appear to be vastly different—certainly different from the types of problems encountered in nuclear explosions or missile re-entry. However, the answer is that they are not that different. They all involved fluid mechanical and chemical kinetic concepts, so that the real efforts were in reconverting our own thinking from one area of research to another but not necessarily in starting from scratch..."

One problem Probst's lab did have was in getting money from non-military sources to carry on this research.

With money available and a reorientation to civilian problems federally sponsored research centers would produce amazing results. Seymour Melman, writing in the Columbia Forum, has pointed out: "While the outer limits of feasibility in technologies are set by knowledge of nature, the selection (design) of preferred technology, in an industrial society, is controlled by social, largely economic criteria. Men select from an array of available or conceivable technological options to suit specific social requirements."

By changing the criteria and social requirements through a public conversion program, research and development personnel could direct their energies toward developing nonpolluting energy sources, recycling systems, decentralized



Drawing by R. L. Rucker

information systems, etc.

Research centers, like the Institute for Defense Analysis or the Stanford Research Institute, which have done strategic planning and social systems research, for the military could concentrate on problems of regional transportation, pollution control, power production, etc. which face state and local governments.

Retraining Technical People

The problem of shifting technically trained personnel into nonmilitary work is not as great as is sometimes assumed. A number of studies sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency conclude that "most defense jobs which appear to be unique can be related to counterparts in other industries, if they are broken down into their component duties..." A study of the missile industry in California concluded that most jobs have counterparts in civilian-oriented industries, sufficiently similar to permit transfer with little or no additional training. One of the major obstacles is the lack of cost-consciousness on the part of military scientists and engineers, as well as the lack of job opportunities.

Lloyd Dumas, in a study in 1970, investigated job transfer for military-oriented technical personnel and concluded:

If general and complete disarmament were to be accomplished now, an estimated 533,900 scientists and engineers would be laid off by the major defense employers, assuming that the defense-oriented industries were able to convert successfully to civilian production. These more than half a million technologists, who are displaced from both the type of work and the industry [or government affiliation] of previous employment, would then have to begin to acquire further education in order to prepare themselves for re-employment in a civilian-oriented economy in which many of their skills are obsolete and in which the mode of operation is quite different from that to which they were accustomed. Almost all of these men and women could, within a re-education period of 1 1/2 years or less, qualify for and find employment in six major areas: high school teaching, construction, pollution, transportation and public utilities, food and related products, and various agencies of the federal government.

Through federally-sponsored retraining programs many of these scientists and engineers could join the staff of new R&D centers and production



authorities in the already discussed areas of transportation, housing, and shipping, as well as the technical staffs of state and local government.

In fact, a few such pilot programs, which admittedly barely scratch the surface of the problem, have been started by the government. In March, 1971, the Department of Housing and Urban Development announced a \$1.2 million pilot project to put unemployed aerospace professionals to work on urban problems. In April, the government announced that the Technology Mobilization and Reemployment Program would provide \$25 million to retrain approximately 10,000 scientists and engineers for new fields. An additional \$10 million would pay for moving expenses, travel, and research. The program was directed at cities hard hit by the temporary cutbacks in military

procurement in 1970 and 1971.

In addition, in 1971 Senator Kennedy introduced The Conversion, Research, Education and Assistance Act bill which would provide \$500 million in loans to nonprofit Community Conversion Corporations, NSF fellowships to technical personnel, and SBA loans to small technically-oriented firms. The amount is not adequate, but it is an indication of a direction in which the Congress should move.

Under the new programs mentioned previously many scientists and engineers would be hired by new regional and state authorities. It is also possible to outline a program where federal and state funds would be used to support establishment of "public interest engineering firms" to work with cooperatives and state and local government; and an increase in technical personnel in state and local programs would aid in the broadening of public power programs, pollution control, mass transit, etc.

Any retraining program would, of course, have to provide for some sort of income maintenance, credit payment moratoriums, health insurance payments and relocation insurance. Such transition benefits would also be available to production workers affected by the conversion program. (Seymour Melman has drafted a model Defense Workers Benefits bill which outlines such a program.)

Nationalization

The conversion of military facilities would obviously have to be coordinated at the federal level and would entail some outright nationalization of property held by private firms. The rearrangement of the use of government-owned facilities, some of which are in private hands (such as the Lockheed plant at Marietta, Georgia, or some of Boeing's plants in Wichita, Kansas) would not pose too many legal problems. A new government Defense Production Agency would have to be established, under Congressional control, not Executive, to maintain the minimal military production necessary for the real defense of the country. Regional authorities in shipping, housing, and transportation would be established to oversee the new programs in which former military facilities would be utilized.

A formula for nationalization of many military-oriented private firms might be that any firm doing more than 60 percent of business with the government was a possibility for takeover. In

some cases, the cost of takeover and compensation would be minimized by letting the firm go into bankruptcy and by establishing a compensation formula which took into account excess profits on military contracts from past years.

In the case of some large, basically civilian-oriented firms such as GE or General Motors or RCA which have military divisions, only the military sections of the firm might be taken over by the new production authorities. Given the close relationship between the commercial and military airplane and shipbuilding businesses, it is likely that under such a conversion program the entire air frame and shipbuilding industries would be nationalized. The railroads would also be nationalized and modernized.

The experience of nationalized industries in Britain, among others, suggests that the newly created authorities can operate efficiently and in the public interest.

The conversion would also include the stipulation that plants under control of the new production authorities would be run in a democratic manner, through a system of workers' participation and/or control. Such an arrangement might be viewed as working experiments for workers and unions and examples of how factories and offices might be democratically run.

An important element of the conversion program would be decentralization and the stimulation of state and local economic development by converting former military facilities. A new Economic Development Act under a restructured and redirected Commerce Department would be needed to establish better mechanisms for aiding Community Development Corporations, and cooperatives established using former military facilities. These would include loans, technical aid, etc. (The Economic Development Administration has, in rare cases, already given such help to cooperatives, for example, a cooperative mill for wood cutters in rural Minnesota).

Such help is necessary not only because local communities do not often have the necessary technical know-how and capital resources to stimulate economic development, but because there is often a lack of local initiative in the absence of stimulative outside programs. Part of the stimulus to participate in conversion planning for local people would be the knowledge that there is a national conversion program in which they can participate.

A Transitional Program

As should be obvious, the proposals outlined in this article are not a program for complete socialization of the economy or even of all the major corporations. The conversion of military facilities proposed should be viewed as a transitional program aimed at creating a viable public production sector which would demonstrate the potential and possibilities of decentralized, publicly-owned economic activity.

The immediate legitimacy of the program comes from two basic facts: (1) most of the facilities that would be engaged in public production are already government-owned or heavily subsidized by government contracts, primarily through the Pentagon, and (2) most of the areas in which the new production authorities would operate—transportation, housing, shipping, public power—are sectors which have either stagnated under private enterprise or have been largely ignored and underdeveloped. Private enterprise has not

On recent loans to military firms and purchases of stock see New York Times, December 27, 1972, "Navy Buys \$1.7 Million in Stock of Ailing Defense Plant on L. I.," and New York Times, January 4, 1973, "Grumman Gets Navy Loan Despite Its Refusal on F-14."

For background on military contractors' use of government-owned property see "MIRVing the Boondoggle: Contracts, Subsidy, and Welfare in the Aerospace Industry," by Richard Kaufman, American Economic Review, May, 1972; and Hearings on "Economy in Government Procurement and Property Management," Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 90th Congress, 1st session, 1967. On government WWII purchases of plants and equipment see **Monopoly in America** by Walter Adams and Horace Gray; also, **The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-45** by Perry McCoy Smith (Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

For details on military procurement policies see **The Structure of the Defense Market, 1955-64** by William L. Baldwin (Duke University Press, 1967); and **The War Profiteers** by Richard Kaufman (Anchor, 1971).

A copy of Walter Reuther's conversion plan "Are War Plants Expendable?" is reprinted in Hearings on "Postwar Economic Conversion" of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, US Senate,

provided adequate housing, transportation, shipping, or cheap power; our argument is that now it's time to give another approach a chance.

The approach to the conversion program outlined above should follow Gorz's "nonreformist reform": the aim is to enlarge the power of noncapitalist groups and institutions in the society. Such a program might even be carried out by a Populist oriented government; it could be endorsed by a McGovern politician or a Nader advocate.

The program should be spelled out in detail in proposed legislation—the Transportation Authority Act of 1976 or the Housing Authority Act of 1976, for example—and introduced for debate, perhaps in conjunction with the Bicentennial activities, as an example of what could be done with national resources. The importance of detailing the conversion program with concomitant legislation is that the existence of the detailed proposals themselves are valuable political tools for demonstrating that viable alternatives do exist: **there are workable economic alternatives to the warfare state which are not farfetched.**

NOTES

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Paul Sweezy's quote appears in *The Nation*, May 17, 1971.

For a detailed discussion on the rationale for radical changes in American military and foreign policy see **The Economy of Death** by Richard Barnet (Atheneum, 1969); and **The War Economy of the United States** edited by Seymour Melman (St. Martin's Press, 1971).

Details on the Pentagon's Office of Economic Adjustment are available in the study, **Local Economic Development After Military Base Closures** (Praeger, 1971) by John Lynch.

The discussion of military shipyards is largely based on the study, **The Conversion of Shipbuilding from Military to Civilian Markets** by Daniel M. Mack-Forlist and Arthur Newman (Praeger, 1971); also "A 'Big Four' for Shipbuilding?" by Bruce Cossaboom, *Armed Forces Journal*, July 4, 1970. The conversion of the Brooklyn Navy Yard is mentioned in "A 'Partnership' Forged on Navy Yard Plan," *New York Times*, June 19, 1972; and in "Planning for Conversion of Military-Industrial and Military Base Facilities" by Seymour Melman, US

Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Office of Technical Assistance.

The McDonagh and Zimmerman study of the airframe industry is discussed in "Conversion Options of the Airframe Industry" by Marvin Berkowitz and Seymour Melman, in **The Defense Economy** edited by Seymour Melman (Praeger, 1970); also, "Rapid Transit and Aerospace," New York Times, December 10, 1972; "Gas-Turbine Manufacturers Foresee a \$2 Billion Electric Utility Market," Wall Street Journal, January 5, 1973; and for background see Hearings on "Application of Aerospace and Defense Industry Technology to Environmental Problems" of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd session, November 23 and 24, 1970.

The discussion of the electronics industry is based on the study, **Potential Civilian Markets for the Military-Electronics Industry: Strategies for Conversion** edited by John E. Ullmann (Praeger, 1971). The proposal that the government take over plants left by firms "running away" overseas is also made by Victor Perlo in **The Unstable Economy** (International Publishers, 1973).

For background on research and development see **The Conversion of Military-Oriented Research and Development to Civilian Uses** by Marvin Berkowitz (Praeger, 1971). Professor Probst's MIT speech is reprinted in **March 4: Scientists, Students and Society** edited by Jonathan Allen (MIT Press, 1970).

A complete list of government studies on conversion and retraining of technical personnel is available from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. One of the

most recent and most massive studies is "Adjustments of the US Economy to Reductions in Military Spending" edited by Bernard Udis.

Lloyd Dumas' study, "Re-Education and Re-Employment of Engineering and Scientific Personnel," appears in **The Defense Economy** edited by Seymour Melman (Praeger, 1970). Recent government-sponsored retraining programs are discussed in "Moving Out of Aerospace," New York Times financial section, July 16, 1972, and "Recruits from Space," Newsweek, September 25, 1972.

The British experience with nationalization is discussed in **Public Enterprise in Practice** by Richard Pryke (MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1972).

The entrenchment of military spending in the postwar American economy is discussed with intelligence in "Does the US Economy Require Military Spending?" by Michael Reich, American Economic Review, May, 1972.

There is a useful technical bibliography, "A Preliminary Bibliography of Studies of the Economic Effects of Defense Policies and Expenditures" by Geraldine P. Sica, reprinted in **The Defense Economy** edited by Seymour Melman (Praeger, 1970).

Additional readings on the military-industrial economy are listed in the course outline and research guide reprinted in **The Pentagon Watchers** edited by Leonard Rodberg and Derek Shearer (Doubleday, 1970).

For the author's earlier discussion of the conversion problem and a review of source materials, see "Reorganizing the Lines of Power" by Derek Shearer, The Nation, May 17, 1971; and "A Reader's Guide to the Defense Economy" by Derek Shearer, Ramparts, June, 1971. ■



Photo by Bill Fibben

PENTAGON DROPOUTS

Book Review by Bob Hall

Papers on the War by Daniel Ellsberg, Simon and Schuster, 1972. 309 pages. \$2.95.

Militarism, U.S.A. by Colonel James A. Donovan (Ret.), Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970, 237 pages. \$2.95.

Soldier by Anthony B. Herbert, Holt, Rinehard, and Winston, 1973. 456 pages. \$10.95.

The High Priests of Waste by A. Ernest Fitzgerald, W.W. Norton Company, 1972. 366 pages. \$8.95.

Roots of War by Richard Barnet, Atheneum, 1972. 350 pages. \$10.00.

Drop-outs from the defense establishment are becoming more visible these days, speaking out and writing books on militarism in our society. They are like conscientious ghosts roaming the country as living proof of the skeletons in our collective closets. Their words are terse, with a hint of desperation, the tone of someone who has been inside the monster, seen its hydra-headed ugliness and now wants to warn the rest of the nation—before it's too late.

Daniel Ellsberg is probably the most celebrated delinquent, and his book, **Papers on the War**, draws heavily on the Pentagon documents he finally managed to leak to the world. His essays, written between 1965 and 1971, recount how American foreign policy makers defined U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia following the 1950 "loss" of China and relentlessly escalated the scale of our intervention in Vietnam out of political expediency.

As a lower ranking policy maker, Ellsberg came to view the war first as a mistake, then as a stalemate, and finally, after breaking through the

bureaucratic barrier to apply moral questions to his policy judgments, as a criminal act. Having come to such a conclusion, he became powerless. The very nature of the team partnership between military, government, and business means uncooperative cogs must be routinely pushed out. Henry Durham's story (elsewhere in this issue) is representative of those who fight boondoggling and mismanagement in their companies only to be expelled like disobedient school children.

Retired military officers are also writing about what it's like inside the Pentagon. To date the best book in this league is Colonel James Donovan's **Militarism U.S.A.** A former president of the Armed Forces Journal, Donovan describes how competition between the branches of the armed services fuels the war machine. Senior officers from each branch demand weapons systems that will get them to the scene of battle first. An invasion of the Dominican Republic or Vietnam become opportunities to test new technologies and mobilization theories plus providing the exploits for further promotions. Private contractors sell the military on flashy new weapons, and the military gets the civilian bureaucrats to let them try the new toys out.

As the books under review here indicate, your analysis of such a circle depends on where you are in it. Like Donovan, his Atlanta neighbor, Lt. Col. Anthony Herbert views the situation from inside the military—but his book **Soldier** is an autobiographical adventure story of the front-line professional soldier.

Escaping from a west Pennsylvania coal town, Herbert began his military career at age 17. He became a man before he had been a boy; he took hold of the rules and regulations of the Army, obeying them to the letter like a newly initiated boy scout who didn't know everybody else was smoking cigarettes on the sly. Korea became the first testing ground for his almost instinctive appreciation for a good fight—he won loads of medals but elicited the anger of higher-ups. For example.

Once we were being cut up pretty bad by some little bastard who sat tight behind a machine gun and just played hell with us for about five hours, long after the rest of his Chinese friends had bugged out. It cost us a lot of men to get up behind him, and I know he knew exactly what we were doing. . . . I had him covered and I shouted at him to surrender when MacCullough, one of the guys in our squad, ran up beside me and poured a full magazine of twenty rounds from his AR into the guy. I rapped Mac in the mouth and the lieutenant chewed my ass out for hitting one of our guys, but Chinese or no Chinese, the dead machine gunner had been one hell of a trooper. He deserved better than he got. If he'd fought like that for us, he would have been a hero.

Herbert came out of the Korean War the most decorated enlisted man on our side and was more dedicated than ever to an Army career. But on the advice of Eleanor Roosevelt, who had joined him on an honor tour of Allied countries, he left the Army long enough to get a college education. More of an intellectual than this book reveals, Herbert kept going back for more schooling until he obtained a masters degree in psychology from the University of Georgia (with a thesis on General Patton's psychology—a man of deep insecurities typical of a professional warrior, he says).

Between Korea and Vietnam, Herbert trained as a member of the elite Rangers and Special Forces, commanded a battalion in the 1965 Dominican Republic invasion, and engaged in all sorts of James Bond escapades. Despite a growing disdain for West Point jelly-fish officers, Herbert continued to believe in the Army, the one on paper with codes and hierarchical rankings necessary for getting the discipline needed to win wars.

But Tony Herbert balked when he found out what the U.S. Army was doing in Vietnam: violating its own rules, torturing peasants, allowing mass murders, supporting high-living senior officers. His superiors tried to convince him their way was the way to win wars—but Herbert knew better. Fifty-eight days after taking command of a battalion in Vietnam, our super soldier was summarily relieved of duty.

When he got back to the states, Herbert launched an attack on the high ranking officers who had covered up the war crimes he reported. Part of the controversy became front page news, but the complete tale recorded in **Soldier** is even more damning to the military. Cut off at every turn within the Pentagon bureaucracy, Herbert eventually left the Army to push for reforms from

the outside. He's now under contract to write a second book on the alternatives to America's armed services system.

If wars are necessary (and Vietnam never was, says Herbert), then they should follow the classical pattern of honorable men fighting to the death, fair and square; and Herbert's book reeks of the supreme self-confidence of a man who knows how to kill you forty different ways. (In person, Tony Herbert's lack of self doubt about who he is or what he believes allows him to talk with a detached patience and military-style firmness; he's not intimidated by anyone so he doesn't have to show off—although some have questioned his credibility).

But those who sluff off Herbert's charges of corruption and war crime coverups because they can't stomach his apparent ease in gunning down "the enemy" are clearly missing the point. Those who like to keep the blood and guts of war far in the distance, who favor the Kennedy-McNamara technological warfare where the enemy is never



*... if wars were more personal
to Americans, maybe we'd get
involved in far fewer of them....*

seen, those are the over-civilized sophisticrats who have brought us a new generation of electronic bloodshed where wholesale murder is routine. If wars were more personal to Americans, maybe we'd get involved in far fewer of them. As Herbert reflects on his experience in Vietnam:

When I remember the folly of it all now, I rationalize a bit and tell myself that there wasn't time enough to be fully sensitive to the finality of death. . . . When even just one man died or got his fingers blown off . . . it was one hell of a costly battle—especially if you happened to be the guy who got it that day. It's something generals and presidents can never understand—only mothers, fathers, brothers, sons and daughters and wives. Maybe if I were a general or a president who never went to war with his men and who never risked paying the same price, maybe I'd want to convert the whole damned show into a statistical table to be read solemnly by some broadcaster every Thursday night. . . . If you want to make your war a war of numbers, you have no trouble sleeping. Most generals and presidents sleep well.


But the Pentagon's numbers don't even tell the true statistical picture, as Ernest Fitzgerald makes very plain. In 1965, Fitzgerald enthusiastically left his career as a successful cost analyst and efficiency expert to go to work with McNamara's whiz kids, convinced of their commitment to hold defense expenditures down to the bare bones minimum. What he found was a pack of lies.

He writes his **High Priest of Waste** with the fervor of the southern Protestant he is, a preacherman bent on rewarding the self-restrained contractors and banishing the self-indulgent, "unprincipled rascals" to eternal hell. He is concerned with malicious waste, not the system of capitalism, with the production of shoddy weapons, not the imperial wars they are used in. Yet he documents the words and deeds of countless government, industry and military personnel to show that waste is not an accident, but the rule.

Unlike Richard Kaufman's comprehensive **The**

War Profiteers, which meticulously identifies the culprits and the range of federal programs they control, Fitzgerald provides a personal account of how the Pentagon bureaucracy allows giant weapons-makers to bilk the public of billions of dollars. But as with Kaufman's book (the two men work together on the staff of Proxmire's Joint Economic Committee), the effect is a clear indictment of corruption and thievery in the military-industrial complex.

"Inefficiency is national policy," Air Force Major General Zeke Zoeckler told Fitzgerald after he protested the Pentagon's tolerance for sloppy bookkeeping and massive cost overruns on McNamara's pet project, the F-111. With one weapons system after another, Fitzgerald describes his attempts to halt waste only to be rebuffed by a higher layer of the bureaucracy. Time and again,



he gathered information from his "secret sympathizers" inside a contractor, held "revival meetings" for top brass to reinforce the litany of cost saving, and challenged the "Ape Theory of Management" which said if you hire enough people and spend enough money, something worthwhile will surely result.

In the end, Fitzgerald was called before Senator Proxmire's Joint Economic Committee to talk about weapons contracting. To the disgust of his superiors, he wouldn't lie. He confirmed Proxmire's suspicion that the Air Force's "pet dinosaur," Lockheed Aircraft, was running \$2,000,000,000 over its original C-5A contract of \$3.7 billion. With that admission, all hell broke loose. Georgia's Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, was furious: the C-5A was being made in Marietta, Georgia! The Secretary of Defense's office scurried around trying to find some evidence that would discredit Fitzgerald or his testimony. A rematch was scheduled and the Pentagon in the person of Assistant Secretary Bob Charles planned to present Proxmire's committee with manipulated figures that would contradict those Fitzgerald would offer. The day of the face-to-face contest came, and Fitzgerald, with a characteristic personal touch and sense for comic relief describes it:

As I walked out the [Pentagon's] River Entrance I saw below me on the sidewalk a sizeable knot of Bob Charles' principal associates—perhaps a dozen people—gathered around the small cavalcade of cars waiting to take them and the Assistant Secretary to Senator Proxmire's hearing. Secretary Charles' car, complete with permanently assigned uniformed chauffeur, telephone, and rear seat reading lamp, was first in line, followed by a couple of G.I. staff cars to haul the lesser weenies. I was riding the bus.

The bus ride from the Pentagon to the new Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill was probably the low point of my adventures in the military spending complex. I was strangely and uncharacteristically depressed by the array of power against me. I had to remind myself that . . . I had the rascals outgunned. I was right, and I had all the facts I needed in my head. . . . Bob Charles had the unenviable task of defending a lie. . .

As I got off the bus, my recovery was complete. There just across the street at the back of the new Senate Office Building was Bob Charles' cavalcade of official vehicles discharging their loads of Assistant Secretary and weenies. For some reason, the fact that

I had traveled to our mutual destination just as fast and far more economically completely restored my competitive spirit.

The Pentagon lost that round of Senate hearings. But they still had the upper hand; one by one Fitzgerald's job responsibilities were narrowed until his position, with the approval of President Nixon unless he "mis-spoke" (whatever that is!)* was unceremonially liquidated. Ernest Fitzgerald became **persona non grata**.

By my stubborn adherence to facts . . . I had placed myself in opposition to the Air Force "position" that all was well with the big plane. . . . It was an article of faith. Those who denied it were heretics and blasphemers. I had denied the true faith and consequently was an outcast.

Throughout his detailed account of fighting over this or that rip-off, it is this sense of moral battle that keeps Fitzgerald's book lively and highly readable; the struggle against complicated Pentagon contracts and bureaucratic red tape became a personal crusade against the "rascals," "thieves," "weenies," "bean-counters," "cost-estimating Calvinists," "conscientious objectors to active warfare on high costs," and "lollygaggle of contractors and military men." Fitzgerald was "a one man band playing the cost-reduction tune" in the face of an impressive array of witch doctor-like Pentagon economists who "neither questioned nor thought much about fundamental causes and effects"; they just waved their slide rules and embraced waste as necessary for high employment and growth in demand.

In his final chapter, Fitzgerald offers a prescription for combating these technocrats and their superiors. First you must recognize the bad effects of a defense establishment that lies, cheats and steals: (1) shoddy weapons production has jeopardized our actual military preparedness; (2) a fat defense budget that stimulates inflation and retard competitive enterprise has helped weaken the fiscal health of the U.S.; (3) widespread thievery by the military spending coalition is eroding our nation's morality and respect for law and authority.

Realizing these things, Americans must unite to cut the Pentagon's life line—its money supply. They will have to resist the big spenders' appeal to fear (the communists will overtake us) and greed (we

*The day after President Nixon boasted of personally firing Fitzgerald, his press secretary rescinded the comments suggesting the President had "mis-spoke," apparently confusing Fitzgerald with another victim.



*... violence is the natural
product of a bureaucracy
fascinated with new
techniques of power...*

make jobs). The "permanent cure" requires changes in the nation's political economy, Fitzgerald admits, but in the meanwhile, citizens should mobilize themselves and others as a voter and taxpayer lobby, carefully educating themselves, then selecting this or that defense contract or boondoggling congressman, and leveling all guns on the target. "When sufficient numbers of taxpayers are so aroused, they will simply outvote the beneficiaries of the boondoggles." Now all we need is the numbers. . . .

For an analysis of this warrior nation's political economy that could serve as the backbone of a strategy for the "permanent cure," turn to Richard Barnet's **Roots of War**. It's not a personal account, and it won't sell as well as Herbert's book or read as cleverly as Fitzgerald's. But it is without doubt the most lucid, penetrating account available of the factors propelling the U.S. from one war to the next. It is so full of provocative thoughts and


sub-themes, it could be easily expanded into several volumes.

From his vantage point in John Kennedy's State Department and later the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Harvard educated Barnet observed the "national security managers" discuss, plan, and implement foreign policy for America. The early sixties was a time of rearmament for the U.S. under the leadership of a darling liberal and a host of Keynesian advisors. When the point got through to Barnet that things were getting worse instead of better under the speed-reading technocratic managers brought in by Kennedy, he left the government and helped start (with other young turk government drop-outs) the now famous Institute for Policy Studies, a Washington, D.C. based clique of intellectuals that has had a hand in shaping left-liberal thought for a decade.

Roots of War is Barnet's sixth book, the fifth since he organized I.P.S. It is less documented than his excellent reference work on U.S. meddling in other countries (**Intervention and Revolution**) but more analytical than the essays comprising **The Economy of Death**. In a sense, it is the summation of the analysis of American foreign policy and the "national security state" developed over the last several years by I.P.S.ers Marc Raskin, Ralph Stavins, Art Waskow, Leonard Rodberg and Barnet.

Barnet does not attempt to explain **how** this or that war started, but rather to give a systemic answer to the question "**why** those who have been in charge of defining and meeting the threats facing the United States have determined that the national interest must be pursued by war and preparation of war." Combining cultural, historical, and political approaches, Barnet divides his analysis of the "national security managers" into three general sections: the bureaucracy's internal dynamics, its relationship to the business elite, and its manipulation of the public.

Barnet is clearly at home in the first section in describing the inner workings and rise to power of America's foreign policy bureaucracy. Reinforcing



Herbert's point about depersonalized warfare, Barnet shows how the federal bureaucracy is divided so that some plan the war, some give the orders, and others do the killing. Under this system war crimes become the responsibility of no one, but simply the automatic result of policy. Violence is the natural product of a bureaucracy which is fascinated by new techniques of power and which pushes technology to its limits to achieve "national goals." "Having made the bomb," Truman explained in 1945, "we used it."

But Barnet does not analyze the degree to which technology has determined policy (as does Donovan's **Militarism U.S.A.** and Michael Klare's **War Without End**); rather he sees a war-prone foreign policy arising from the security managers' conception of the interests and goals of the U.S. The goal, of course, has been expansion; indeed, since its beginning, American leaders have sought to control greater and greater portions of the globe. We are in Southeast Asia because we are in Texas and California and Hawaii. The techniques of expanding control are sanctified by "a powerful imperial creed" which has shifted from the Manifest Destiny doctrine to the post-World War II ideology of "world responsibility." With numerous well chosen quotes from the bureaucrats' private and public statements, Barnet shows how this ideology has become a compulsive duty, an ethic, a battle cry for a whole generation of national security managers who entered government after 1940—men like Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, Robert Lovett, Clark Clifford, John Foster Dulles, John McCloy, James Forrestal, Averill Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow.

World War II is **the** watershed in Barnet's analysis of the national security managers. Others, notably Columbia University's Seymour Melman, argue that the major turning point in the creation of the defense establishment and centralized state capitalism came with the rationalization of the Pentagon bureaucracy under McNamara. But Barnet's concern with the origins of the national security bureaucracy, its Cold War ideology and quest for a permanent war economy, correctly pushes him back to the great war.


For after World War II, the national security agencies had grown in civilian employment to 3,000,000 people from the 1939 level of 80,000. The defense budget leaped from 1.4% of the GNP before the war to a remobilized level after 1948 of roughly 8%. Agencies experienced in foreign and military affairs literally took command of the government. Dilettante ambassadors and crony advisors were replaced with lawyers and bankers trained in

managing warfare, men who responded to the challenge of America's opportunity for world control. The business elite, discredited by the Depression and at first reluctant to mobilize under F.D.R., came out of the war as servants of the nation, and they pushed to maintain a partnership in which they could reap profits, expand their markets, and come off as the good guys. Conversely, Congress lost most of its clout in molding foreign policy:

In the 1930's Congress exercised a powerful veto on military spending, refusing to fortify Guam and, only a few months before Pearl Harbor, passing the Selective Service Act by a single vote. In 1938 President Roosevelt had to summon all his political powers to block the Ludlow Resolution for a constitutional amendment forbidding the President to send troops overseas without a national referendum. Less than ten years after its narrow defeat, his successor secured broad Congressional support for the President's right [the Truman Doctrine] to use American military power at his discretion to put down revolutionary movements abroad.

The new managers from corporate law firms and high finance knew how to manipulate language, stretch the law, and calculate risks in order to serve their new "client." While respecting loyalty and duty (what Barnet calls "the supreme bureaucratic virtues"), they were not what some have described as mindless technocrats who merely fulfill their designated role in the larger machine.





Rather, these men felt themselves among the elect by virtue of their worldly success; their Calvinist upbringing—invariably the case, Barnet points out—led them to value expediency above all else in achieving their lofty goal; and the widely accepted Niebuhrian neo-orthodox rationale which made a nation seeking its intelligent self-interest immune from moral questioning gave them the self-vindicating authority to fashion a U.S. policy of world control.

In this context, the national security managers began to work forcefully as a team. With the death of F.D.R., they formulated “the collective picture of the world adopted by the uninformed and ill-prepared Harry Truman,” and they continue to “structure” presidential choices to this day. Nixon’s decision to invade Cambodia was only possible because bureaucrats supplied him with success-predicting scenarios (which, incidentally, were originally developed by the J.F.K. bureaucrats).

In this game of power, Barnet identifies two rules: (1) don’t let your rivals “become powerful enough” to threaten your ability to define a situation, and (2) every nation is a potential contestant in the global game. The American public is more or less a pawn in this contest, consciously manipulated to turn what Barnet identifies as their natural isolationist tendencies (i.e., chauvinistic self-indulgence) into a rationale for continuing world domination.

Following Dean Acheson’s policy of gaining popular support by making things “clearer than truth,” the bureaucratic managers, in Barnet’s words, “alternatively frighten, flatter, excite, or calm the American people. They have developed the theater of crisis into a high art.”

Political considerations come into play insofar as the other party may label your proposals a

“white flag” policy, much as Laird did to McGovern. Thus Kennedy was persuaded to okay the Cuban intervention rather than face the consequences of being the President that let Russia put missiles only ninety miles from our shores. And a war weary Dwight Eisenhower, afraid of being labeled **soft**, let a minister’s son, John Foster Dulles, install a foreign policy of winning converts to Americanism through the threat of nuclear hellfire.

Small wonder, then, that the excitement of crisis management and the machismo ethic of handling violence with distant comfort made this generation of national security bureaucrats a team of highly aggressive, disciplined wielders of power—not unlike Herbert’s professional killers. But how do these men make decisions, choose priorities, weigh options; how do they decide to intervene here or there, to support this or that government?

In the second part of his book, Barnet examines this question in light of whether these policy bureaucrats actually exercise power themselves or whether their decisions are determined by the interests of a business elite. In developing a historically valid theory of managerial power, this is a critical question.

On the one hand nothing in their class background or education would suggest a division of interest between the bureaucrats and the capitalists. In fact, the matrix of values out of which the national security managers define foreign policy “coincides” wonderfully with the business creed of expanding capital. Members of the two groups shuttle back and forth so often that the post-war policy of political and economic expansionism has achieved an unquestioned legitimacy. A foreign policy which promotes development of other countries along lines

favorable to U.S. business is as "natural" as believing in progress: both the policy and the faith rest on the racist assumption that furthering the systems of private capital and stable government is as good for them as it is for us.

But even though 60 to 86% of the national security managers come from big business, the two groups don't always see eye to eye, says Barnet. And here's where the sticky part comes. The short range, tangible goals of corporate executives are occasionally in opposition to the long range, intangible goals of the bureaucrats. The conflict may give rise to the State Department stopping Ford from selling armored trucks to South Africa or a Senior Advisory Group of businessmen telling President Johnson to cut down or cut out the Vietnam War.

Since the mid-sixties, examples of such rifts have qualitatively changed. The repercussions of a belligerent foreign policy in Vietnam have now shattered the monetary and trade systems which gave U.S. business its global superiority after WWII—and the multinational corporations are raving mad. "Ironically, the quest for an empire which was supposed to expand American influence has left the American economy more and more vulnerable to the decisions of foreigners."

To Barnet the very fact that the Vietnam intervention could take place and continue so long indicates foreign policy power is held by the national security managers. Business knew better, but their "influence" was not the same as the "power" of the bureaucrats to start and stop wars. In a situation of heightening tension, Barnet asks whether new business forces could overcome the political bureaucrats and inaugurate a new era of global peace? Or are imperial wars inevitable results of capitalism itself?

Contrary to Marxist-Leninist theory, Barnet argues that war is not a logical outgrowth of corporate capitalism: it involves a political rather than an economic choice. It is now theoretically possible for multinational corporations to prosper better through trade with leftist governments rather than launch wars to overturn them. And if big business doesn't realize this (some already do), then the "reason will not be the iron laws of economics but political inflexibility."

Even under such enlightened capitalism, Barnet foresees no end of the domination of the weak by the strong and the insatiable appetite for growth. But these are viewed as "an inevitable part of human nature," rather than intrinsic to the capitalistic political economy. We can at least get rid of the

imperial wars, Barnet suggests, by (1) shrinking the national security bureaucracies and reasserting popular control of them, (2) shifting government funding to involve private industry in solving social problems rather than producing weapons, (3) encouraging business to assist technological and economic development under arrangements equitable to the host country, and (4) politicizing foreign policy issues to increase a "new internationalism" consciousness which recognizes our survival in global terms.

Unfortunately, I think Barnet's own evidence disproves his assessment of the relation of bureaucratic and business power in our society: he mistakenly shifts from identifying who can start wars to who defines foreign policy powers. Historically, the national security managers have implemented long range policies which would benefit the American economy. Their decisions have been structured by the interests of U.S. corporations rather than the reverse.

In some cases, short range business interests have clashed with the long term goal of increasing the sphere of U.S. control; and there are certainly

*.... the racist assumption that
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lively debates within and between each group over what decision should be made. But in areas where business has established a firm pattern of operation, such as Latin America, foreign policy choices follow this lead. In the Middle East, where oil and Jewish interests conflict, the bureaucrats must pursue a middle course. The fact that the bureaucrats could get America involved in Vietnam is less an example of their power over business than a reflection of the degree of their power in areas where business is only casually interested. With the rise of the multinational, increasingly expansionist corporation, the areas where security managers can set policy along Cold War lines are vastly diminished. These firms are now demanding long range planning by new bureaucrats who recognize the need for global trade relations. The

clash, therefore, is not between business and politics, but between an old school and a new, each with economic and political components.

Finally, it seems that Barnett's treatment of exploitation of the weak by the strong as human nature is no more rational than the Marxist notion that it will continue as long as human behavior is structured by competitive, expansionist capitalism. And I think it doubtful that the demand for equity by the poor can be ameliorated with capitalistic trade rather than lead to more war. This is not to say that war will end with socialist regimes, as the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia illustrates. It seems clear that as long as competitive, expansionist institutions define human behavior—whether their goals are greater wealth, greater territory, or greater political control—the result will be fighting. To change these war-breeding institutions, one may as logically choose the Marxist understanding of exploitation in terms of class

behavior, and thereby work toward a classless society, as choose Barnett's hope that the multinational capitalists can be forced out of enlightened self-interest to moderate their plundering tendencies and their pre-occupation with endless growth.

Whichever course you wish to take (and the one may be a step toward the other), Barnett's **Roots of War** is an immensely informative analysis of U.S. political power from the Cold War to Vietnam. Unfortunately, it is too Washington oriented to give a sense of **how** foreign policy is made; there is too often a feeling that the security managers are not connected to other forces here and abroad. What we now need are analytical works describing the interrelations of regional power structures with the bureaucratic and corporate elite, so we can identify the targets we need to attack on a local and regional level. ■■■



MORE BOOKS . . .

Black Mountain: An Exploration in Community by Martin Duberman. E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1972. 527 pp., \$12.95.

Black Mountain is the "story of a small group of men and women—ranging through time from a dozen to a hundred, most of them anonymous as judged by standard measurements of achievement—who attempted to find some consonance between their ideas and their lives, who risked the intimacy and exposure that most of us emotionally yearn for and rhetorically defend, but in practice shun."

In the years since it closed in 1956, Black Mountain College has become more myth than reality. To southerners, who have traditionally been robbed of their history, through distortion and omission, Black Mountain has usually been thought of as a "radical" enclave in the North Carolina mountains that was not allowed to survive. To others, it implies a radical experience in education and community that had some of the most famous names in the arts associated with it. The "prepared piano" of John Cage, the Merce Cunningham dance company, the geodesic dome of Buckminster Fuller, and the mixed media events of the late 50's all "happened" at Black Mountain.

Duberman's careful work allows us to look beyond the famous personalities and the reputation of the school to discover what an innovative experiment in education means on a day to day basis, and just how fragile and illusive—as well as how precious—community can be.

It is an extraordinary book about extraordinary people, at once both sensitive and scholarly. His research included over 100,000 documents in the state archives at Raleigh, as well as numerous taped interviews and written memoirs and reminiscences of people who lived, worked, studied and

believed in Black Mountain.

The most significant factor and apparently most controversial, is Duberman's "participation" with his material. "Every historian knows that he manipulates the evidence to some extent. . . . Yet the process by which a particular personality intersects with a particular subject matter has rarely been shown, and the intersection itself almost never regarded as containing materials of potential worth. . . . I've felt the responsibility to let myself be known. . . . I believe it's time historians put their personalities as well as their names to their books."

The community/college of Black Mountain as explored by Martin Duberman is a unique and exciting experience in reading. A book that is not simply to be read—but to grapple with, to argue with, to laugh with, and, in the end, to learn with the people of Black Mountain and the man who has recaptured them, their time and their place.



The Making of Black Revolutionaries by James Forman, The Macmillan Company, 1972. 567 pp. \$12.50.

Jim Forman's political autobiography should be read by all those who were involved in the civil rights movement, and by all those who want to understand the meaning and significance of those tumultuous years. Forman was a key figure in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the courageous assortment of "field secretaries" and office staff who conducted sit-ins and voter registration campaigns across the South, culminating in the challenge of the Freedom Democratic Party at Atlantic City in 1964, and the raising of the Black Panther symbol in Lowndes County, Alabama, in 1966.

It is an absorbing work, telling his own story of a youth spent in

Chicago and Northern Mississippi—experiencing racism southern style, northern style, and finally western style when he was a student in California. After a stint in the Air Force, Forman came South to do voter registration in Fayette County, Tennessee.

Many of the early southern struggles have been forgotten—Monroe, North Carolina; Americus, Georgia; Albany, Georgia; McComb, Mississippi; it's not an accident. White America wants to forget the memory of SNCC. **The Making of a Black Revolutionary** recreates the history of those movements and the people who made them.

The importance of the book, however, is that it is more than history retold. Forman analyzes the civil rights movement through his own life—from civil rights to the Black Panthers to the Black Manifesto—to class analysis of American society, ". . . talking about the need for total change, studying revolutionary theory and grappling with the role of the working class as the decisive force in the making of history."

[This book can be ordered directly from the publisher at a special discount rate of \$7.50. Checks should be sent in advance to The Macmillan Company, 866 Third Avenue, New York 10022. Attn: Mark Toby, Special Sales.]



The Last Play: The Struggle to Monopolize the World's Energy Resources by James Ridgeway. E. P. Dutton, 1973, 446 pp. \$10.00.

The **Last Play** "tells the public what Congress and the United States government refuses to tell them: what corporations own the world's energy resources and how they work to monopolize and exhaust those resources for corporate profits." The Energy Industry is not only big business, but big monopoly business, dominated by the large multi-national oil companies (the "seven sisters") who in turn are backed and controlled by the banks, foundations, insurance companies and large institutions. The understanding of all these interrela-

tionships and forces is absolutely necessary for one to have any understanding of the much ballyhooed "energy crisis." While Ridgeway's book does not tie all of its many strands together in the clearest possible fashion, it does provide the beginnings of any serious study of the issue of energy and its use. Heavy on data, facts and figures, it provides an excellent reference work.



American Counterpoint: Slavery and Racism in the North-South Dialogue by C. Vann Woodward. Little Brown & Co., 1972. 283 pp.

The author exhibits in these collected essays the subtlety, the style, and the willingness to take ideological opponents seriously which has made him one of the greatest of southern historians. Essays include a long-needed criticism of W. J. Cash's **Mind of the South** for its narrow concentration on the white male southern mind and an effort to transcend the stale controversy engendered by Woodward's own **Strange Career of Jim Crow** by moving from arguments about the exact point in time when segregation started to the more important question of how segregation functions in maintaining white supremacy through changing historical circumstances. Cumulatively, these essays convey a much stronger sense of racism as fundamental to the American experience and character than has emerged from Woodward's earlier works which combined a sympathy with the Populist critique of capitalism with an integrationist optimism about the position of blacks in southern society.



Fat Cats and Democrats by G. W. Domhoff. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972. 191 pp. \$5.95.

The author of **Who Rules America?** applies his analysis of elites to the Democratic party for some revealing conclusions. More diversified than the old line WASP wealth behind the GOP, the "common man's" party is none the less dominated by

rich Jews, "limousine liberals," southern patricians, and Western cowboys. A fleeting chapter identifies several bankrollers of Southern politics and sketches the historical and political reasons they don't support a local two party system ("You mean give the poor whites and black the balance of power? Never!"). Additional examples of Southern and northern Democratic Party frictions and coalition are mentioned in other chapters. With its bibliographic essay and index, the book is a handy reference for those interested in power structure research and electoral politics.



Inequity: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America by Christopher Jencks. Basic Books, 1972. 399 pp. \$12.50.

Backed by loads of statistics, this heavily funded study evaluates the correlation of social background, schooling and job opportunities and concludes there is very little correlation to be found. In contrast to the liberal's argument for desegregation, Jencks says a school's curriculum, social composition, resources, and a kid's race or background do not affect his IQ scores (women aren't in the study and the race factor is only slightly introduced); furthermore, IQ scores don't affect adult job status or income. In contrast to the reactionary's use of this evidence, Jencks' contorted point becomes that success (i.e., income) in America happens because of a person's luck and access to good job opportunities regardless of his IQ. Ignoring the reality that schools are important places to get such access (meeting friends, making contacts, etc.), Jencks rejects educational reforms in favor of radical changes in the political economy to eliminate competition for high incomes altogether. Considering how the book is now being used by segregationists in the South, the book unfortunately does a better job of debunking liberal solutions to inequality than it does in making a case for radical alternatives.



Hunger USA Revisited: A Report by the Citizens Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States. Published by the National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition and the Southern Regional Council, Atlanta.

Documents how little has changed (particularly in the South) in poverty and hunger since the 1968 **Hunger USA** report and recommends not more anti-hunger programs but a guaranteed income for all Americans.



The Hurricane Massacre by Thomas N. Bethell. Perennial Library, Harper & Row, 1972. 145 pp. Paper \$1.25.

An experienced observer of Appalachia's problems provides a probing investigation into the December 30, 1970, coal mine explosion in Eastern Kentucky that killed thirty-eight men, stirred national controversy over safety in mines—and saw the Finley Brothers get off with a mere \$50,000 fine.



Investigating the FBI, edited by Pat Watters and Stephen Gillers. Doubleday, 1972. \$7.95.

Collected papers from the 1971 Princeton conference on the FBI ranging from discussions of law and civil liberties to confessions of former G-men. J. Edgar wouldn't let his boys attend so book is weighted against the snoop agency.



The Disruption of the Solid South, by George Tindall. University of Georgia Press, 1972. 99 pp. \$4.00. Paperback from W. W. Norton Co., \$1.75.

The President of the Southern Historical Association reviews in these lectures (plus a bibliographic essay) the historical dynamics, particularly those inside the Democratic Party, leading to the emergence of a "viable Republican party" in the South after 1952's election—a subject which promises to receive much analysis and comment in future years.

SOUTHERN MILITARISM

Introduction

Time was when the only way for a poor southerner—black or white—to escape the region's poverty was to join the Army. Now, if he's lucky, he can get a job in a defense plant in one of the small, rural towns that punctuate the southern landscape. Or he can still enlist. Or if he has enough cash to live on for awhile, he can go to a New South metropolis and look for a factory or warehouse job; but even here, he would likely find himself working in an industry that got (or gets) its stimulus from the demand of nearby military bases or far-off wars.

Except for the Far West, the South, more than any other region, has built its economy on the military dollar. In 1968, one in fourteen breadwinners in the South were directly on the Pentagon's payroll or on the payroll of a private supplier of military goods and services. That compares with one in twenty for the rest of the nation. Regionally, it means if you added all the employees in the South's gigantic textile, apparel and synthetics industries, you'd still have to add 200,000 workers to reach the number of people in defense-related jobs. That's a lot of people—over 1,600,000—and figuring in their families and the people who live by servicing them, that is even more votes for continued military spending.

The South's inordinate dependency on the federal military dole didn't happen overnight, of course. Over the past three decades, the region has slowly grown to industrial maturity with the Pentagon acting as its wet nurse—an ironic twist considering the anti-federalism, state's rights howl of southern politicians. Like so many other aspects of US militarism, the process got its major boost with the mobilization of America for World War II. At the time, the South was literally hobbling along from hand to mouth, its agricultural economy shattered, thousands of tenant farmers and laborers out of work. Franklin Roosevelt called the region the nation's "number one" economic problem, and channelled significant relief and recovery money into the region, most notably

through TVA. However, we now know that it wasn't FDR's New Deal programs, but World War II that brought the South—and the nation—out of the Depression.

From mid-1940 to mid-1945, the federal government and private industry spent \$74,000,000,000 in the US for capital expansion of industry, military installations and other physical facilities (e.g. roads and houses). Half this amount went to construct and equip manufacturing plants and military bases, and the South got more than its share on both counts. The southern block of congressmen were central to FDR's push for internationalism against the northern and western liberal isolationists. So partly as a political payoff, and partly because of cheap land and desirable climatic conditions, the South received 40% of the War Department's money for building military installations in the US during 1940-45. Training camps sprouted up all over the southern states, particularly in the southeast from Virginia to Florida and in Texas—home of Roosevelt's 1932-40 Vice-President John Nance Gardner and of Jesse Jones, the all-powerful head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation which moved from bailing out bankrupt businesses of the Depression to funneling funds to war production plants. The trade-offs between pro-Pentagon votes and location of military bases continues today, just as the largest concentration of both remains with the South. In 1971, 40% of America's shore-side military personnel were stationed in the South—and that doesn't even include the Virginia suburbs of Washington where the Pentagon itself and several other installations are located. Today, as a legacy of WWII, hundreds of thousands of people and dozens of Southern cities are economically strung out on the military base dollar.

Providing the soldiers and servicing the bases were important war contributions for an under-industrialized South, but the region also managed to capture its share of war plants. Roosevelt favored putting shipyards in the South, and reinforced the National Resources Planning Board's recommendation to locate war plants in "low-income areas" where "large numbers of

workers . . . available for unskilled work or for training" needed "supplementary employment." Receiving 22% of the public money spent for manufacturing plants during the war years, the South managed to get more relative to its pre-war portion of US industrial production (15%), but less relative to its population (28%).

By 1945, the government had spent nearly as much in five years on southern war plants as had private business for the region's existing plants, thus nearly doubling capital investment in southern manufacturing. Of course, a large (26%) portion went for building ammunition plants, which had dubious conversion value in the eyes of private industry; but twice as much went into the oil, coal, related chemicals, and the aircraft and shipbuilding industries.

The government financed what became the growth industries in the southern states: it built the shipyards that are now operated by the **largest industrial employers** of Virginia (Tenneco's Newport News Shipbuilding), Mississippi (Litton Industries), and to a lesser degree, Louisiana (Ogden's Avondale Shipyard), as well as other giants like Florida's Jacksonville Shipyards. The public also paid for the aircraft plants of Georgia's largest industrial employer (Lockheed) and those now used by top employers in Texas (General Dynamics and LTV Corporation), South Carolina (LTV's E-Systems), and Alabama (City Investing's Hayes International). And the government built such enduring and significant employers as Arkansas' Pine Bluff Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama's Redstone Arsenal, Texas's Lone Star plant, the Milan, Kingsport and Chattanooga, Tennessee Army Ammunition Plants, and the Radford Works in Virginia. Finally, the oil and, less significantly, the coal industries of Texas and Louisiana, Kentucky and West Virginia got a tremendous spurt at public expense and continue to be the backbone of industrial growth in those four states, as the aircraft, shipbuilding, and ammunition industries have been for other areas.

Significantly, these same manufacturing lines continue to expand with the help of Department of Defense (DoD) purchases. In 1971, the South provided the Pentagon with 52% of its ships, 46% of its airframes, 42% of its petroleum products, 62% of its coal and other non-petroleum fuels, and 27% of its ammunition. There is certainly no lack of evidence that these industries are rightfully "public property" and their facilities thus open to the demand for public management for the public good.

In addition to beginning the process of federal military dollars providing the capital for industrial

growth in the South, World War II also pulled thousands of people from the Piedmont farmland, the piney woods and the mountains, from the Texas prairies to the Carolina coasts, into factories for the creation of an industrial labor force. At the peak of World War II in 1944, the South had 60% more workers in manufacturing jobs than in 1939, and even with the 1946 post-war cutbacks, the region emerged with a 40% increase over the 1939 level. That's not quite as great as the expansion in such industrialized states as New York, Michigan and Ohio (although Texas had a greater gain than even these giants), but the significance of industrial expansion under public sponsorship was greater in the South because the region had so little to begin with.

The federal government literally created an industrial work force, trained a new breed of business managers, and built the factories in which the two groups cooperated for mutual benefit and the good of society, or so they thought. Liberal southern leaders were particularly delighted with this industrial development, and they pushed for maximum use of these war by-products as a means for raising the region's standard of living. Their perspective could be clearly seen in a report by the National Planning Association's Committee of the South on converting publicly built plants to private



ownership: "The skills and habits of mind which southern labor and management absorbed during the period of intensive work with war industrial facilities are perhaps more important assets than the plants, for upon the skills can be founded a permanent, efficient, growing industrial structure to use the abundant resources of the area."

But the pace of expansion was not as spectacular as these men would have liked. The pipeline to the Pentagon's billions fell to a moderate trickle compared to the war-time gush, and it took most southern states six to ten years after the war to get their manufacturing work force back up to the 1944 peak. Even so, this rate of expansion was respectable, considering the fact that industrialized New York, Michigan and Ohio have still not regained their war time peaks.

But for the South, as for the nation, the next real period for industrial expansion came with a new liberal Democratic president, and the reassertion of the Keynesian policy of federal spending to create jobs and stimulate growth. Kennedy and McNamara and their advisors consciously used Pentagon funds to expand the economy, with some attention to depressed areas.

"The federal budget can and should be made an instrument of prosperity and stability," JFK told Congress two weeks after his inauguration. From 1961 to 1969, in almost every southern state, the number of industrial jobs grew at 2½ to 3 times the pace of the 1950's. And in almost every case, the defense-related electronics and electrical equipment industries combined with each state's special military contribution (like shipping or aircraft or ammunition) to lead a period of unprecedented growth—and inflation.

Once again, the military taxpayer's dollar was the fuel for southern industrialization, and this time it lasted long enough to stimulate growth in personal income and consumer industries all across the South. Even as **Business Week** proclaimed the South at the "take-off" point in economic development, the region was increasing its share of Pentagon contracts up to 38% of the national total in 1971. Once again, many liberal leaders are encouraged by this industrialization, interpreting it as a means to raise the region's standard of living, to allow blacks and unions access into industry, and to break down the provincial attitudes of southern politicians and businessmen. Unfortunately, such a perspective fails to recognize two critical points: First, the industrial south's dependence on the federal military dole is deepening the push from this region, not for humane domestic programs, but for a continued nationalistic foreign policy, and a policy of growth that is both stimulated and secured through massive military spending. Secondly, there are alternatives for economic development which would be much more consistent with the use of public funds to finance industrial growth—namely, the control of those industries by the public and the use of funds for public benefit rather than private accumulation.

The theory that public money dumped into private industry helps the "common man" by expanding the economy is fast becoming unmasked as a tragic farce and an ecologically disastrous policy. It is utterly absurd to applaud the inclusion of the poor southerner in an economy that is rushing the whole world to its death. To have the volunteer army and the weapons factories staffed by poor folks may not be a deceitful conspiracy by the ruling class, but it is certainly not progress.

What COULD Your Tax Dollars Buy?

	Today's cost:	
1 Vulcan 20mm. cannon used extensively on aircraft in Indo-China	\$200,000 or	Construction of 13 low-cost housing units with two bedrooms each.
10 B-52 bombing sorties in Indo-China	\$446,000 or	Construction of a 22-bed nursing home in Estill, S.C.
1 Huey helicopter	\$1 million or	Construction of a 2-story public health center in Decatur, Alabama.
1 DD-963 destroyer	\$100 million or	Unfunded applications for federal housing assistance in Arkansas as of November, 1971.
1 Nuclear powered aircraft carrier, minus supporting equipment	\$1 billion or	Salary for 100,000 elementary school teachers at \$10,000 annually.

SANE

State Profiles

The following pages provide a state-by-state sketch of defense spending in the thirteen southern states. They are designed as preliminary profiles of the state's current pattern of military involvement as indicated by (1) prime contracts, or awards directly received from the Pentagon by corporations in the state, (2) military installations and (3) political representation on key Congressional committees which oversee defense-related activities. Additional background information on the state's political or economic situation as well as concluding remarks on the prospects of future Department of Defense (DoD) spending in the state are also included. The descriptions were kept brief and intended as introductory reviews of the major elements involved in southern militarism. We are interested in developing fuller profiles of each state with the help of other people, and hope those interested in such work will contact us at the Institute for Southern Studies.

CHARTS. The three charts at the beginning of each profile provide data in several areas. The first chart shows how the state ranks in terms of warfare and welfare: Total Pentagon or DoD funds for the last two fiscal years (the government's fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30) include military and civilian payroll for Defense Department personnel in the state, plus pay for retired military, the Reserves, and the National Guard, plus all prime contracts awarded in the state. The latter contrasts with the figures in the graph where only the total of prime contracts over \$10,000 are recorded for each fiscal year. The graphs make visible the sharp tilt in military spending with the Kennedy-Johnson-Vietnam War.

The defense dependence ratio is the 1968 percentage of breadwinners (work force plus military personnel) employed directly by the Pentagon or by private contractors doing Pentagon business. It includes as "defense dependent" only those employees involved in actual defense work, e.g., of Kodak's 13,000 work force in Kingsport, Tennessee, only the 3000 involved in munitions production are included.

Each state's defense spending per person for FY 1971 may be compared to the average 1970 income per person, as well as to the relative rank

of each among the fifty states. The rankings show how the southern states score high in defense dependency ratios (holding nine of the top 21 spots) and per capita defense spending (seven of the top 22), while doing very poorly in per capita income (eight of the bottom ten states).

This contrast between warfare and welfare is further indicated in the Education, Health, and Poverty ranks. The Education Index is the rank of the state's funding per public school pupil for education (eight of the bottom ten states are in the South). Health denotes rank in number of private doctors per 1000 citizens, and Poverty is the rank of the state in terms of the percentage of its families existing below the federally established poverty level (the South has seven of the worse ten states). All figures, including states' populations, are for 1970.

POLITICIANS. The disparity between the South's commitment to human welfare and wasteful warfare is well illustrated, and well preserved, by the region's political leaders. The extreme power of southern Congressmen is legendary, a source of ulcers for liberals in the North and South. Their seniority is measured in decades, allowing them to maintain a grip on the four committees most concerned with Pentagon affairs: the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate. Southerners chair all four bodies and hold a disproportionate number of the ranking posts (giving them subcommittee chairmanships) on such other military related committees as Veterans' Affairs, Science and Astronautics (House), Aeronautics and Space



Sciences (Senate) and Merchant Marine. With the chairmanships of half the standing committees in Congress, southerners can block most "human resources" programs they dislike. The Profiles provide several examples of their flip-flops between support of military funding and opposition to anti-poverty spending. Space would not permit details of how Congressmen protect militarism in their home districts, such as the maneuvers of Louisiana's Front Four (Hebert, Ellender, Boggs and Long) on behalf of the Ogden Corporation's Avondale Shipyard and at the expense of Pentagon procurement analyst Gordon Rule (see details in "Admiral Kidd vs. Mister Rule," New York Times Magazine, 3/25/73).

CORPORATIONS. The material on private contractors in the states comes from many sources, particularly reports from companies and the DoD. All contract figures and rankings are for fiscal year 1971 unless otherwise noted, and they give the company's total contracts of \$10,000 or more for a particular area. Smaller contracts by company are not available from the DoD. Employment data is for 1973, which invariably understates the 1971 work force. Our study did not include defense business done by subcontractors of prime contractors. For example, some 23% of Lockheed-Georgia's DoD \$730,000,000 contract for 1968 went to subcontractors outside Georgia, which, of course, reduces somewhat the impact of its funds on Georgia's economy, while spreading the influence of Pentagon dollars to other areas. Thus the impact of the hiring and laying off of 1200 people at Nashville, Tennessee's Avco Corp. plant, the largest US subcontractor for Lockheed's C-5A, is not considered here. Neither is the flow of defense funds from the parent plant to its other divisions, e.g., from Lockheed-Georgia to Lockheed at Chattanooga.

In several cases, the top ten contractors for a state (see charts) have shifted since FY 1971. Some like South Carolina's Avco plant and West Virginia's Wollensak have shut down altogether or moved out of the state. Significant fluctuation has occurred in many cases related to ammunition production. Thus, employment at the Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant (AAP) in Texarkana, Texas, has dropped from 11,200 in 1969 to 4200 in 1973 because of Vietnam cutbacks. As in other rural munition plants, many of those employed were "under-employed" farmers, housewives and blacks who recognize the temporary nature of the work, but who are nevertheless thrown back to a marginal income without these jobs.

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. These range from hospitals to ordnance depots to Air Force Bases (AFB). In many cases, the 1970 population of the town closest to the base is given, along with total civilian employees and military personnel at the base. In comparing these figures it is important to remember the town population includes children while the installation figure does not. Also, a multiplier effect is generally recognized, such that for every person stationed at the base, two others in the town gain their livelihood from servicing his or her needs.

SOURCES. Helpful in researching militarism on a local level are the methodology guides published by NACLA and NARMIC, two groups listed among the resource groups at the end of the Journal. The Council of Economic Priorities prepared a valuable study entitled "The Business of War" which we relied on, and the NARMIC library subscribes to the expensive but exhaustive Defense Marketing Survey, a private periodical/catalog published for the defense industry. Both groups were generous in allowing us to use these materials. In addition to reports from public relations and personnel offices of businesses and military bases, several US government publications were used in preparing the Profiles. Chief among these are Bureau of Census and Commerce and Labor Department statistical tables. The Department of Defense publishes a number of helpful reports, including "100 Companies and Their Subsidiaries Listed According to Net Value of Military Prime Contract Award," "Military Prime Contract Awards by Region and State," and "Listing of Contractors Receiving a Prime Contract of \$10,000 or More." The first two are free, and the third is available for each state at a \$3 to \$5 cost. They are available for each Fiscal Year from The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. Other general reference works and statistical almanacs were helpful, and of particular value is The Almanac of American Politics, 1972 by M. Barone et al. from Gambit Press. For the material on World War II spending in the South, see F. L. Deming and W. A. Stein, Disposal of Southern War Plants, National Planning Association Committee of the South, 1949.

ABBREVIATIONS:

AAP = Army Ammunition Plant

AFB = Air Force Base

DoD = Department of Defense

per. = civilian and military personnel

pop. = 1970 population

Alabama


Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$893,813,000
FY 1972 \$938,529,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 6.8 Rank 19th
DoD funds per capita: \$296 Rank 21st
Income per capita: \$2853 Rank 48th
Education Rank: 50th
Health Rank: 46th
Poverty Rank: 47th

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	City Investing Co. Hayes International Birmingham	\$58,097,000	Aircraft repairs, ammunition, & consulting
2	Chrysler Corp. Huntsville	31,871,000	military surveil- lance systems
3	Northrop Worldwide Aircraft, Inc. Fort Rucker, Ala.	27,155,000	aircraft mainten- ance and repairs
4	Etowah Mfg. Co. Gadsden	9,595,000	fuze boosters for artillery shells
5	Teledyne, Inc. Brown Engineering Co., Huntsville	9,586,000	Safeguard ABM subcontractor
6	Lansen Industries Inc., Cullman, Ala.	7,903,000	bomblet dis- pensers
7	Genesco, Inc. Huntsville	7,321,000	combat boots
8	Western Electric Huntsville	6,500,000	Safeguard ABM prime contractor
9	I.D. Precision Com- ponents, Inc.	5,229,000	mortar shell fuzes
10	I.B.M. Huntsville	4,854,000	electronics

DoD Contracts over \$10,000
(in million \$)



With the introduction of new industries and agri-businesses, Alabama's economic base has somewhat shifted in recent years. Cotton was the state's major farm product, but as small farms have been gobbled up and consolidated—or abandoned, production has centered on more profitable crops such as soybeans, peanuts and corn. With 66% of its area in timber land, Alabama also has a large pulpwood industry, ranking second in the country in total production. But the number of manufacturing jobs have not increased as fast as in most southern states, rising only at a 3% annual rate for the last decade, or half the rate of growth in Arkansas and Mississippi. Despite **George Wallace's** claim to help the little man, Alabama now ranks 48th in per capita income, spends less per pupil on public education than any other state, and ranks 46th in number of private doctors per 1000 people.

The state's industrial base began to develop back in 1907, when **U.S. Steel** moved into Birmingham in search of cheap labor and easy access to the three basic elements of steelmaking: iron ore, coal and lime. The company became the chief factor in the growth and lack of diversified development in its new home, "the Pittsburg of the South." Much of Alabama's industry is still concentrated around steel and metal products in Birmingham, Gadsden, and Anniston, and employment will be heavily influenced by continuing imports of less expensive products from Japanese and European companies, and the runaway shops of U.S. multinational firms.

Alabama's defense industries are well distributed among four fields—airframes, missiles and space systems, ammunition, textiles—and because of this the state may be in a better position

than other southern states with post-Vietnam cutbacks. The biggest single DoD contractor, also located in Birmingham, is **Hayes International Corporation**, a subsidiary of the N.Y.-based conglomerate, **City Investing Co.** For more than twenty years, Hayes has been almost completely dependent on the Pentagon for its revenues, providing the military with numerous munitions components, including the 2.75" fragmentation rocket warhead, the most frequently used weapon in Vietnam. Now, as one of Alabama's largest industrial employers (4000 workers), Hayes is most active in maintaining and refurbishing military aircraft, particularly transport planes. It also does management consulting for the Pentagon and handles production of many Air Force publications.

Birmingham has several other smaller defense contractors. One worth noting is the **Southern Research Institute** which contracts with private industry and the DoD to do various research projects, especially in the health and electro-optics fields. For the Pentagon, SRI has developed a portable alarm for detection of chemical warfare agents and the highly acclaimed "smart bomb" guidance system used extensively over North Vietnam.

Birmingham may have the largest single contractor, but Huntsville, the state's fastest growing city, gets the most defense money. Huntsville hosts the Army's **Redstone Arsenal** and NASA's **Marshall Space Flight Center**. It's also the home of Senate Banking Committee Chairman **John Sparkman**, and has thus been dubbed "the town that John built." Because of its federal

installations, the town's size ballooned from 14,000 in 1950 to 114,000 in 1970. During FY 1971, ten of Alabama's top twenty defense contractors were located in Huntsville. Such major companies as **Chrysler**, **I.B.M.**, **Western Electric**, **Thiokol** and **Teledyne**, all set up operations there and began concentrating on development of missiles for the war effort and rockets for the space program. The local population rapidly shifted their attention from federal TVA to federal aerospace dollars. Employment at **Chrysler's** Huntsville division is now 500, down from its peak of 1800, and the company is attempting to shift from its near-total dependence on DoD spending to "a more even-keeled position with a mixture of both government and industrial dependence." Employment at **Brown Engineering**, a Huntsville subsidiary of **Teledyne**, is now down to about 350, with 40% of its business in defense work, chiefly on the Safeguard ABM.

The third major sector of Alabama's defense contracting is the production of ammunition and ordnance equipment in the northeast part of the state. The four leaders in this area are: **Lansen Industries** in Cullman, and **Etowah Manufacturing, I.D. Precision Components**, and the **Defense Ordnance Corporation**, all of Gadsden. With a \$9.6 million contract, **Etowah** was the state's fourth largest DoD contractor, and presently employs 700 workers in the production of fuze components for various weapons; 75% of its Alabama business is with the Pentagon. **Lansen Industries** gets over 90% of its sales from the military for making SUU-30 metal bomb dispensers. For bombing missions in Vietnam, the SUU-30 has been filled



Photo by Bill Fibben

with guava and pineapple anti-personnel bombs which shower out chunks of metal, destroying huts and mutilating people. Lansen employs 160 workers and says it expects demand for its product to continue into "peace" time.

The logical center for this ammunition business is Anniston, site of the **Army Depot** that packs and stores munitions for wartime use. The facility was opened in 1940 and is now the largest employer in Calhoun County. Nearby **Fort McClellan** has a chemical warfare center as well as being a WAC training base, and helps make the county one of the few areas of growth in the state. Characteristically, the 9,500 personnel on the Depot and Fort are now represented in Congress by arch-conservative **William Nichols** who conveniently sits on the House Armed Services Committee. The former Wallace state legislature leader also represents Lowndes County, where the Black Panther emblem was first raised by a SNCC-organized political party, and

several other counties which were put into his district to dilute the black vote of central Alabama: Nichols is clearly more interested in the Pentagon dole to the rich than federal aid to the poor.

A similar contrast holds for hawkish Rep. **William Dickinson**, who got elected on Goldwater's 1964 coattails and now serves as the second ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. His district contains Montgomery, "cradle of the Confederacy," home—on the one hand—of **Maxwell AFB** with its Air University, important training center and 6000 personnel, and on the other hand, scene of the 1956 bus boycott that launched the civil rights movement. Dickinson also looks out for Dale County's **Fort Rucker** with its 13,500 military and 2500 civilian personnel. With such men in Congress, Alabama will certainly be fighting hard for more DoD money to make up for cutbacks in ammunition and Vietnam related procurement.

Arkansas


Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$255,940,000
FY1972 \$291,438,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 2.9 Rank 39th
DoD funds per capita: \$133 Rank 41th
Income per capita: \$2791 Rank 49th
Education Rank: 47th
Health Rank: 45th
Poverty Rank: 49th

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	AMBAC Industries Pace Corporation East Camden	\$9,372,000	ammunition
2	Addison Shoe Corp. Wynne, Ark.	4,045,000	boots
3	Aerojet-General Corp. Batesville	3,911,000	ammunition
4	Wisner & Becker Contracting Engrs. Ozark, Ark.	3,600,000	construction
5	Baldwin Electronics Camden & Little Rock	2,444,000	ammunition
6	Martin Eby Constn. Arkadelphia	2,281,000	construction
7	Martha & Mac Corp. Hughes, Ark.	2,278,000	construction
8	Pine Bluff Sand & Gravel Company Pine Bluff, Ark.	1,961,000	construction supplies
9	Amis Constn. Co. Dierks, Ark.	1,887,000	construction
10	Eugene Lühr & Co. Helena, Ark.	1,826,000	construction

DoD Contracts over \$10,000
(in million \$)





Arkansas, primarily an agricultural state with significant oil production, has dramatically increased its manufacturing industries in recent years, thus helping bring its population back up to its 1940 level. Although agriculture (cotton, rice, and poultry), minerals (oil and bauxite), timber products and tourism provide much of the state's personal income, employment in durable manufacturing increased by 70% during the 1960's led by electronics and electrical supplies producers. In spite of this growth, the state still has the smallest amount of manufacturing employment in the South and the second lowest per capita income in the nation.

Overall, the state's mixed political climate reflects the moderate balance between Republican-leaning mountaineers and its Deep South Democrats, and is expressed in the differences (and similar anti-civil rights stands) of Senators **J. William Fulbright** and **John McClellan**. Both men are powerful leaders in domestic and foreign affairs in the Senate with Fulbright chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and McClellan chairing the all important Appropriations Committee. Adding **Wilbur Mills**—chairman of the most powerful committee in the House, the one they call Ways and Means because it oversees all legislation regarding the how and what of taxation—the Arkansas delegation in Congress becomes one of the strongest there is, particularly in relation to its size. The Democrats on Ways and Means also determine their party's committee assignments for the House, thus giving Mills even more leverage.

It just so happens that the biggest military base

in Arkansas lies in Mills' district. Located in the state's only major metropolitan center, the **Little Rock AFB** serves as a tactical air command and missile wing center, and with 6,100 military and 700 civilian personnel, it pours nearly \$40 million into the local economy each year in payrolls and local purchases. Two other important military facilities are in Arkansas and they both have a tremendous impact on the economies of their neighboring communities. In the northeast corner of the state, the **Blytheville AFB** hosts the Strategic Air Command designated 97th Bomber Wing. With 10,500 personnel and dependents in a city of only 25,000, the base is clearly what keeps the town of Blytheville perking along. To the southwest, just forty miles south of Little Rock, is the **Pine Bluff Arsenal**, famous as the center of the Army's chemical-biological warfare testing and production. The Arsenal is the largest employer in the Pine Bluff area with 1250 civilians involved in producing "chemical munitions." These include gas grenades, napalm-tipped rockets, and "incendiary clusters" for use in Vietnam.

Ammunition production by private businesses has been a significant factor in the state's industrial growth, attracting outside dollars to Arkansas and training its work force in manufacturing skills. As the Vietnam War escalated and then dragged on, the demand for Arkansas-produced munitions steadily increased. All together, the firms in this field received over half the Defense Department's prime contract money in the state for more than a decade (the construction industry received the next largest portion).

As if by coincidence, two of the largest ammunition producers are located in the same industrial park in Camden (pop. 15,147), and a third formerly operated a facility there also. Actually the park is what's left of a 68,000 acre Naval Ordnance Depot after it was closed down. Since its "conversion" to private ownership, the complex has attracted over twenty manufacturers to set up shop in the old Navy buildings. These include such firms as ITT, International Paper, and defense supplier **Stromberg-Carlson** (a **General Dynamics** division). The state's number one defense contractor, the **Pace Corporation**, has 740 people at the complex making flares and anti-personnel munitions. All of Pace's Arkansas sales are to the military, and it has been a leading ordnance contractor in other southern states. **Baldwin Electronics Company**, number five in Arkansas, operates a munitions plant in the Camden park, too. It employs 85 people

and gets 100% of its sales from the Pentagon for making the 2.75" rockets that were so frequently sprayed from U.S. helicopters in Vietnam.

The exit of a third ammunition firm from the industrial park is characteristic of this line of work. At the peak of the Vietnam conflict, the **Aerojet-General Corporation** had 1000 workers making armaments at the Camden park, and the company was the state's leading contractor. But by 1971, it had closed down the entire operation. (Pace did nearly the same thing for its operation in Memphis, Tennessee, which went from a work force of 1200 to 25.) But Aerojet, a subsidiary of **General Tire and Rubber**, also maintains an ordnance plant north of Camden in Batesville, Arkansas. Operating under the name of **Batesville Manufacturing Company**, the plant has held a steady work force of 600 and is that city's second largest industrial employer. Nationally, Aerojet is one of the leading


producers of various anti-personnel weapons and annually gets as much as 70% of its sales from the DoD. It has been a leader since 1956 when, capitalizing on the Korean War experience and the Yellow Peril hysteria, it helped originate a full line of anti-personnel weapons with its creation of the Claymore mine, a weapon designed "to reduce a human sea-charge to mincemeat at the touch of a button."

The ammunition field fluctuates wildly and is now headed for a downturn. But Arkansas, with a low defense-dependency anyway, has some of the most stable suppliers in this field with the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Aerojet, and Pace, so the impact of cutbacks on the state as a whole may not be as great as elsewhere. However, some communities dependent on the erratic defense dollar (like Texarkana—see Introduction to State Profiles) may feel the pinch more sharply.

Florida

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$1,987,280,000
FY1972 \$2,483,149,000


Defense Dependency Ratio: 6.9 Rank 18th
DoD funds per capita: \$292 Rank 22nd
Income per capita: \$3642 Rank 26th
Education Rank: 20th
Health Rank: 20th
Poverty Rank: 36th



TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	United Aircraft W. Palm Beach	\$124,591,000	R&D on F-15, aircraft engines
2	Western Electric Orlando	102,776,000	Safeguard ABM prime contractor
3	Pan American World Airways, Cocoa Beach	81,536,000	operate Eastern Test Range
4	Martin Marietta Orlando	64,918,000	electronics, mis- sile assemblies
5	Honeywell, Inc. St. Petersburg & Tampa	60,279,000	electronic air- craft equipment
6	Airlift International Miami	32,581,000	military cargo services
7	Harris-Intertype Corp. Radiation, Inc. Melbourne, Fla.	28,200,000	electronic battle- field equipment
8	McDonnell-Douglas Titusville, Fla.	23,682,000	tactical missiles
9	Fairchild Industries St. Augustine, Crestview, & St. Petersburg	19,882,000	aircraft overall & repair
10	Jacksonville Shipyards Mayport, Fla.	11,052,000	ship repairs

As the fastest growing and most urbanized state in the South, Florida enjoys one of the most diversified economies in the region. Tourism is still the number one industry, bringing in \$3.6 billion annually, and it's growing by leaps and bounds with the opening of Disney World near Orlando. Florida also continues to have a strong agricultural base, profiting off the cheap labor of nearly 100,000 migrant farm workers. The state produces over 80% of the nation's citrus products and ranks second only to California in fresh vegetable output. The political diversity of the state, the least southern in this respect, ranges from the rural Dixiecrats of the panhandle through right-wing Republicans in the retirement centers along the western coast to the liberal Yankee communities of Miami. It is a diversity that can produce a flamboyant Republican **Claude Kirk** or an earnest populist **Reubin Askew** as governor, and now has, as Senators, a conservative, transplanted Maine Republican (**Edward Gurney**) and a moderate, anti-war Democrat (**Lawton Chiles**).



Florida can thank the aerospace business for its phenomenal industrial growth during the last dozen years. This growth perfectly reflects the partnership between the post-Sputnik era of space exploration and the Kennedy step-up of defense spending for weapons systems and surveillance equipment. Electronics and aerospace firms flocked to locate plants in developing Florida, particularly in the central strip from Cape Canaveral across to Orlando and over to Tampa-St. Petersburg.

But Florida's largest DoD contractor for FY

1971 was located in West Palm Beach. The **Pratt and Whitney** division of **United Aircraft** is the largest employer in this resort city with 5800 people and a payroll of \$72.5 million. Its \$120,000,000 contract for research and development (R & D) on engines for the Air Force's F-15 and Navy aircraft is the major reason United Aircraft was the country's ninth largest DoD contractor for R & D for FY 1971.

Western Electric, the prime contractor for the ABM (see N.C. writeup), and **Martin-Marietta**, developer of the Sprint interceptor missile for the ABM system, are both large Defense Department contractors with sizeable plants in central Florida. Martin's Orlando division also works on the Army's SAM-D mobile air defense system under a sub-contract from the Raytheon Company. With over 7000 workers and a 1972 payroll of \$93,600,000, Martin-Marietta is the biggest industrial employer in Orlando. The company's employment is expected to remain stable in the near future although its volume of defense-related production is expected to increase.

Among other top DoD contractors in the state are: **Pan American World Airways**, operator of the Eastern Test Range (ETR) which supports development of various ballistic missiles and space systems. Pan Am has held the ETR operation and maintenance contract for nineteen years and over the past five has averaged \$65 million annually for its services. **Honeywell, Inc.**, with operations in Tampa and St. Petersburg and a combined work force of 5,500 is the fifth largest contractor in Florida and ranks 22nd nationally. Honeywell has received considerable attention nationally as a major producer of anti-personnel weapons, and the Clergy and Laymen Concerned organization has organized a boycott of its products. In Florida, the company is involved primarily in producing classified cryptographic equipment (code unscramblers) and guidance components for the Navy's Polaris-Poseidon ICBM's. **Radiation, Inc.**, a division of **Harris-Intertype** (41st largest DoD contractor nationally), develops surveillance and reconnaissance systems for anti-submarine and counterinsurgency warfare, referred to as "area denial techniques."

Another important component in Florida's economy is the operation and maintenance of military bases. Each of the state's large urban centers has a major DoD installation, and the effect of a base on a smaller city can be quite dramatic. **Homestead AFB**, for example, has an overwhelming impact on the nearby community of Homestead

(thirty miles south of Miami, scene of the recent migrant camp typhoid epidemic and pop. 22,000) since the base has 7,700 personnel and an annual military payroll of \$56,000,000.

The greatest concentration of DoD installations, however, is in the largely rural first Congressional district which covers the western panhandle from Pensacola to Panama City. It includes **Elgin Air Force Base**, the largest air base in area in the U.S. and a test center for anti-personnel weapons, and **Pensacola Naval Air Station**. Represented by **Robert L. Sikes**, ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee, its Defense Subcommittee and chairman of its Military Construction Subcommittee, this nine county area (pop. 489,000) supports 44,000 military and civilian personnel on ten major installations.

Armed Services Committee members Democrat **Charles Bennett** and Republican **C. W. (Bill) Young** can take credit for keeping the dough flowing to the giant **Jacksonville Naval Complex** (14,000 pers.) and St. Petersburg's **McDill Air Force Base** and strike command (8,400 pers.), respectively. But only Florida's fifth district can rival the \$460,000,000 Robert Sikes brought his panhandle district in 1970. With \$542,000,000 or over one fourth the state's


total Pentagon funds for 1970, Republican **Louis Frey**, a ranking member of the NASA governing Science and Astronautics Committee, represents the most militarized swath of Florida. It stretches from Cocoa Beach and Cape Kennedy to Orlando and includes five of the state's top eight DoD contractors, plus **McCoy** and **Patrick Air Force Bases**, **Orlando's Naval Training Center** (total pers. 16,200), and additional millions of NASA funds thrown in for the space program and its multitude of suppliers.

Florida also has the third largest retired military population in the country behind California and Texas, with total military pensions in the state approaching \$250,000,000 for FY 1971. Appropriately, the man who looks out for this constituency is **James Haley**, third ranking Democratic member on the House Veterans' Affairs Committee and Representative from the Bircher retirement center of Sarasota.

The defense industries of Florida will continue to be a major factor in the state's economy, and with Martin-Marietta, Honeywell, Western Electric and United Aircraft leading the way, they seem to be in little danger from post-Vietnam cutbacks.

Experienced AX men.

Over the past 39 years, Republic has built more than 25,000 fighter-bombers. The kind of battle experience gained with the P-47, F-84's and F-105 doesn't come easy. But it has been called, "probably the greatest aircraft ever put together." We can bring the same experience to bear on the Air Force's new close-air support aircraft—the AX. We've got the engineers (the same design team that worked on the F-15 and US/FRG proposals). We've got the manufacturing knowhow (the same production group that built the F-84 and F-105 is now building the empennage and other vital sections on both the F-4 and F-14). For the AX, this means a low-cost, low-risk airplane that can hit with accuracy and maximum survivability. Lethal, accurate, agile and cheap. That's our AX.




F
FAIRCHILD HILLER
REPUBLIC AVIATION DIVISION

Georgia

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$1,846,662,000
 FY1972 \$1,798,763,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 9.7 Rank 6th
 DoD funds per capita: \$402 Rank 10th
 Income per capita: \$3332 Rank 34th
 Education Rank: 42nd
 Health Rank: 32nd
 Poverty Rank: 41st



Two men are most responsible for Georgia now having fifteen military installations employing 110,000 personnel and a gigantic **Lockheed Aircraft** assembly plant. One man is **Carl Vinson**, a House member from Georgia for 50 years and chairman of the Armed Services Committee. **Richard Russell** is the other man: a legend in his own time, U.S. Senator for 38 years until his death in 1971, the patrician leader of southern Senators in both anti-black and pro-Pentagon legislation, chairman of the Appropriations Committee and before that of Armed Services, a man so powerful he decided from his death bed the fate of Edward Kennedy's aborted bid for majority whip. Russell called for massive U.S. remobilization back in the 1930's and today nearly one in ten Georgia breadwinners gets his dough from Pentagon contracts or Pentagon installations.

The legacy of Vinson and Russell is preserved

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Lockheed Aircraft Lockheed-Georgia Marietta, Ga.	\$555,303,000	C-5A aircraft, other transport planes
2	Bibb Mfg. Co. Macon, Ga.	8,899,000	textiles, uniforms clothing supplies
3	Thiokol Chemical Brunswick, Ga.	8,212,000	tear gas, munitions
4	Somers Coite Co. Augusta	7,873,000	construction at Ft. Gordon
5	Hardaway Const. Columbus	6,000,000	construction at Ft. Benning
6	U.S. Justice Dept. Atlanta	5,191,000	electronic equipment
7	Dell Industries, Waycross Machine Shops, Waycross, Ga.	4,712,000	ammunition
8	Standard Container Homerville, Ga.	4,106,000	ammunition
9	A.L. Johnson Construction Co. Minneapolis, Minn.	4,100,000	construction in Carters, Ga.
10	Georgia Power Co. Atlanta, Ga.	2,389,000	electricity

in Congress by (1) Senator **Herman Talmadge**, Agriculture Committee chairman and number two man on Veterans' Affairs, a re-packaged Dixiecrat who pleases Atlanta's Coca-Cola and banks as well as the rural (white) vote; (2) Senator **Sam Nunn**, newly elected conservative who pledged he would get—and he did—a seat on the Armed Services Committee; and (3) Representative **Jack Brinkley**, typical right-leaning black belt Democrat, member of both the Armed Services and Veterans' Affairs Committees, whose district contains the state's two biggest bases, **Fort Benning**, a key Army training base that overshadows the development of Columbus, Georgia, and **Warner Robins AFB**, just south of Macon, which employs 16,800 civilians.

The largest state east of the Mississippi, Georgia still has 72.5% of its land in commercial forests—the largest percentage of any southern state. Agricultural and timber products and

textiles and apparels still account for a large portion of the work force, but since WWII the state has undergone a rapid industrial expansion led by the transportation industry. And key to that sector's growth was production of aircraft for the military. The government's Bell Bomber plant in Marietta, just north of Atlanta, employed 30,000 during WWII, giving many their first taste of assembly line work and turning the rural area into suburban sprawl. In 1951, the **Lockheed Aircraft Corporation** reopened the government owned airplane factory (largest plant in the southeast at the time), and hired some 10,000 people to assemble B-47's for use in the Korean War. In 1955, Lockheed began building the C-130 Hercules military transport to help beef up U.S. worldwide superiority. Today, the company is still the biggest industrial employer in Georgia with 11,000 employees, and its contracts for the infamous C-5A (including cost overruns) and other cargo planes easily made it the state's largest defense contractor for FY 1971. Headquartered in California, Lockheed is also the nation's number one DoD contractor. But with C-5A production virtually ended, Lockheed-Marietta is continuing to cut back employment from its 33,000 peak in 1969 to 7,000 by the end of 1973. Employment will pick up in many of the new industries which have moved into the area to capture a trained work force, but many of the high technology firms and suppliers that fed off Lockheed's fat will suffer greatly.

After Lockheed, the largest portion of prime contracts go to textile firms, the state's biggest industry. But after Lockheed there's not much left; nevertheless, companies like **Bibb Manufacturing**, **Dovling Bag Co.**, and **J. P. Stevens** racked up sales of \$25,000,000 in FY 1971 for uniforms, sand bags, pillow cases . . . you name it.

Another large category of procurement has been for ammunition, although with the Vietnam wind-down it has decreased from \$65.8 million in FY 1969 to \$21.1 million in FY 1971. As in other southern states, **Thiokol** is a leader in this field. Around 1960, Thiokol excited the imaginations of Georgians by announcing it planned to open a plant for producing giant rocket engines that propel man into outer space. But in June, 1965, NASA announced it would cancel its multimillion dollar solid fuel program of which Thiokol was then an integral part. So Thiokol shifted its work in Woodbine, Georgia, just south of Savannah, to making munitions and nausea-producing gases for the military. The gases became particularly popular in Vietnam; they were sprayed over an



area before a bombing mission in order to stun the enemy so they couldn't hide. Thiokol's Georgia division also makes 40mm fragmentation grenades which scatter metal pieces through human flesh. On February 6, 1971, the Woodbine plant exploded and killed twenty-five workers, nearly all black women; the families of the dead are now suing Thiokol for negligence.

Other important ammunition producers in the state are **Maxson Electronics Corporation** in Macon, **Dell Industries** in Waycross, and **Standard Container** in Homerville. Maxson gets over 90% of its sales from the military for such items as grenades, flares, fuzes for anti-personnel weapons and bomb primers. Dell Industries produces fin assemblies for 500 lb. bombs like those used in raids over North Vietnam. With 300 workers, Dell is the largest manufacturing employer in Waycross; it says demand for its product has boomed in the last decade, bringing sales volume (100% from DoD contracts) up to the six to nine million dollar range. Standard Container, Homerville's largest employer, gets over \$4,000,000 for making 30 and 60 caliber bomb casings.

Well over a billion dollars pours into Georgia each year in payrolls and local purchases for its fifteen major defense installations. In FY 1971, military personnel and civilian employees of DoD each got over \$400,000,000, thus ranking Georgia

sixth in both payroll categories for the nation. These funds provide the stimulus for the continued growth of the cities around each base. In fact, each of Georgia's major urban areas have a major facility: the Atlanta area with **Fort McPherson** (includes the 3rd Army Headquarters), an **Army Depot**, **Dobbins AFB** (site of Lockheed's aircraft plant), and a **Naval Air Station**—total base population is 9,300; Columbus (pop. 155,000) with **Fort Benning** (infantry and counterinsurgency training; pers. 30,000); Macon (pop. 122,500) with **WarnerRobins AFB** (22,350 pers.); Savannah (pop. 118,350) with **Fort Stewart** and **Hunter Army**

Airfield (helicopter training; 9,500 pers.); Albany (pop. 72,625) with the **Marine Corps Supply Center** and a **Naval Air Station** (total pers. 5,250); Augusta (pop. 60,000) with **Fort Gordon** (infantry training and signal school; 21,050 pers.). No wonder a general remarked that a proposed new air base for Georgia would "sink the state." Although there are rearrangements planned for military bases and cutbacks in many contracting areas, it can be expected that Georgia will continue to provide the soldiers, the weapons and the politicians to use them for years to come.




Kentucky

*Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$623,714,000
FY1972 \$639,933,000*

*Defense Dependency Ratio: 6.8 Rank 19th
DoD funds per capita: \$194 Rank 32nd
Income per capita: \$3073 Rank 43rd
Education Rank: 41st
Health Rank: 34th
Poverty Rank: 46th*

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)			
Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	G.K. Newberg Construction Co. Chicago, Ill.	\$5,990,000	construction project on the Ohio River
2	Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. Louisville, Ky.	5,576,000	tobacco products
3	Struck Construction Co., Louisville	4,971,000	construction at Fort Knox
4	General Electric Louisville & Owensboro	4,018,000	electronic components
5	Louisville Gas & Electric Company Louisville	2,611,000	electricity, utilities
6	Gibbs Die Casting Aluminum Corp. Henderson, Ky.	2,458,000	steel balls for cluster bombs
7	Penn-Dixie Corp. Guy H. James Const. Louisville	2,260,000	construction
8	Ashland Oil Co. Ashland & Covington	1,641,000	petroleum products
9	Kentucky Mfg. Co. Louisville	1,571,000	
10	Standard Dredging Corp., Columbus & Wickliffe, Ky.	1,531,000	construction services



Kentucky has hardly been affected by defense spending in the Vietnam buildup and will suffer little from America's apparent defeat. In fact, the Bluegrass State stubbornly resists the influence of current events, clinging to its past as strongly as any southern state. Its politics and economics still reflect earlier battles: the civil war, and the war between the United Mine Workers and the miners. Counties divide up politically along their slave-holding or miner histories (Democrats) or their pro-Union past (Republican). Economically, agriculture—with tobacco the principal product—and coal are leading income producers, although much of their profits flow out of the state. In the last decade, manufacturing has grown significantly, particularly in electronics and electrical supplies with firms like Lexington's IBM and Louisville's GE. Republicans have now tipped the political scales their way, overturning the one party tradition, but the vestige of ante-bellum rule in the horse and tobacco country and of outside domination in Appalachia still persists: with a 7% black population, the one party system was not deemed necessary to preserve the status quo.


Most DoD money flowing into the state in recent years has been for support of the state's three military installations—**Fort Knox**, **Lexington Army Depot**, and **Fort Campbell**—and for a massive construction program in the western Kentucky-Ohio River area. On June 21, 1971, the Army Corps of Engineers announced a gigantic \$83,800,000 construction contract to **Dravo Corporation**, **G. K. Newburg Construction Co.** of Chicago, and **S. J. Groves and Sons** of Minneapolis. As a joint venture, the companies will construct a series of locks and access roads in Pope County, Ill. and Livingston County, Ky. on the Ohio River. The project will continue several years and account for a significant portion of the state's prime contracts.

Perhaps the lack of large industrial involvement in military work helps explain why Republican Senator **John Cooper** (now retired) could co-sponsor the Cooper-Church amendment that would prohibit use of U.S. troops in Cambodia and Laos. And how Louisville could elect an anti-war Representative with the help of its 33% black population. But Rep. **Mazzoli's** victory was very slim. After all, the state's largest industrial employer and a top defense contractor, **General Electric**, employs 20,000 people in Louisville. GE also has a plant in Owensboro (pop. 50,330) employing 3,600, and the company specializes in manufacturing repair parts and components for military communication equipment. Defense work

does not account for a large portion of GE's Kentucky business and even with the war's end, there will be a continuing requirement for the electronic components it does produce.

On the other hand, the **Gibbs Die Casting Aluminum Company**, Kentucky's sixth largest defense contractor, will be extremely affected by DoD cutbacks. Gibbs is a major producer of steel balls and pellets which are used to fill many of the Army's deadly cluster bomb units. Other items provided the military by Kentucky include tobacco products (**Brown & Williamson** was the leader in 1971), petroleum products (**Ashland Oil** and **Chevron**), and coal (**Kilpatrick Coal Co.** came in first here with \$1,060,000 in FY 1971). The state supplies the military with 7.6% of its non-petroleum fuel needs (mostly coal and natural gas), which is barely half what West Virginia sells.

Of Kentucky's three military installations, **Fort Knox** is the biggest. Located twenty miles south of Louisville, it directly supports 32,000 military and civilian personnel. Interestingly, both Fort Knox and GE's Owensboro plant lie in the district of **William H. Natcher**, a ranking House Appropriations Committee member and chairman of its subcommittee governing the District of Columbia; in the latter capacity, Natcher has shown his true colors by pushing through an unwanted freeway



and bridge before he would appropriate any money for the city's badly needed rapid transit system.


Fort Campbell, home of an airborne division and Army training center, has a military population of 18,000 (see Tennessee writeup). Support and subsistence for these two installations along with the **Louisville Ordnance Plant** (3,000 pers.) and the

Lexington Army Depot (3,475 pers.) make up the largest concentration of defense-related spending and are the primary reasons Kentucky has a defense-dependence ratio for its employment of 6.8—equal to Florida and North Carolina. Base cutbacks will lower this figure, but increase pay for remaining soldiers and civilians will keep the dollar flow up.

Louisiana

<i>Total DoD funds:</i>		<i>FY1971</i>	<i>\$701,742,000</i>
		<i>FY1972</i>	<i>\$722,598,000</i>
<i>Defense Dependency Ratio:</i>		<i>4.2</i>	<i>Rank 31st</i>
<i>DoD funds per capita:</i>		<i>\$193</i>	<i>Rank 33rd</i>
<i>Income per capita:</i>		<i>\$3049</i>	<i>Rank 44th</i>
<i>Education Rank:</i>		<i>36th</i>	
<i>Health Rank:</i>		<i>24th</i>	
<i>Poverty Rank:</i>		<i>48th</i>	

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)			
Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Exxon, Inc. Baton Rouge	\$48,481,000	petroleum products
2	Sperry Rand Corp. Shreveport & Doyline	45,172,000	ammunition
3	Lykes-Youngstown, Lykes Bros. Steamship New Orleans	23,548,000	shipping services
4	Central Gulf Steamship Corp. New Orleans	16,336,000	shipping services
5	Cities Services Oil Lake Charles, La.	9,487,000	petroleum products
6	Jms. Flanigan Shipping New Orleans	5,786,000	shipping services
7	J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. New Orleans	4,385,000	men's trousers and shirts
8	Southwestern Pallet Co. Clarksville, Texas St. James, La.	4,225,000	hardwood pallets
9	Atlas Construction Co. Empire, La.	4,100,000	construction
10	Delta Petroleum Co. New Orleans	3,300,000	petroleum products



FY1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

Petroleum products put Louisiana's mineral output second only to Texas, and account for 30% of its sales to the Pentagon. With 7,000 miles of navigable waterways linked to the state's deep sea ports, shipping and ship building are also important industries, both in terms of growth areas and defense dollars. New Orleans is the second busiest port in the country with over 100 shipping companies, and the center of a NASA complex for **Boeing** and **Chrysler Corporation's** development of the Saturn rocket.


Other important products include sugar cane and rice from the south, sweet potatoes and cotton further north, a large food industry, a chemical industry fed by petroleum and sulfur mining, and with 52% of the state in timber land, a sizeable paper and wood products industry. The number of manufacturing jobs has generally declined since WWII, until a new growth started in 1962 with Keynesian JFK in the White House. By contrast, the oil and gas extractive business has nearly tripled its employment since WWII. The six largest SMSA

areas account for 55% of the state's population, and as agricultural jobs disappear, the state's 30% black population is moving steadily to the cities.

The politically moderate (for the South), pro-spending, **Huey Long** state of Louisiana could count on its unusual power in Congress to get its share of Pentagon dollars (see introduction). But with the deaths of Senate Appropriations Chairman **Allen Ellender** and House Majority Leader **Hale Boggs**, this power is diminished. However, the state still holds the chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee in the person of **F. Edward Hebert**, an old product of the famous **Leander Perez** machine. Hebert, like Boggs, represents the New Orleans area, the prime recipient of DoD funds. Louisiana also maintains a senior post on House Appropriations in **Otto Passman** and a slot on the critical Ways and Means in **Joe Waggoner, Jr.**, who happens to "represent" the **Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant** and **Barksdale AFB**-Shreveport area. And then there's still Senator **Russell Long**, Huey's son and now chairman of the Finance Committee (which oversees oil depletion allowances) and chairman of Commerce's Merchant Marine Subcommittee—so he helps out the state's oil industry on the one hand and shipping on the other. Finally, two newly elected House members sit on that body's Merchant Marine Committee, and one of them, as a reflection of his cohort's power, joins Hebert on Armed Services. If the state is to survive post-Vietnam cutbacks in its ammunition production, these men will have to bring in more contracts, particularly in oil and shipping.

During the Vietnam build-up, however, ammunition received the greatest portion of Louisiana's DoD procurement. The principal beneficiary of this money was, and still is, the **Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant** located 20 miles east of Shreveport on a 14,000 acre "reservation" in Louisiana's largely black and most right-wing country. The government owned plant is operated by **Sperry Rand** with a labor force of 2,600. Throughout Vietnam, it manufactured, loaded, and packed demolition charges, mines, 2.75" rockets, and various projectiles. With stockpiles low, demand continues but is significantly reduced; Sperry's 1971 contract was less than a third its 1969 award of \$155,233,000, but the 1972 contract is up to nearly half this peak.

But the petroleum and shipping industries, as a whole, outdo ammunition and will prove more durable for bringing in DoD dollars. One third of the state's \$270-odd million 1971 prime contracts



over \$10,000 went to New Orleans-based shipping and ship building firms. Among the leaders were **Lykes Brothers Steamship** (a **Lykes-Youngstown Corp.** subsidiary), **Central Gulf Steamship**, **Flanigan Shipping**, **Delta Steamship Lines**, **Gulf and South America Steamship** (a new Lykes subsidiary bought from **W. R. Grace Co.**), and **Avondale Shipyard**.

Avondale, a subsidiary of the conglomerate **Ogden Corporation** is the only major shipyard on the Gulf Coast besides Pascagoula's Litton yards. With 10,500 employees and rising, Avondale is the state's largest industrial employer. It has also ranked among Louisiana's top half-dozen recipients of Pentagon money for several years. The actual dollars fluctuate depending on the number of multi-year contracts received in one fiscal year. Thus awards swung from \$27.6 million in 1969 to \$6.7 million in 1971 to \$36.7 million in 1972. Less than half of Avondale's business is for the military, a reduction from previous years. However, its entry into production of commercial LASH ships or giant Lighter (barge) Abroad Ships is 40% financed by the federal government under the Nixon supported Merchant Marine Act of 1970. These ships hold dozens of container-carrying barges that can be separately taken ashore and they join the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tankers as the cornerstone of the government's attempt to regain the number one position in world shipping for American flag vessels.

The first of these LASH type ships under construction is the SEABEE built in Quincy, Mass. by **General Dynamics** (the nation's number two defense contractor) as that company's first attempt to move into the commercial vessel market. The

SEABEE is being built, again with government subsidy, for New Orleans' **Lykes Steamship**. Lykes, already getting 20% of its revenues from the Pentagon contracts, hopes its new cargo ships will win an even greater share of government sponsored trade. The Lykes-General Dynamic deal is a perfect example of industrial expansion supported by taxpayers' money and of conversion that capitalizes on public funds rather than promoting public control.

Standard Oil of New Jersey (**Exxon**), the nation's top supplier of petroleum products to DoD for more than a decade, is also La.'s 1971 leading contractor. One fourth its national contract of \$186,000,000 for 1971 came to its massive Baton Rouge refinery. Other oil firms whose tanks dot the state's shore and the Red River are: **Cities Services** (\$9.5 million); **Delta Petroleum** (\$3.8 million); **Triangle Refineries** (\$3.4 million); **Tenneco Oil** (\$3.2 million); **Ashland Oil** and **Evangeline Refining** with \$1.4 million each.


Military installations in Louisiana provide 42,000 direct jobs to civilian and military personnel, with 24,000 accounted for by the Army's infantry and basic training base, **Fort Polk**. With this job force, a military payroll of \$94 million and a civilian payroll of \$22,200,000, Fort Polk overshadows its nearest city, Leesville (pop. 9,000). The Strategic Air Command's **Barksdale AFB** (8,000 pers.) has similarly been a major factor in the growth of Bossier City, a suburb of Shreveport. Other bases include Alexandria's **England Tactical AFB** (4000 military) and the **New Orleans Naval Air Station** and Headquarters for the 8th Naval District (2000 pers.).



Mississippi

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$773,392,000
FY1972 \$930,620,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 7.3 Rank 17th
DoD funds per capita: \$349 Rank 13th
Income per capita: \$2575 Rank 50th
Education Rank: 49th
Health Rank: 48th
Poverty Rank: 50th



With its economy still heavily dependent on cotton, timber and fish, the predominantly rural Mississippi has nevertheless experienced a surge of industrial growth—even though its population has only increased by 10% since 1930 and it still has the lowest per capita income in the nation. Showing up mainly in the apparel, furniture, electrical equipment and shipbuilding industries, the state's rate of growth in manufacturing employment has been about twice the national rate of growth for the last three decades. A prime attraction for new industries are Mississippi's low wages—second lowest in the nation. With 36% of the population black, racism has traditionally been used to keep workers divided and unorganized. A notable exception has been the successful organization of pulpwood haulers into the bi-racial Gulfcoast Pulpwood Association.

An important contributor to Mississippi's

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Litton Industries Ingalls Shipyard Pascagoula, Miss.	\$401,925,000	Navy vessels, destroyers
2	Travenol Laboratories Cleveland, Miss.	4,876,000	medical supplies
3	MRS Manufacturing Flora, Miss.	4,111,000	tractors
4	Sperry Rand Corp. Jackson, Miss.	3,364,000	aircraft electronic components
5	Pioneer Recovery Systems Company Columbia, Miss.	3,326,000	parachutes
6	Vermont Gas Systems Southland Oil Co. Yazoo City & Rogers Lacy, Miss.	2,972,000	petroleum products
7	Greenhut Constr. Co. Biloxi & Gulfport	2,806,000	construction at Keesler AFB
8	Consolidated Food Corp. West Point, Miss.	1,982,000	food products
9	Poloron Products, Inc. Batesville, Miss.	1,895,000	500 lb. bomb fin assemblies
10	Chevron Oil Co. Pascagoula, Miss.	1,499,000	petroleum products

industrialization. Pentagon contracts for FY 1971 in the state came to \$349 per person while the national average of defense spending was only \$285. The state was finally getting the bucks to put behind its old motto, "By Valor and Arms." Most impacted by the funds has been the Gulf Coast region, receiving 89% of the prime contracts over \$10,000 for FY 1971. Almost all this, or \$462,000,000 went to one company, **Litton Industries**. As the state's largest industrial employer (18,700 workers) and with its DoD contracts tripling in three years, Litton's Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula is the prime reason why **Business Week** called the coastal region one of "the four fastest-growing sections of the New South."

Litton completed a new shipyard at Pascagoula and won a \$2.1 billion contract for building thirty DD-963 destroyers, "the largest single contract in the annals of American shipbuilding." The new

shipyard, financed by the state of Mississippi, uses "innovative marine design and construction techniques," building ships by modules instead of from the keel up. Major difficulties, however, caused the **Wall Street Journal** to comment, "thus far, . . . Litton has found the new techniques easier to describe in slick multicolor brochures than to execute." Delays in the project prompted considerable debate in Congress. But Senator **John Stennis** of Mississippi chairs the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, so the Navy has not found it necessary to consider another contract site.

Senator Stennis also serves on the Appropriations and the Aeronautics and Space Services Committees, while the state's junior Senator, **James Eastland**, chairs the Judiciary Committee and uses it to pocket civil rights legislation. Eastland also pockets \$160,000 annually for not growing cotton on his Sunflower County plantation. Fortuitously, Eastland's farmland lies in the district of Representative **Jamie Whitten**, Chairman of Agriculture's Appropriations Subcommittee, which oversees hand-outs to big farmers. Eastland is a ranking member of the Senate Agriculture Committee and an advocate of farm subsidies. On the other hand, both Whitten and Eastland are vigorous opponents of meaningful federal aid to the poor. In fact, Whitten got FBI agents to interview poor families (an intimidating process in itself) who had cooperated with reporters from CBS's "Hunger in America" special and the Citizens Board of Inquiry's **Hunger U.S.A.** and produced his own report blasting the two groups' findings.

Besides its contracts for destroyers, Litton has a contract to build five Landing Helicopter Assault Ships, "the nucleus of the Navy's amphibious assault force in the seventies." Heavy cost overruns and more delays on these projects have been the focal point of opposition to the appointment of Litton's president **Roy Ash** as director of Nixon's Office of Management and Budget. In addition to having a voice in the White House, plus two strong senators, Litton also has another friend in Republican **Trent Lott**. Lott became the Representative from Mississippi's coastal region in 1972 and promptly won a seat on the Merchant Marine Committee, lawmakers for government subsidized commercial shipbuilding. Litton is now looking for more contracts in this field.

NASA's \$250 million **Mississippi Test Facility** is also located on the Gulf Coast (remember Stennis is a ranking member of Aeronautics and Space); built

in the mid-sixties to test Saturn boosters, the facility is now operated by several government agencies outside DoD. Finally, Mississippi's largest military base, **Keesler AFB** (16,700 pers.) is located in the coastal city of Biloxi (pop. 49,000). Keesler's pilot training school teaches not only Americans going to Southeast Asia, but also South Vietnamese under the Military Assistance Program. The second largest base, **Columbus AFB**, also trains pilots, and it heavily impacts the second largest city in Jamie Whitten's district. Then comes the Navy's **McCain Field** (2,600 pers.) in Meridan (pop. 45,080) which is the biggest city in **G. V.** ("**Sonny**") **Montgomery's** district. Montgomery holds Mississippi's only seats on the House Armed Services and Veterans' Affairs Committees.

After Litton and the bases, there's not much left. The second largest contractor for FY 1971, **Travenol Laboratories Inc.**, got only 1.2% of the Litton contract for its product—medical supplies. Other firms furnish the DoD with tractors, airplane parts, parachutes, and parts for 500 lb. bombs, like those used over North Vietnam. The bomb parts are made by **Poloron Products**, another DoD recipient in Jamie Whitten's district.


Thus the key to defense spending in Mississippi is Litton Industries—and a bunch of pro-Pentagon, anti-poor Congressmen. As military priorities shift from supplies for Vietnam, it is likely Congress and the White House will be very sympathetic to an emphasis on refitting our "outmoded" Navy and merchant marine. Such a program has already begun, and it will be very beneficial to Litton Industries and bring even more defense dollars into Mississippi.



North Carolina

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$1,265,403,000
 FY1972 \$1,417,073,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 6.8 Rank 19th
 DoD funds per capita: \$249 Rank 27th
 Income per capita: \$3207 Rank 39th
 Education Rank: 43rd
 Health Rank: 31st
 Poverty Rank: 40th



North Carolina has the lowest industrial wages and the least unionized work force in the nation; perhaps that helps explain why it has the highest portion of its population in manufacturing jobs among the southern states, with as many jobs in this category (715,000) as twice-as-populated Texas. Most of the state's industry and white collar positions are concentrated in the rapidly expanding Piedmont region, including Raleigh, Durham, Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Charlotte, the only cities of significant size. Here are the numerous small factories that make the state the nation's top producer of textiles, tobacco products, and wooden furniture. The largely black, poor and rural Tidewater or coastal plain scraps along on tobacco, peanuts and general farming with some shipping and paper mills—and several military bases.

Despite the fact that North Carolina is the third most rural southern state, its banking laws and

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71).

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Western Electric Burlington, Greensboro & Winston-Salem, N.C.	\$213,338,000	Safeguard ABM prime contractor
2	CONDEC Corp. Charlotte	58,715,000	military trans- port vehicles
3	Union Carbide Corp. Charlotte	16,430,000	batteries
4	Ogden Corp. International Ter- minal Operating Co. Southport, N.C.	6,397,000	shipping services at Military Ocean Terminal, Sunnypoint (MOTSU)
5	Duke University Durham	4,319,000	research services
6	ECT Corporation Fayetteville, N.C.	4,135,000	trousers, gun slings
7	Kings Point Industries Fayetteville	4,070,000	textile products
8	Ellis Hosiery Mills, Inc. Hickory, N.C.	3,607,000	socks
9	Carney GnrL Contractors Cherry Point, N.C.	3,170,000	construction
10	Stencel Aero Engr. Asheville & Arden, N.C.	2,944,000	jet escape systems

rapid development have spawned the Southeast's two largest banks (Wachovia and NCBC). Diversification and modernization of the industrial base is indicated by the fact that jobs in machinery and electrical equipment, chemicals and plastics, and fabricated metals have doubled since 1961, about twice the overall growth in manufacturing.

An important stimulant to this development has been the expanding operations of **Western Electric**, the third largest industrial employer (following two textile giants) in the state with three plants in the Piedmont. The largest defense contractor in N.C., Western Electric got 57% of the large (over \$10,000) contracts for FY 1971. It is also the main reason its parent, **AT&T** ("your local Bell company"), is the third largest Pentagon contractor nationally. Roughly 25% of AT&T's defense money came into Western Electric facilities in Burlington (\$111,583,000), Greensboro (\$89,388,000), and



Winston-Salem (\$13,524,000). WE's defense work occupies 6,000 of its 15,000 workers in the state, and it consists largely of white collar research, development and some production for the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile, or simply, the ABM. As the main contractor for the ABM system, the company has profited greatly off production work actually done by its subcontractors. Fortunately for WE's future, North Carolina's **Sam Ervin**, the strict constitutionalist chairman of the Senate's Committee on Government Operations, also holds a ranking position on the Armed Services Committee and favored the ABM. Unfortunately for WE, the SALT agreement reached in May, 1972, limits the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to two anti-ballistic sites with a maximum of 100 missiles per site, a marked reduction from the plans for over a dozen sites. But WE is counting on the limitation meaning more research and development to make these two sites much stronger and more effective than originally planned. There may also be a large increase in non-limited weapons systems as alternatives to Safeguard, and WE is predicted to be the prime contractor.

North Carolina's largest industry by far is textiles, and firms receiving over \$10,000 apiece from the Pentagon racked up a tidy \$63,000,000 in FY 1972, up from 1971's \$35.7 million, but down from the 1969 high of \$90.7 million. During these years, N.C. sold 12½ to 16% of the clothing and textiles bought by DoD, making it the leading producer of military textiles followed by New Jersey and Tennessee. With the exception of a few companies (like **Suprem Manufacturing Company**, whose sole product is Army T-shirts, the textile/apparel industry is not dependent on military sales; even at the 1969 peak, only 5% of N.C.'s sales in this field went to Uncle Sam.

Because of a \$58,715,000 contract held by the **Condec Corporation** in Charlotte, the state ranked fourth nationally in production of combat vehicles for FY 1971. (The dollar value of this contract varies from year to year because of a multi-year production schedule; in FY 1972 N.C. got only \$2.5 million for combat vehicles). With a work force of

450 Condec produces "Gama Goats," small all-purpose trucks for use by the military. Nationally, Condec is a conglomerate with assorted operations in the Midwest and the North making valves, machinery, generators; 64% of its total sales come from the Pentagon, and 72% of this goes straight to Charlotte.

It is worth noting that N.C.'s fifth largest contractor in FY 1971 was **Duke University**, the only university to make it in the top ten of a southern state. Duke provides the Pentagon with research and technical advice in such areas as decompression and hyperbaric chambers.


The almost totally rural coastal area of the state is given an economic boost by several military installations. Representative **Walter Jones**, a Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee member, pulled some \$100 million (1970) into his district on the north coast, primarily for support of the **Cherry Point Marine Air Station** (13,145 pers.) and the **New River Marine Air Corps Station** (4189 pers.). The Marine training base, **Camp LeJeune** (13,419 pers.) and the **Johnson AFB** (6685 pers.) at Goldberg, dominate the middle coastal area of the third Congressional district. And further south along the coast, south of Wilmington in sparsely populated Brunswick County, is the **Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point**, a high efficiency and high security port from which ⅓ of the ordnance used in Vietnam in recent months has been shipped. **International Terminal Operation Company** (an **Ogden Corporation** subsidiary) and **Universal Terminal Stevedoring** which operate the port were the fourth and sixteenth contractors in N.C. in FY 1971 with \$6,400,000 and \$2,000,000 respectively, and the most significant employers in the county. The state's largest military base lies inland, however, and it has a devastating effect on its nearest city. **Fort Bragg**, the huge Army base with 36,700 military and 4,000 civilian personnel joins **Pope AFB** (4,500 pers.) in providing the juice that keeps neighboring Fayetteville, a city of 53,000, in the black. Fort Bragg has more soldiers than any other single base in the South; it's the home of the Green Berets and the 82nd Airborne, which has been called out for major antiwar protests.

The flow of Pentagon money to North Carolina may dip in the next several years depending on base cutbacks and the fortunes of the electronic and missile contractors, chiefly Western Electric. In any case, it is important to recognize that much of what WE gets is subcontracted to firms outside North Carolina, so it doesn't help the state's economy.

South Carolina

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$780,876,000
FY1972 \$832,310,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 8.9 Rank 11th
DoD funds per capita: \$301 Rank 19th
Income per capita: \$2936 Rank 47th
Education Rank: 45th
Health Rank: 47th
Poverty Rank: 45th



For most of the 20th century, South Carolina has been one of the lowest ranking states in per capita income, educational levels and health services. It still is. Pick up any major business magazine and you'll likely find an advertisement boasting that the state has less work stoppages and a higher percentage of blue collar workers than any other state. The ads—and the poverty—reflect the predominance of the low paying, non-unionized textile industry, which accounts for 44% of S.C.'s manufacturing jobs and nearly half the value of all manufactured products in 1971. While the number of textile jobs is declining slightly, the allied apparel and chemicals industries are expanding, as are electronics and machinery lines. Nationally, S.C. ranks second in peaches and third in tobacco, but its total farm receipts of \$441,455,000 are considerably smaller than the \$698,644,000 it got from the Pentagon the same year (1970).

TEN TOP DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Avco Corporation Charleston, S.C.	\$13,112,000	aircraft services & repairs
2	E-Systems, Inc. (LTV) Greenville	10,261,000	aircraft services & repairs
3	Blair Algernon, Inc. Columbia	8,783,000	construction at Ft. Jackson
4	Ruscon Constn. Co. Charleston	7,519,000	construction at Parris Island
5	Palmetto Construction Charleston	4,807,000	construction
6	J.P. Stevens Company Clemson and Piedmont, S.C.	4,601,000	textile products
7	Nantex Riviera Corp. Greenwood Underwear Co. Greenwood, S.C.	4,079,000	underwear
8	McDonald Lake Corp. Richland County, S.C.	3,781,000	construction at Ft. Jackson
9	Regis Milk Company Charleston	3,150,000	milk products
10	Detyens Shipyards, Inc. Mt. Pleasant, S.C.	2,620,000	ship repairs & services

The siege mentality of this state—the first to secede from the Union—finds expression in its two mottos: "while I breathe, I hope," and "prepared in spirit and resources." And such an attitude is well represented by S.C.'s long line of demagogues: men such as **Strom Thurmond**, the 1948 "States Rights" presidential candidate, the 1957 champion filibustering (the 24 hr. 17 min. record) opponent of the civil rights bill, and today, as a Republican, a ranking member of the Armed Services and Veterans' Affairs Committees; **Mendel Rivers**, the self-righteous war-monger, given to habitual drunken and racist tirades, who died in 1970 after a thirty year career on the powerful House Armed Services Committee, the last five as its chairman; and **James Brynes**, one time New Dealer turned sour, who, as Secretary of State, counseled Truman to drop the Hiroshima bomb out of "political" expediency.

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Like other southern states, racial moderates are gaining more success in politics (e.g., Governor John West), but the priority commitment to militarism continues. In addition to Thurmond's key positions on Armed Services and Veterans', the more moderate S.C. Senator, Democrat **Ernest Hollings** is a member of the Appropriations Committee and its Military Construction Subcommittee. Coincidentally, the construction industry as a block gets the state's second largest amount of Pentagon prime contracts with \$44 million in FY 1971. **Blair Algernon**, a Montgomery, Alabama, based construction firm with defense jobs all over the South, got the largest hunk with \$9 million for work on the **Charleston Naval Hospital**. Two Charleston firms, **Ruscon Construction** and **Palmetto Construction**, were next with seven and five million dollars respectively.

Charleston is, of course, the former district of Mendel Rivers, and the good ole boy put the port city back on the map with ten military installations. Upon his death, his godson and aide, **Mendel Davis**, won the first district seat and with his reelection in 1972, he gained a position on the Armed Services Committee. Considering the 38,000 personnel (24,000 military, 14,000 civilian) on the DoD payroll from the city's Air Force, Army and Navy installations, the Pentagon may well account for 35-50% of the area's employment, as some have estimated. The Navy has the biggest operation with a 15,000 acre base that headquarters the 6th Naval District. One wonders what Rep. Davis does for the largely black rural counties surrounding this military bastion.

Mendel Rivers and Mendel Davis' district also includes Beaufort, the county where Senator Hollings and colleagues "discovered" hunger. The county is at no loss for Pentagon dollars, however: four more installations, supporting 17,000 military and civilian personnel, dot the sparsely populated area (county pop. 51,136). The most famous of these is the **Parris Island Marine Recruit Depot** where a number of recruits have died from "rigorous" training.

Finally, the state's largest defense contractor for 1971 also operates in Charleston, joining 113 other companies that each have contracts over \$10,000 for a total to Charleston businesses of \$46,109,000. Number one in the state is the **Avco-Lycoming** division of **Avco Corporation** (29th largest DoD contractor nationally) which repairs the Huey and Chinook helicopter engines widely used in Vietnam. (Avco closed out its Charleston plant in 1972, putting 3300 people out of work; **Cummins Engine Company** bought the plant

but its employment won't get to Avco's level for several years.) S.C.'s second largest contractor, **E-Systems, Inc.** (an **LTV Corporation** spin-off), has a three year contract to refurbish F/FR-101 aircraft at its Greenville plant. Since the Vietnam peak of 1968-69, the textile industry, S.C.'s traditional leader in defense contracts, has been failing. With the departure of Avco, however, it will be the mainstay of Pentagon procurement in the state.

South Carolina has a second mouthpiece on the House Armed Services Committee: second district Republican **Floyd D. Spence**. His district contains the state's capital, its university, and the Army's training base, **Fort Jackson**. Located just outside Columbia (pop. 113,542), the base has 21,000 military and 2800 civilians on its payroll. Even more impacted is the city of Sumter (pop. 24,555) by the **Shaw AFB**. Located on three thousand acres in the fifth Congressional district, the base was built in 1941 "at the request of local citizens" and

continues to be leased to the Pentagon by the Sumter Chamber of Commerce for one dollar a year. Shaw headquarters the 9th Air Force, whose primary mission is electronic warfare: training, equipping and controlling tactical reconnaissance and airlift units. It operates with 7000 troops, 700 civilians and a payroll and local purchasing budget of \$75 million.


Throwing in the 3,800 soldiers at the **Myrtle Beach AFB**, the total military personnel in South Carolina comes to 58,000. It is thus noteworthy that the chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee is 57 year old **William Jennings Bryan Dorn**. Dorn's own Congressional district is dominated by federal Atomic Energy Commission funds going to the Savannah River AEC Reservation in Aiken County and its operator, the **DuPont Company**.

With such an array of political power and military facilities, it is difficult to conceive of South Carolina's militarism waning in the near future.

Tennessee

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$588,871,000
FY1972 \$671,842,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 4.0 Rank 32nd
DoD funds per capita: \$150 Rank 38th
Income per capita: \$3085 Rank 42nd
Education Rank: 46th
Health Rank: 25th
Poverty Rank: 43rd



TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Martin Marietta Corp. Harvey Aluminum Milan, Tenn.	\$51,074,000	operation of Milan AAP
2	Svedrup Parcel & Assoc. ARO Corporation Tullahoma, Tenn.	46,900,000	operation of Arnold Engr. Devel. Center
3	Eastman Kodak Holston Defense Corp. Kingsport, Tenn.	38,787,000	operation of Holston AAP
4	Atlas Chemical Chattanooga	17,850,000	operation of Volunteer AAP
5	Raytheon Corp. Bristol	17,389,000	ammunition
6	AMBAC Industries Pace Corporation Memphis	15,090,000	ammunition
7	Pearce, DeMoss & King Chattanooga	13,084,000	construction
8	Heckethorn Mfg. Co. Dyersburg, Tenn.	11,710,000	ammunition
9	Capitol Int'l Airways Nashville	11,264,000	services
10	Delta Refining Co. Memphis	8,423,000	petroleum products

Tennessee earned its nickname "the Volunteer State" through a long tradition of mobilizing against its chosen enemies: the British, the French, the Mexicans, and most especially, the Indians. Here rugged individualism, militarism, and racism combined in perfect harmony to secure new lands for a growing America. It is a tradition epitomized by the state's hero, Andrew Jackson, who parlayed his exploits in the 1812 Battle of New Orleans and his Indian fighter reputation into a Presidential victory. As President, the founder of the modern Democratic Party promptly defied the Supreme Court by ordering the removal of the Cherokee Nation from north Georgia via "the Trail of Tears."

Since WWII, the political balance between Jackson's bluegrass country Democrats, the pro-Union Republican mountaineers, and the Dixiecrats in the state's southwest has allowed populist, racial moderates like Senators **Estes Kefauver** and **Albert Gore** to win elections and Republicans to support TVA; but today Tennessee is the number one success story of Nixon's "southern strategy." TVA is still protected by the state's two Republican Senators and eight Representatives (five Republicans) as they stack themselves on committees overseeing Public Works. But the

anti-war Gore and Representative **William Anderson** (the former Nautilus skipper who exposed the Con San tiger cages) have been canned; the former in favor of candy fortune heir, Republican racist **William Brock**, and the latter, for pro-Pentagon Republican **Robin Beard** who has Tennessee's only seat on the Armed Services Committee.

TVA and the Atomic Energy Commission's large Oak Ridge facility near Knoxville provide much of the federal money and jobs in the state. But Tennessee's large chemical industry makes it ripe for ammunition production, and in providing the Army with 7% of its ammunition needs during Vietnam, many areas of the state have become dependent on DoD generated jobs. (Only the allied apparel industry provides more manufacturing jobs than chemicals and synthetics, while textiles, foods, lumber products and fabricated metals are also significant employers.) Ammunition is by far the biggest category of defense procurement in the state, consuming over half its FY 1971 Pentagon contracts over \$10,000, and following the Vietnam influence from \$45,900,000 in FY 1965 to a high of \$316,000,000 in 1969, then down to \$172,000,000 in 1971. Significantly, much of this production takes place in small, rural cities. Two of the three government owned but privately operated Army Ammunition Plants (AAP) in Tennessee are located in such towns: one in Milan and another, the Holston AAP, in Kingsport. The third, Chattanooga's Volunteer AAP, a major TNT producer, is operated by **Atlas Chemical**; its employment has already dropped from 2500 to 1000 and will probably drop more as the Army's supplies are replenished.

On the other side of the state, employment at Milan's AAP plummeted from its 1968 peak of 7000 to a current work force of 3700. Considering the town's size (pop. 7313), the impacts of such cutbacks are devastating to the area's employment, and many underemployed farmers and blacks are now jobless. But the plant is still operating and its manager, the **Harvey Aluminum Co.**, (a **Martin Marietta** subsidiary—see Florida writeup), ranks first in the state in 1971 defense contracts. The largest industrial employer in Tennessee is **Eastman Kodak** with some 13,000 employees at its vest-pocket city, Kingsport (pop. 31,938). Most of these workers are involved in production of synthetic fibers and chemicals; however, 1900 of them operate the Holston AAP. Specializing in plastic explosives and propellants, the plant was employing 3000 people during Vietnam's peak; but Eastman has picked up employment at other Kingsport activities, so lay-offs are not as damaging

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as elsewhere. Nationally, Eastman's defense contracts have also fluctuated during the War years, but largely because of its Holston AAP operation, it has managed to rack up Pentagon sales of over a half billion dollars during FY 1966-71. It's now the 69th biggest contractor in the country, and it supplies over 40% of the military's photographic equipment and supplies which find use in such things as tactical aerial reconnaissance.

Only twenty miles from Kingsport is another ammunition producer—the **Raytheon Corporation** (number 14 nationally). Raytheon's Bristol plant makes various fuzes and bomb parts as well as the guidance systems for the well-used Sparrow missile, the primary armament on many U.S. and allied fighter planes. From FY 1969 to 1971, Raytheon's Tennessee contracts dropped by more than half while employment dipped from 1500 to 850. **Harvell-Kilgore's** ammunition plant in Toone, a small town (pop. 300) in west Tennessee's Hardeman County, is a severe example of a defense dependent economy. In 1969 the plant drew people from surrounding counties to get a work force of 700 to make illuminating cartridges, smoke cannisters, and various flares and target markers. When its contracts collapsed by 80%, employment fell to 175.

Other defense money comes into Tennessee that is perhaps less dramatic in effect. For example, the state's only military base lies just north of Memphis, the state's biggest city. Covering

3471 acres, the **Millington Naval Air Station** is the largest inland naval complex in the world; it has 11,300 military and 1000 civilian personnel, with the total receiving an annual payroll of \$60,000,000. There are also subcontractors (like Nashville's **Avco Corporation**, (builder of the C-5A's infamous wings) and divisions of defense firms that bring in DoD money from their out-of-state headquarters (like **Lockheed's** Chattanooga plant). But on the whole, the state's defense spending outlook follows the fate of the ammunition industry, and that trend is heading down.

Then there's the case of Tullahoma (pop. 15,311) in central Tennessee where the Army's **Arnold Engineering & Development Center (AEDC)** has its 40,000 acre reservation. For a whopping \$47 million, the **ARO Corporation** operates the AEDC's 38 test units which include wind tunnels, high altitude propulsion test centers, vacuum chambers, and ballistic ranges. Some of the Center's business is related to Vietnam, but continuing work on the F-15 and B-1, plus additional tests for NASA's space shuttle engines should lead to a high level of contracts for ARO and a continued flow of some \$10 million to other prime contractors in the area. Finally, there's the example of Clarksville (pop. 31,719). Although **Fort Campbell** (pers. 18,000) is across the border in Kentucky, Clarksville is the closest town and gets much of the "impacted" area benefits—including \$801,000 in federal funds to the school system and another \$1.6 million to businesses for supplies.

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
BELL HELICOPTER



Texas

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$5,182,928,000
 FY1972 \$5,119,839,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 8.4 Rank 12th
 DoD funds per capita: \$463 Rank 6th
 Income per capita: \$3531 Rank 31st
 Education Rank: 38th
 Health Rank: 28th
 Poverty Rank: 38th



With such firms as **LTV Aerospace**, **General Dynamics**, and **Textron's Bell Helicopter**, and with more than two dozen major military facilities, Texas hosts one of the largest military-industrial complexes in the nation—quite in keeping with its tradition of landgrabbing cowboys and reactionary oilmen. Thousands of Texas families live off the more than \$5,000,000,000 the Pentagon annually dumps in the state. Of course, Texas is huge (six times the size of Mississippi or Tennessee!), but even so, its per capita share of Pentagon funds ranks it second in the South and sixth in the nation. It ranks second in military population and third—behind California and New York—in value of prime contracts. The tenure of native son **Lyndon Johnson** in the Presidency coincided remarkably with the dramatic surge in DoD spending in the state. From 1964 to 1969, the years of LBJ's Vietnam buildup, DoD contracts to Texas industries shot up from \$1.2 billion to over \$4 billion, and defense-generated employment more than doubled

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	General Dynamics Ft. Worth	\$914,428,000	F-111 fighter aircraft
2	LTV Aerospace Dallas	501,385,000	A-7 attack plane, aircraft
3	Textron, Inc. Bell Helicopter Co. Ft. Worth	212,475,000	helicopters
4	Texas Instruments, Inc. Dallas & Austin, Texas	140,268,000	electronic & communications equipment
5	E-Systems, Inc. (LTV) Greenville, Texas	62,019,000	electronics equipment
6	Day & Zimmerman Texarkana	49,272,000	operation of Lone Star AAP
7	Mobil Oil Corp. Beaumont, Texas	41,624,000	petroleum products
8	Marathon Mfg. R.G. Letourneau, Inc. Longview, Texas	33,371,000	ammunition
9	Southern Airways Mineral, Texas	28,409,000	helicopter school
10	Collins Radio Co. Dallas & Richardson	27,031,000	electronics equipment

to over 200,000 jobs. Johnson was also instrumental in bringing the **Manned Space Center** to Houston and the hoard of NASA contractors (invariably the same as defense contractors) that feed off it; the city now gets more NASA money than the decaying Cape Kennedy.

With men like LBJ and **Sam Rayburn** as models, the Texas Congressional delegation is adept at gaining key positions from which to implement their pro-Pentagon sentiments. Senator **John Tower** now sits on the Armed Services Committee and the state's 24 Representatives share between themselves two slots on Appropriations, including the chairmanship, three on the NASA-controlling Science and Astronautics, including the chairmanship, three slots on Armed Services, two on Veterans' Affairs, and two on the Merchant Marine. These politicians know that while the state leads the country in cotton, livestock, and many other agri-products and minerals, its growth has come from the defense and aerospace industries—and, of

course, oil. In FY 1971, Texas industries provided the military with 32% of its aircraft, 8% of its ammunition, and 27% of its petroleum product needs.

The state's largest contractor in '71 (and number two in the nation) was the **General Dynamics Corporation** in Fort Worth, gobbling up over \$900,000,000, primarily for its work on the controversial F-111 fighter (they keep crashing!). Over 10,000 people are employed on the F-111 project, and production is expected to continue, especially if the Air Force's new B-1 bomber runs into stiff Congressional opposition. Another aircraft contractor, the **LTV Aerospace Corporation**, employed over 9,000 workers in its Dallas area plants on the A-7 light attack plane, the "workhorse tactical bomber in the later stages of the Vietnam War," according to the **Wall Street Journal**.

E-Systems, an LTV spin-off for production of electronics equipment, led in production of tactical radio equipment for the Army's reconnaissance and surveillance systems in FY 1971.

Next in aircraft comes Fort Worth's **Bell Helicopter Co.**, now the largest division of **Textron, Inc.**, a Rhode Island-based multinational conglomerate. Bell's helicopters have been the cornerstone of U.S. "combat effectiveness" in Vietnam: the Vietnamese call its well-armed AH-1G/J Huey-Cobra helicopter gunship, "The Muttering Death"; and U.S. pilots have called the UH-1 Iriquois, the Army's most versatile offensive weapon, "the Cadillac of helicopters." After they get damaged in Vietnam, the helicopters return to Amarillo for Bell's repair work—and more defense sales.

Second in importance for Texas contracting is the ammunition industry. The state boasts seven major producers in this field: **Texas Instruments, Day and Zimmerman** (operator of the Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant in Texarkana), **R. G. Letourneau, Inc.** (subsidiary of **Marathon Mfg. Co.** in Longview, Texas), **Intercontinental Mfg.** (in Garland), **Thiokol Chemical** (operator of the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant), **Alcoa** (aluminum powder explosives maker in Rockdale), and **American Mfg. Co.** in Fort Worth. All have been active ammunition producers for the Vietnam War. For example, Day and Zimmerman's Lone Star AAP produces 2.75" rockets, the most often used ammunition in the War. Letourneau makes parts and fin assemblies for 750-pound demolition bombs, and Intercontinental makes 500-pound bomb bodies. Significantly, these ammunition firms provide a prime source of employment for many Texas rural towns; several, for example, operate in the Texarkana area, home of **Wright Patman**, Chairman

Suddenly!
NIGHT'S COVER IS STRIPPED AWAY

And its enemy becomes nakedly exposed. Under the cover of darkness, he had been moving, quietly infiltrating, confident that night would provide its accustomed sanctuary. Now he is exposed, captured. The light is above. It doesn't go away. He looks. It's the light—shining down brightly, covering a small area. Unlike a flare which burns out in moments, this light is different. It doesn't go out. It remains, covering him. It matters where he goes. (Think about it.)

It's an airborne, battery-powered illumination system that actually turns night into day. Its name is AGIL, and it is becoming increasingly better known every day as a result of its application in Viet Nam, where it is effectively finding "Chick" off the shadows of night he employed too long. AGIL is a major breakthrough, exposing "Chick" which are possible, by accident.

From a distance of 12,000 feet altitude, AGIL casts a cone of light four times brighter than full moonlight over an area two miles in diameter. Illumination is continuous over one area as long as needed. Light intensity increases dramatically at lower altitudes while the illuminated area is only slightly decreased.

Conceived and developed by the Greenville Division of LTV ElectroSystems, AGIL (Airborne General Illumination Light Set) has been refined and produced under sponsorship of the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), under a contract with the Air Force Systems Command Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD). It is available for production in quantity and use anywhere in the world. LTV ElectroSystems, Inc. / P. O. Box 1096 / Greenville, Texas / A Subsidiary of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.

LTV ELECTROSYSTEMS, INC.
GREENVILLE DIVISION

of House Banking and Currency and the Joint Committee on Defense Production, and the inevitable post-war cutbacks will create serious unemployment problems in his, as well as other, districts.

The state's third major area of DoD procurement is petroleum products, used particularly to fuel the Air Force's massive fleet within Texas. Among the largest contractors were **Mobil Oil, Coastal States Petrochemical, Humble (Exxon)**, and **Chevron**. Finally, Texas is also the home of **Collins Radio** (now owned by **North American Rockwell**), a major radar and communication systems producer; **Brown and Root Construction Co.**, LBJ's friends and largest firm for Vietnam construction (including building the Con San "tiger cages"); and **Texas Instruments**, a high technology firm specializing in guidance systems for missiles, aircraft and bombs.

The other side of Texas' massive military-industrial complex is its gigantic military population of 235,000; nearly half of these are with the Air Force, making the state the leader in Air Force personnel. The twenty-nine major installations provide the major economic base for many cities, particularly those in rural areas. For example, Texarkana's **Red River Army Depot** (5242 pers.) is the area's biggest employer. Along the

Texas-Oklahoma border, the **Sheppard AFB** outside Wichita Falls (pop. 96,265) has over 17,000 personnel on the base. **Fort Hood's** 33,000 personnel dwarf the town of Killeen, and the ratio of base personnel to town population is roughly one to six for **Fort Wolters** at Mineral Wells, **Webb AFB** at Big Springs, and **Laughlin AFB** at Del Rio. In El Paso, **Fort Bliss** supports 18,400 breadwinners and occupies a land area bigger than the state of Rhode Island.

Then there's San Antonio, the nation's 15th largest metropolitan area. The site of the Alamo and now the home of many Mexican-Americans, the city has no less than five major bases: **Brooks, Kelly, Lackland, and Randolph Air Force Bases**, and the 5th Army Headquarters **Fort Sam Houston**. Half a billion dollars pour into the local economy annually in military payroll alone; and Kelly AFB's aircraft maintenance operation has the city's largest civilian work force with 22,500 workers. Residents of San Antonio can credit the thick

concentration of bases to former Representative **Paul Kilday**, a prominent Armed Services member who retired in 1961 with twenty-three years seniority. Central San Antonio is now represented by a liberal but moderately pro-Pentagon Mexican-American, **H. B. Gonzalez**, while the northern part lies within the district of **O. Clark Fisher**, the third ranking Democrat on Armed Services. Significantly, the two men got their districts over \$1 billion in Pentagon dough in 1970 but only \$1.4 million in HUD money. Considering one family in six in the San Antonio area exist below the poverty level, that contrast says it all.

Texas defense industries, some of the biggest profiteers from the Vietnam War, can look forward to a decline in contracts in the near future, particularly in aircraft and ammunition. (Aircraft employment has already dropped from 78,000 in 1969 to 47,000 in 1971.) The state's politicians and business elite will have to work hard to keep spending levels for industry and for the military bases up to their new appetite.

Virginia

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$3,369,936,000
FY1972 \$3,289,410,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 13.8 Rank 3rd


DoD funds per capita: \$725 Rank 3rd

Income per capita: \$3607 Rank 27th

Education Rank: 30th

Health Rank: 27th

Poverty Rank: 34th



TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Tenneco, Inc. Newport News Ship- building & Dry Dock Co. Newport News	\$911,939,000	Navy vessels, aircraft carriers
2	Hercules, Inc. Radford, Va.	78,737,000	operation of Radford AAP
3	I.B.M. Arlington	12,993,000	electronics equipment
4	Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Company Norfolk	10,968,000	ship services
5	R.C.A. Corporation Arlington	10,906,000	electronics equipment
6	Institute for Defense Analysis (I.D.A.) Arlington	10,594,000	research services
7	Computer Sciences Corp. Arlington	10,036,000	research services
8	Radiation Systems, Inc. McLean	9,290,000	research services
9	Sperry Rand Corporation Charlottesville	9,143,000	ship services
10	Center for Naval Analysis Arlington	8,204,000	research services


Virginia's tradition of gentlemen soldiers stretches back to the choice of George Washington as general of the Revolutionary Army, a choice calculated to get the southern colonies involved in the fight against Britain. For similar reasons, Lincoln tried to get Virginia's Robert E. Lee to head the North's troops. Today, the state's countryside is sprinkled with battlefield markers and graveyards from these and other wars. Virginia is now more than ever the heartland of American militarism, blending conservative politics, defense businesses, military installations and heavy Congressional representation on key defense-related committees. The tobacco, textile, synthetics and farming operations in the lower and western parts of the state are overwhelmed by the money DoD pours into the state. Virginia ranks just behind Hawaii and Alaska in ratio of Pentagon dollars to people with \$725. An estimated 15-25% of the state's breadwinners are directly supported by the defense dole; and Virginia ranks among the top four states in total DoD funds received, civilian payroll, military and retired military payrolls, and dollar value of prime contracts. With only 2.3% of the nation's people, Virginians get 7.2% of the whole federal government's payroll.

The fastest growing areas of the state are the Norfolk-Newport News region and the Alexandria-Washington suburbs. With 42% of Virginia's people the virtual dependence on the defense dollar in these areas tilts the perspective of the whole state toward military matters. Thus, both U.S. Senators (**Harry F. Byrd, Jr.** of the Byrd machine and Republican newcomer **William Lloyd Scott**) sit on the Armed Services Committee and three of the ten Representatives provide further protection on the House counterpart. One of these men, Republican freshman **R. W. Daniels, Jr.** looks out for the city of Petersburg, south of Richmond, where the **Fort Lee Army and Air Base** are located with their 12,500 personnel. Another, conservative Republican **G. W. Whitehurst** represents the largest naval complex in the world on the Norfolk-Portsmouth coast. The twelve installations in the area provide employment for 34,300 civilians and 21,700 military personnel.

But there's more in the Tidewater area. Jammed into the Norfolk port are five of Virginia's six largest cities: Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Newport News, Hampton, and Portsmouth, in descending order (total pop. 850,000). In addition to Norfolk-Portsmouth, the other three cities contain eight more military installations that support 8200 civilians and 22,500 troops—including the Army's

Continental Command, the Army's **Transportation Center**, and **Langley AFB**, headquarters for the Tactical Air Command. When the Navy throws in its reservist and retired officers, it claims a total area payroll of more than a half billion dollars for 129,000 people. It's a wonder the whole area doesn't sink. And we haven't even mentioned the area's private contractors.

The Norfolk Shipbuilding Company gets several million for its Pentagon work, but it plays second fiddle to the huge **Newport News and Drydock Company** across the bay. The largest industrial employer in the state (27,000 workers), Newport News is the chief factor making shipbuilding the biggest item Virginia supplies the military, consuming 70% of the prime contracts over \$10,000. In 1968 the company merged into **Tenneco, Inc.**, a giant conglomerate that boasts being the nation's largest natural gas pipeline company. It can now boast running the largest privately owned shipyard in the world. For its principal customer, the U.S. government, Newport News is building two nuclear-powered, billion-dollar-each, aircraft carriers; five nuclear-powered guided missile frigates; and seven nuclear-powered attack submarines (two are named the **L. Mendel Rivers** and the **Richard B. Russell** (see S.C. and GA. writeup). The cost overrun on the two CVAN-70 carriers was spotlighted recently on an NBC special concerning military spending in the 1970's.



The Newport News Co. is also gearing up its government subsidized commercial shipbuilding, primarily in construction of liquid natural gas (LNG) tankers that will haul foreign fuel to American consumers; remembering Tenneco's natural gas interests, this may be just another form of an overrun—using public money for private gain. But Newport News/Tenneco has a strong ally in their district's Representative, **Thomas Downing**, a helpful member of the helpful Merchant Marine Committee. Downing's position on the Science and Astronautics Committee also helps keep the dough flowing to NASA's nearby **Langley Research Center**.

Washington's Virginia suburbs are also leaning heavily on the federal dole. Many of the 140,000 civilian and military Defense Department employees

in the metropolitan area live in Virginia; after all, the Pentagon building and **Fort Meyer** are in Arlington, and **Fort Belvoir** (the 26,000 man Army Engineers headquarters) and **Cameron Army Station** are in Alexandria. The area is represented in Congress by law and order, anti-welfare Republican **Joel Broyhill**. It's also the base for another element of Virginia's war economy: the think tanks. Chief among these are the **Institute for Defense Analysis** (IDA) in Arlington, the **Research Analysis Corporation** in McLean, the **Center for Naval Analysis** and the **Mitre Corporation**. IDA started in 1965 as a non-profit corporation to coordinate research for the military, particularly among university professors; it became a logical target for anti-war protest on many campuses. Among the studies Research Analysis Corp. has done for the Army are "impact of dissident elements and minority groups within the Army on enforcement of discipline," "counterinsurgency

costing" and "probable Communist tactics for takeover of developing countries: post-Vietnam through 1985."


But ammunition rather than research follows shipbuilding as the second largest procurement category for Virginia, and this business is concentrated at the **Radford Army Ammunition Plant** in the western region of the state. The government-owned plant is operated by **Hercules, Inc.** and accounts for over 3.5% of the explosives and propellant needs of the military. Employment is now stabilizing at 4000, down from the 9200 employed at the peak of Vietnam.

Overall, the state's dependency on the military is so vast that cutbacks could throw it into chaos. Given the power and persuasion of its Congressional leaders, the prospect for converting the Virginia war machine seems to imply a total restructuring of its political economy—and the nation's.

West Virginia

Total DoD funds: FY1971 \$86,832,000
FY1972 \$98,987,000

Defense Dependency Ratio: 1.5 Rank 47th
DoD funds per capita: \$50 Rank 49th
Income per capita: \$3021 Rank 45th
Education Rank: 40th
Health Rank: 33rd
Poverty Rank: 42nd



TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (FY71)

Rank	Contractor	DoD Amount	Product
1	Occidental Petroleum Island Creek Coal Co. Coal Mt. & Scarlet Glen	\$7,933,000	fuel products
2	Arundel Corp. & L. E. Dixon Co. New Martinsville	7,450,000	construction
3	Wollensak, Inc. Polan Industries Huntington	6,026,000	electronics & ordnance equipment
4	U.S. Aerospace Agency Pinto, W. Va.	5,966,000	missiles & space systems R&D
5	FMC Corporation South Charleston	5,655,000	combat vehicles
6	Rubber Fabricators, Inc. Grantsville, W. Va.	3,027,000	ship supplies
7	Hercules, Inc. Rocket Center, W. Va.	2,956,000	missiles R&D
8	United Aircraft Corp. Bridgeport	2,932,000	aircraft engines
9	Pittston Coal Company Meriden, W. Va.	2,006,000	fuel products
10	Boone County Coal Monclo, W. Va.	1,233,000	fuel products

West Virginia is one of the lowest ranking defense recipients in the nation—third from the bottom. It is the country's leading supplier of bituminous coal with about 25% of the U.S. total and recoverable reserves estimated at sixty billion tons. Because of its coal and other mineral deposits, the state is also a major producer of chemicals, steel and glass. Like the coal fields, these three industries are well organized, and give the state a large and more politically powerful union labor force than any other southern state.

Throughout its history, W.Va. has been the scene of many United Mine Workers victories—and massacres—as well as the scene of struggles of other labor unions; for example, the general railway strike of 1877 began in Martinsburg, where federal troops were eventually used to force people back to work. More recent battles over the UMW's leadership, which triggered Jock Yablonski's murder, have occurred on West Virginia turf. In 1972, Arnold Miller, the 49 year old disabled miner and Miners for Democracy candidate for the UMW presidency, defeated the corrupt Tony Boyle regime in a hard fought campaign.

In the late 1960's, the state was a prime recipient of federal anti-poverty funds, including money for highways, schools and hospitals. Despite the federal aid and the myriad community action projects spread throughout the mountains, West Virginia still has a large outmigration—even from the cities. Per farm income is still by far the nation's lowest and, as the least urbanized among them, it is the only southern state that lost population during the 1960's.

West Virginia doesn't like the label "southern," since it joined the Union in 1863 after splitting with Virginia over slavery. But the state certainly has its share of reactionary politicians as Senate majority whip **Robert C. Byrd** exemplifies. Byrd is a former member of the Ku Klux Klan and now sits among the pro-Pentagon huddle on the Armed Services Committee. Then there's Representative **Harley Staggers** who, as chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, sought to cite CBS' Frank Stanton with contempt for not releasing the edited-out portions of the controversial documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon." Senator **Jennings Randolph**, a Veterans' Affairs member, chairs the Public Works Committee, prime source of the non-Pentagon pork barrel, and in that capacity he carefully attends to the interests of the coal industry. The tradition of patronage and corruption is strong in the state, with golden boy **Jay Rockefeller**, current Secretary of State for W.Va., and Representative **Ken Hechler**, former

professor and now number two man on Science and Astronautics, considered the only major exceptions in the liberal camp.

Not surprisingly, coal is West Virginia's biggest business with the DoD as it supplies the military with one third its non-petroleum fuel. In FY 1971, twenty-three coal companies received prime contracts over \$10,000 for a total of \$14,000,000. **Island Creek Coal** got the lion's share with \$8,000,000. Ironically, Island Creek is a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum whose new board chairman is **Albert Gore**, the former anti-war, populist Senator from Tennessee (see TN writeup). With no military bases in the state and few prime contractors, West Virginia is one of the few states that actually lost DoD funds during the Vietnam escalation. Contracting fell by 40% from FY 1969 to 1971, due largely to the phase out of the **FMC Corporation's** plant in south Charleston.

FMC is a diversified company producing chemicals, power transmissions equipment, synthetics, and military products. The South Charleston plant of FMC manufactured the M113 series of tracked combat vehicles, the backbone of the Army's mechanized armor units. In Vietnam, the M113 was used in the forefront of the fighting as a "light tank" and armored troop carrier. Since 1968, FMC has been consolidating its operations on the West Coast; today, its South Charleston plant is empty, and the final 300 workers have had to find jobs elsewhere. The company offered the facilities free for one year to any corporation that would move into the area, but as of yet, there are no takers. Another defense contractor leaving West Virginia is **Wollensak, Inc.** The company's **Polan Industries** division was the state's third largest contractor in FY 1971, producing electronic and weaponry equipment at its Huntington plant. For various reasons, not all connected with decreasing Pentagon contracts, the company has since folded, and its 200 workers put out of work.

On the upswing, however, is the contract award for missiles and space systems; Pentagon sales in this category went up from \$3,000,000 in FY 1970 to \$13,000,000 in FY 1972. Center for this business is in tiny Pinto, West Virginia, just across the Potomac River from Maryland. Here, **Hercules, Inc.** employs 700 people to operate its Rocket Center for testing and development of missiles, especially the Navy's Poseidon ICBM's. The **U.S. Aerospace Agency** and **Martin-Marietta** also operate with Hercules out of the Rocket Center facilities. For a state with as pro-Pentagon a leadership as West Virginia, they should do okay in DoD contracts—if they can keep their contractors from leaving.

CHARTS

DOD RESEARCH GRANTS IN THE SOUTH TO EDUCATIONAL AND NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS

(Over \$10,000, July 1971 - June 1972)

ALABAMA

A & M College	Normal	\$ 30,000
Alabama Association of Regional Planning	Decatur	35,000
University of Alabama	Birmingham	110,000
	Huntsville	458,000
	Normal	15,000
	University	57,000
Athens College	Athens	16,000
Auburn Research Foundation	Auburn	54,000
Auburn University	Auburn	530,000
Mitre Corporation	Huntsville	472,000
Southern Research Institute	Birmingham	1,322,000
Stanford Research Institute	Huntsville	3,794,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$6,893,000</i>

FLORIDA

Atlantic University	Boca Raton	25,000
Florida Institute of Technology	Melbourne	52,000
Florida State University	Tallahassee	477,000
University of Florida	Gainesville	1,699,000
	Orlando	30,000
	Tampa	20,000
Marineland Research Lab	St. Augustine	45,000
University of Miami	Coral Gables	914,000
	Miami	1,715,000
Mote Marine Laboratory	Sarasota	15,000
Mt. Sinai Hospital	Miami Beach	45,000
Nova University of Advanced Technology	Ft. Lauderdale	340,000
Palisades Geophysical Institute	Miami	98,000
University of South Florida	St. Petersburg	53,000
	Tampa	13,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$5,541,000</i>

GEORGIA

Emory University	Atlanta	50,000
Georgia Institute of Tech- nology	Atlanta	1,146,000
Georgia State University	Atlanta	27,000
Georgia Tech Research Institute	Atlanta	1,152,000
University of Georgia	Athens	146,000
Medical College of Georgia	Augusta	10,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$2,531,000</i>

KENTUCKY

University of Kentucky	Lexington	151,000
University of Louisville	Louisville	123,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 274,000</i>

LOUISIANA

Louisiana State University	Baton Rouge	662,000
	New Orleans	25,000
Southern University A & M	Baton Rouge	33,000
Tulane University	New Orleans	178,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 898,000</i>

MISSISSIPPI

Mississippi State University	State College	42,000
University of Mississippi	Jackson University	23,000 143,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 208,000</i>

NORTH CAROLINA

Batelle Memorial Institute	Durham	157,000
Duke University	Durham	1,874,000
LeHigh University	Beaufort	20,000
North Carolina State University	Raleigh	167,000
University of North Carolina	Chapel Hill	269,000
	Wilmington	67,000
Research Triangle Institute	Triangle Park	536,000
Wake Forest University	Winston Salem	40,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$3,130,000</i>

SOUTH CAROLINA

Clemson University	Clemson	190,000
Medical College of South Carolina	Charleston	99,000
University of South Carolina	Columbia	106,000
	<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 395,000</i>

TENNESSEE

Memphis State University	Memphis	79,000
Tennessee Polytechnic Institute	Cookeville	46,000
University of Tennessee	Knoxville	465,000
	Memphis	97,000
	Tullahoma	125,000
Vanderbilt University	Nashville	41,000
	TOTAL	\$ 853,000

TEXAS

Baylor University	Houston	107,000
Bishop College	Dallas	27,000
Harvard University	Ft. Davis	62,000
Methodist Hospital	Houston	93,000
University of Houston	Houston	136,000
Institute for Storm Research	Houston	44,000
Mitre Corporation	Houston	15,000
Rice University	Houston	376,000
Southern Methodist University	Dallas	497,000
Southwest Foundation for Research	San Antonio	85,000
Southwest Research Institute	River Oaks	95,000
	San Antonio	5,485,000
Texas A & M Research Foundation	College Station	1,190,000
Texas A & M University	College Station	140,000
Texas Christian University	Fort Worth	54,000
Texas Institute for Rehabilitation and Research	Houston	61,000
Texas Tech College	Lubbock	120,000
University of Texas	Austin	4,938,000
	Brooks AF Base	82,000
	Dallas	123,000
	El Paso	215,000
	Galveston	97,000
	Houston	16,000
	Richardson	40,000
	San Antonio	62,000
	TOTAL	\$14,170,000

VIRGINIA

Analytical Services Inc.	Falls Church	1,868,000
Historical Evaluation and Research	Dunn Loring	115,000
Human Factors Research Inc.	Alexandria	15,000
Human Resources Research Organization	Alexandria	3,998,000
Institute for Defense Analysis	Arlington	9,852,000
Medical College of Virginia	Richmond	23,000

Military Operations

Research Soc.	Alexandria	39,000
Mitre Corporation	McLean	19,589,000
Old Dominion College	Norfolk	57,000
Research Analysis Corp.	McLean	7,988,000
University of Rochester	Arlington	9,310,000
Stanford Research Institute	Arlington	68,000
Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences	Gloucester Point	66,000
Virginia Institute of Scientific Research	Richmond	61,000
Virginia Military Institute	Lexington	49,000
Virginia Polytechnic Institute	Blacksburg	265,000
University of Virginia	Charlottesville	547,000
	TOTAL	\$53,910,000

WEST VIRGINIA

West Virginia University	Morgantown	74,000
	TOTAL	\$ 74,000



TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE SOUTHERN STATES

(FY 1971, in Thousands of Dollars)

Southern States	Total Defense Spending (Pay Roll & Contracts)	No. of Military Persons	No. of Civilian DoD Employees	Defense* Dependency Ratio	Total DoD Payroll	Total DoD Prime Contracts	DoD Spending Per Capita in State (in \$)
Alabama	\$ 893,813	32,546	28,214	6.8%	\$ 448,358	\$ 364,218	\$295.51
Arkansas	\$ 255,940	9,442	4,704	2.8%	\$ 114,037	\$ 98,328	\$133.07
Florida	\$1,987,280	77,683	33,327	6.8%	\$ 785,329	\$ 927,697	\$292.70
Georgia	\$1,846,662	106,403	45,442	9.6%	\$ 863,216	\$ 846,488	\$402.36
Kentucky	\$ 623,714	63,296	17,993	6.8%	\$ 449,676	\$ 125,357	\$193.77
Louisiana	\$ 701,742	41,532	8,317	4.1%	\$ 306,449	\$ 332,408	\$192.71
Mississippi	\$ 773,392	22,584	7,838	7.2%	\$ 219,005	\$ 513,794	\$348.86
North Carolina	\$1,265,403	105,713	14,523	6.7%	\$ 702,318	\$ 475,210	\$248.99
South Carolina	\$ 780,876	67,305	20,166	8.9%	\$ 545,602	\$ 171,147	\$301.43
Tennessee	\$ 588,871	20,407	7,732	3.9%	\$ 155,448	\$ 358,500	\$150.08
Texas	\$5,182,928	183,278	79,466	8.4%	\$1,835,920	\$2,963,840	\$462.89
Virginia	\$3,369,936	102,141	102,504	13.8%	\$1,682,527	\$1,490,126	\$724.95
West Virginia	\$ 86,832	490	1,177	1.4%	\$ 17,514	\$ 49,246	\$ 49.78

* Defense dependency ratio equals employment generated through defense contracting plus military personnel divided by the state's total work force for 1968.

" Our company was chartered March 4, 1962 as a North Carolina Corporation with capital stock of \$9,000. We started operation with 20 sewing machines and twenty five employees, fully on the strength of government contract work. We have maintained a steady growth over the past ten years and at the present time operate 265 sewing machines and 60 knitting machines.

Over the past ten years 95% of our production has been in tee shirts for the four branches of the military services

We are in complete agreement with you that the Federal Government will be forced to spend a big amount of money in this country in order to get the economy at a good level. It is a matter of whether the Government chooses to hand this money out through Welfare Programs or to spend it through a Defense Budget in order to maintain a strong country. Certainly, it would be far more advantageous to spend the money through a military budget which would benefit us on a world-wide basis with the strongest military plus the fact that this would provide jobs which would reduce the amount of free loaders that this country would have should the economy sag."

- President, North Carolina Textile Firm

TOP TWENTY FIVE DEFENSE CONTRACTORS FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES (FY 1971)

Rank in the South	Total DoD Contracts in the South	Product	National Rank	% of DoD Contracts in South
1. GENERAL DYNAMICS				
Fort Worth, Texas	\$915,114,000	F-111 aircraft	2	63%
Orlando, Florida	3,348,000			
Cocoa Beach, Florida	2,748,000			
Stromberg-Carlson				
Camden, Arkansas	1,367,000	electronics equipment		
Stromberg-Datagraphix				
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama	33,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$922,610,000</i>			
2. TENNECO, INC				
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock				
Newport News, Virginia	\$911,939,000	aircraft carriers & submarines	6	99%
Tenneco Oil Co.	3,202,000			
Chalmette, Louisiana		petroleum		
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$915,141,000</i>			
3. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT				
Lockheed-Georgia				
Marietta, Georgia	\$555,303,000	C-5A aircraft	1	37%
Chattanooga, Tennessee				
Lake Charles, Louisiana	1,340,000			
Cocoa Beach, Florida	608,000			
Charleston Heights, South Carolina	13,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$557,261,000</i>			
4. LTV AEROSPACE CORP.				
Dallas, Texas				
Eglin AFB, Florida	\$501,385,000	A-7 attack aircraft	10	70%
Grand Prairie, Texas	199,000			
	3,450,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$505,034,000</i>			
5. LITTON INDUSTRIES				
Ingalls Shipbuilding				
Pascagoula, Mississippi	\$402,326,000	destroyers	11	78%
Ft. Benning, Georgia	143,000			
Stuart, Florida	36,000			
Blacksburg, South Carolina	127,000			
Norfolk, Virginia	25,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$402,657,000</i>			
6. AMERICAN TEL & TEL				
Western Electric				
Burlington, North Carolina	\$110,426,000	Safeguard ABM program	3	27%
Greensboro, North Carolina	89,388,000			
Winston-Salem, North Carolina	13,524,000			
Orlando, Florida	\$102,776,000			
Huntsville, Alabama	6,500,000			
Southern Bell Tel & Tel				
Atlanta, Georgia	2,727,000	telephone service		
South Central Bell				
Birmingham, Alabama	32,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$325,371,000</i>			

Rank in the South	Total DoD Contracts in the South	Product	National Rank	% of DoD Contracts in South
7. TEXTRON, INC.				
Bell Helicopter		AH-1 Huey Cobra & UH-1 Iroquois Helicopters	18	66%
Ft. Worth, Texas	\$195,721,000			
Amarillo, Texas	16,754,000			
Tampa, Florida	70,000			
Eglin AFB, Florida	26,000			
Bell Aerospace		Surface Effects Ships (SES)		
New Orleans, Louisiana	1,000,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$213,571,000</i>			
8. TEXAS INSTRUMENTS				
Dallas, Texas	\$130,955,000	A-7 radar electronics & communications equipment	35	99%
Austin, Texas	8,583,000			
Houston, Texas	564,000			
Corpus Christi, Texas	35,000			
Safford, Texas	91,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$140,228,000</i>			
9. UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP.				
West Palm Beach, Florida	\$124,001,000	research & development on engine for the Air Force F-15	8	17%
Cape Kennedy, Florida	590,000			
Bridgeport, West Virginia	2,932,000			
Corpus Christi, Texas	142,000			
Norfolk, Virginia	53,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$127,738,000</i>			
10. MARTIN MARIETTA CORP.				
Orlando, Florida	\$ 57,744,000	SAM-D missile Sprint ABM for the Safeguard program	26	63%
Pensacola, Florida	1,019,000			
Ocala, Florida	6,750,000			
Eglin AFB, Florida	194,000			
Cleveland, Florida	64,000			
Milan, Tennessee	51,074,000	Ammunition Aluminum products		
Lewisport, Kentucky	1,080,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$117,925,000</i>			
11. HERCULES, INC.				
Radford, Virginia	\$ 78,737,000	Ammunition chemical products	40	70%
Rocket Center, West Virginia	2,956,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 81,693,000</i>			
12. PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS				
Cocoa Beach, Florida	\$ 81,536,000	operation of Eastern Test Range	39	65%
13. E-SYSTEMS (LTV)				
Greenville, Texas	\$ 62,019,000	electronics & aircraft over- haul	10	10%
Greenville, South Carolina	10,261,000			
Falls Church, Virginia	4,436,000			
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia	76,000			
McLean, Virginia	31,000			
Arlington, Virginia	19,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 76,842,000</i>			

Rank in the South	Total DoD Contracts in the South	Product	National Rank	% of DoD Contracts in South
14. EXXON, INC.				
Humble Oil & Refining Co.				
Houston, Texas	\$ 5,337,000	petroleum products	27	34%
Baytown, Texas	8,136,000			
San Antonio, Texas	1,951,000			
Baton Rouge, Louisiana	48,441,000			
Chalmette, Louisiana	40,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 63,905,000</i>			
15. HONEYWELL, INC.				
St. Petersburg, Florida				
Tampa, Florida	\$ 44,484,000	electronics communications & ordnance	22	27%
<i>Other southern cities</i>	15,683,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 64,255,000</i>			
16. SPERRY RAND CORP.				
Shreveport, Louisiana				
Charlottesville, Virginia	\$ 32,154,000	electronics equipment ammunition	16	18%
Doyline, Louisiana	6,788,000			
Jackson, Mississippi	13,006,000			
<i>Other southern cities</i>	3,364,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 66,287,000</i>			
17. CONDEC, INC.				
Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp.				
Charlotte, North Carolina	\$ 58,715,000	military transport vehicles	53	72%
18. CITY INVESTING CORP.				
Hayes International				
Birmingham, Alabama	\$ 49,911,000	aircraft repair ammunition & services	68	89%
Dothan, Alabama	7,783,000			
Leeds, Alabama	403,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 58,097,000</i>			
19. DAY & ZIMMERMAN				
Texarkana, Texas	\$ 49,272,000	ammunition	56	62%
20. SVEDRUP, PARCEL & ASSOCIATES, INC.				
ARO Corporation				
Tullahoma, Tennessee	\$ 46,900,000	operation of Arnold Engineering Development Center	77	97%
21. MOBIL OIL COMPANY				
Beaumont, Texas	\$ 41,624,000	petroleum products	55	52%
22. EASTMAN KODAK				
Holston Defense Corporation				
Kingsport, Tennessee	\$ 38,787,000	ammunition	69	61%
23. THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORP.				
Marshall, Texas				
Woodbine, Georgia	\$ 23,900,000	ammunition tear gas	43	34%
Huntsville, Alabama	8,212,000			
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 35,320,000</i>			
24. MARATHON MANUFACTURING				
R. G. Letourneau				
Longview, Texas	\$ 33,371,000	750 lb. bomb casings	92	97%
25. AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL INC.				
Miami, Florida				
Midway, Florida	\$ 32,244,000	shipping freight & cargo	98	99%
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>\$ 32,563,000</i>			

Resources

For further reading and research on militarism, see the following works, and consult their bibliographies for more extensive references:

Richard Barnett. **The Economy of Death.** New York: Atheneum, 1969.

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Charles Schultze, et al. **Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget.** Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1972.

Ralph Stavins, et al. **Washington Plans an Aggressive War.** New York: Vintage Books, 1971.

William Appleman Williams. **The Roots of the Modern American Empire.** New York: Vintage Books, 1969.



For "how to do research" guides and other resource materials, write to the following groups and ask to subscribe to their publications:

North American Congress on Latin America: NACLA, Box 57, Cathedral Station, N.Y., N.Y. 10025. Publishes NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report and other materials on U.S. operations in Latin American and the Third World. Of tremendous value is their **NACLA Research Methodology Guide** which has sections on researching each facet of the U.S. ruling elite, including the military.

National Action/Research on

the Military-Industrial Complex: NARMIC, 112 South 16th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102. Publishes studies and handbooks on anti-personnel weapons and defense contractors, and assists local anti-war organizing. They prepared a useful guide called "How to Research Your Local War Industry" and their slide show, "The Automated Air War" is an excellent organizing resource.


Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars: CCAS, 9 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Cal. 94104. Publishes the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars and other studies of U.S. policy in Asia, including the book on American policy in Indochina, entitled **Cambodia: The Widening War.**

Center for Defense Information: CDI, 201 Massachusetts Avenue N.E., Room 316, Washington, D.C. 20002. Publishes a newsletter and studies regarding Defense Department policy and new weapons systems.


A Citizens' Organization for a Sane World: SANE, 318 Massachusetts Avenue N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. Publishes the **Sane World** newsletter. Has an extensive program for demilitarizing American society including national legislative lobbying, a comprehensive list of anti-military publications, and a campaign for community organizing around peace issues.

Corporate Information Center: CIC, National Council of Churches, Room 846, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027. Publishes **The Corporate Examiner** monthly and "Center Brief," profiles of various corporations' involvement in Southern Africa and in military production (Honeywell, IT&T, Sperry Rand, Control Data, IBM, Union Carbide, etc.). Also **Corporate Responsibility & Religious Institutions and Church Investments, Technological and the Military Industrial Complex.** Has extensive corporate files.

Council on Economic Priorities: CEP, 456 Greenwich Street, New York, N.Y. 10013. Publishes the quarterly **Economic Priorities Report** on various corporate issues.



Vol. I, No. 1. THE MILITARY & THE SOUTH. Julian Bond and Leah Wise on "Our Culture of Violence," New Orleans draft resister Walter Collins speaks from prison, an Atlanta Lockheed employee blows the whistle on the C-5A, Robert Sherrill talks with William Proxmire and Les Aspin, Derek Shearer on "Converting the War Machine." Plus a 40-page analysis of what defense spending means to the South. **\$2.50**




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
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Vol. II, No. 4. FOCUS ON THE MEDIA. Ronnie Dugger and the *Texas Observer*, the St. Petersburg *Times* reporting for the consumer, the early black press, Alabama's exclusively-white educational TV network, a woman reporter takes on *Atlanta* magazine, and alternative media projects throughout the region. Interviews with Robert Coles, Minnie Pearl, and Alabamian Cliff Durr, an early FCC commissioner. Plus detailed charts on who owns the media. **\$2.50**

